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CAMPBELL, BXSSELL & KIRBY PLLC 
7 South Howard Street, Suite 41 6 
Spokane, WA 99201 
Tel: (509) 455-7100 
Fax: (509) 455-7 1 11 
Anorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor 
IN THE DISTRICT COURI OF THE SECOND JmICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, m AND FOR ' rm  COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
=ED 5. TAYLOR, an individual; 
Plaintiff, 
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN 
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V. 
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A. 
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TR-OXELL 
ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X, 
unknown individuals ; 
Case No.: esi 0 P- & t+ C V u i j  - 0 1 7 * 2 J  
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 
JURY T N A L  DEMANDED 
Category: A. 1. 
Fee: $88.00 
Defendants. I 
- --- 
Reed J. Taylor, by and through his attorneys of record, CAMPBELL, BISSELL & 
KIRBY, PLLC, alleges as follows (all applicable facts alleged below are incorporated by 
reference into each cause of action as necessary to support each such cause of action): 
I. PARTIES 
I .  Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor is a resident of Lewiston, Nez Perce County, 
Idaho. Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor is an elderly personas defined in I.C. 5 48-608. 
2. Defendant Hawley Troxell Emis 6L Hawley LLP (""Hawley Troxell") is an 
Idaho limited liability partnership in the business of practicing law. Hawley Troxell is 
vicariously liable for the acts of the individual Defendants. 
3. Defendant Gary D. Babbitt is an individual residing in the state of Idaho 
and is an attorney practicing law in the state of Idaho with and for Hawley Troxell. 
4. Defendant D. John Ashby is an individual residing in the state of Idaho 
and is an attorney practicing law in the state of Idaho with and for Hawley Troxell. 
5. Defendant Patrick V. Collins is an individual residing in the state of Idaho 
and is an attorney practicing law in the state of Idaho with and for Hawley Troxell. 
6 .  Defendant Richard A. Riley is an individual residing in the state of Idaho 
and is an attorney in the state of Idaho with and for Hawley Troxell. 
7 Jane Does I-X are unknown individuals who are and/or were attorneys that 
participated in the tortious acts and conduct alleged against the above known defendants 
with and for Hawley Troxell. 
11. SURISDICTION, VENUE AND CLAIMS 
8. The Defendants transacted business through the practice of law in Nez 
Perce County, Idaho, and have an expectation of being named as defendants in Nez Perce 
County, Idaho. The Defendants committed tortious acts and/or assisted in the 
commission of tortious acts in Nez Perce County, Idaho. The Defendants' tortious acts 
and/or assistance have inflicted damages upon a resident of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
9. Damages in this action exceed $10,000. Jurisdiction and venue are, 
therefore, appropriate in Nez Perce County District Court. 
i 
+. 
COMPLAINT - 2 
10. PIaintiE Reed J. Taylor's Complaint is not a derivative action. Plaintiff 
Reed J. Taylor is the pledgee of all of the shares of AIA Insurance, Inc., the only 
shareholder of AIA Insurance, Inc. by way of holding all of its shares as collateral, and 
the largest creditor of AIA Services Corporation (Reed J. Taylor is owed over $8,500,000 
and AIA Services Corporation is insolvent). AIA Services Corporation and AIA 
Insurance, Inc.3 value and net assets are insuEcient to pay the over $8,500,000, plus 
interest and attorneys' fees and costs, owed to Reed J. Taylor. Therefore, Plaintiff Reed 
J. Taylor is entitled to bring certain claims directly against the Defendants for certain 
damages. 
121. FACTS 
11. At all material times, Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor was owed over $6,000,000 
by AIA Services Corporation through a promissory note dated August 1, 1995. Plaintiff 
Reed J. Taylor is presently owed over $8,500,000 by AIA Services Corporation. At all 
material times, the Defendants had full knowledge of AIA Services Corporation's debt 
and contractual obligations owed to Reed J. Taylor. 
12. AIA Services Corporation was in default of the $6,000,000 promissory 
note when it failed to pay the note when it matured on August 1, 2005. Although 
unnecessary since the $6,000,000 promissory note matured on August 1, 2005, demand 
for payment was properly served upon AIA Services Corporation by Plaintiff Reed J. 
Taylor on December 12, 2006, a copy of which was also provided to Defendant Richard 
A. Riley pursuant to the notice provisions of the agreements. AIA Services Corporation 
was insolverlt in 2001, and has continued to be insolvent from said date. 
COMPLAINT - 3 
13. Since 1996, as security for the over $8,500,000 owed by AIA Sewices 
Corporation, Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor was g rmed  and possessed a security interest in all 
of the stock of AIA Insurance, Inc. and all of the commissions and related receivables of 
AIA Insurance, Inc. and AIA Services Corporation. Pursumt to the Amended and 
Restated Stock Pledge Agreement dated July 1, 1996, Plaintiff Reed 5. Taylor had the 
contractual right upon default of AIA Sewices Corporation to vote the stock of AIA 
Insurance, Inc., and take operational control of AIA Insurance, Inc. Plaintiff Reed J. 
Taylor's right to vote the stock of AIA Insurance was also perfected through AIA 
Services Corporation's inevocable power of attorney granted to Reed J. Taylor that was 
coupled with an interest as required by 1.C $ 30-1-722. 
14. On February 22, 2007, Reed J. Taylor voted the stock of AIA Insurance, 
Inc. and attempted to take control of it pursuant to his contractual rights as provided 
under the law, the contract documents, and I.C. $ 30-1-722. However, the interested 
directors of AIA Insurance, Inc. (including R. John Taylor) by and through the 
Defendants intentionally assisted in breaching the terms of the Amended and Restated 
Stock Pledge Agreement and refused to acknowledge Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's valid vote 
of the stock of AIA Insurance, Inc. and refused to surrender control as required. The 
Defendants further engaged in inappropriate conduct in assisting interested parties 
(including R. John Taylor) in obtaining and/or maintaining a restraining order and 
preliminary injunction against Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor, when the Defendants knew there 
was no legitimate legal basis to do so, that doing so was an intentional violation and 
tortious interference with Reed J. Taylor's contractual rights, and that the assets and 
funds of AIA Insurance, Inc. were being misappropriated and/or not safeguarded. 
COMPLAINT - 4 
15. Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor has a pending civil action against A1A Services 
Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., R. John Taylor, and 
others for claims of fraud, fraudulent conveyance, civil conspiracy, conversion, breaches 
of fiduciary duties and other claims under Nez Perce County Case No. CV-07-00208 
('Taylor v. A U  Services Corporation, el al."'), and therein Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor 
obtained dn order of partial summary judgment for AIA Services Corporation's default of 
the $6,000,000 promissory note and corresponding default of the Amended and Restated 
Stock Pledge Agreement. By way of this partial summary judgment and/or his prior vote 
of the stock, Reed J. Taylor would and should be in actual control of AIA Insurance, Inc. 
but for the actions and R. John Taylor, which Defendants, with full knowledge of Reed J. 
Taylor's rights, facilitated and aided and abetted to the detriment of AIA Services 
Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc. and Reed J. Taylor. 
16. With the Defendants full knowledge, Reed J. Taylor's claims asserted in 
Taylor v. A H  Services Corporation, et al. included claims for breaches of fiduciary duty, 
conspiracy, fraudulent conveyance, and fraud perpetrated by R. John Taylor and others 
(including Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.), including but not limited to claims that R. 
John Taylor had wrongfully transferred over $1,500,000 of AIA Insurance, fnc.'s cash to 
Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., for no consideration and had transferred 
approximately $700,000 of the assets of AIA Insurance, Inc. to Crop USA Insurance 
Agency, Inc. for no consideration. R. John Taylor was at all material times also an 
interested director, officer and shareholder of Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. Also 
included in the civil action were other claims that R. John Taylor and others had engaged 
in self-dealing and/or fraudulent transactions with AIA Services Corporation and/or AIA 
COMPLAINT - 5 
Insurance, Inc. to the detriment of the corporations and Reed J. Taylor, and for the 
personal benefit of R. John Taylor and other interested pa3ies (including Crop USA 
Insurance Agency, Inc.). 
17. In 2007, Defendants appeared in the civil action, Taylor v. R l i l  Sentices 
Corporation, et al., and assmed legal representation of two distinct clients, ALA 
Sewices Corporation, a corporation, and AlA Insurance, Inc., a corporation, and also 
represented the interests of R. John Taylor, an individual, and other interested parties 
(including Connie Taylor, James Beck and Michael Cashman). At all material times 
John Taylor was an interested CEO and director of AIA Services Corporation and AIA 
Insurance, Inc. and an interested majority shareholder of AIA Services Corporation. The 
civil action clearly alleged acts of fraud, civil conspiracy, conversion, and breaches of 
fiduciary duty perpetrated by R. John Taylor and others against AIA Services 
Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc., and such acts having damaged and continuing to 
cause damages to the corporations, their shareholders and creditors. In violation of the 
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and their duty of care, the Defendants undertook to 
represent the three named clients AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., and 
Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., each having irreconcilable conflicts of interest with 
the other. 
18. Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's attorney, Roderick C. Bond, advised the 
Defendants in May 2007, that it was not appropriate for the Defendants to represent AIA 
Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc., and/or to take direction from R. John 
Taylor because of various conflicts of interest and the fact that R. John Taylor was an 
interested party. Despite the warning and demands made by Reed J. Taylor's attorney, 
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Roderick G.  Bond, the Defendants also appeared and represented Crop USA Insurance 
Agency, Inc., which was created additional conflicts of interest, resulted in a breach of 
the Dekndmts' fiduciary duties (including the duty of loyalty) owed to AIA Services 
Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc., and was a violation of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct and their duty of care. 
19. Tbe Defendants inappropriately entered into and/or participated in a Joint 
Defense Agreement(s) knowing that AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., 
Crop USA hsurance, Inc., R. John Taylor and other named and unnamed individuals in 
7bylor v. AIA Services Corporation, et al. had clear irreconcilable conflicting and 
diverging interests in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and duty of care, and 
to the detriment AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc. and Reed J. Taylor. In 
TwJvor v. AIA Services Corporation, et al., a Joint Defense Agreements was not 
pernlissible or appropriate because it would perpetuate fraud, conspiracy, aiding and 
abetting, and other causes of action, was entered into without obtaining informed consent 
from disinterested representatives of the corporations, and the Joint Defense Agreement 
was also independently not appropriate or permitted when certain parties to a joint 
defense agreement should be asserting claims against other parties to the agreement. The 
Joint Defense Agreement(s) in question have assisted in others (including R. John Taylor 
and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) to perpetrate and/or hide acts of fraud, fraudulent 
conveyances, civil conspiracy, conversion, breaches of fiduciary duties and other claims, 
while also assisting the Defendants in inappropriately obtaining payment of fees and 
costs in violatlon of the Rules of Professional Conduct and their duty of care. 
COMPLAINT - 7 
20. The Defendants assisted AIA Services Corporation, AIR Insurance, Lnc , 
Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., R. John Taylor, and others In entering into various 
inappropriate agreements and transactions which were in violation of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct and their duty of care, were not in the best interests of the 
corporations, not authorized by disinterested parkies, constituted fi-aud and/or the 
inappropriate transfer of assets and f a d s  belonging to AIA Services Corporation and/or 
ATA Insurance, Inc., were not arms-length transactions, and/or were done so without 
requiring AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc. and/or Crop USA Insurance 
Agency, lnc, to retain separate independent counsel that were retained by separate 
independent uninterested parties. 
21. As attorneys for AIA Services Corporation, an entity, the Defendants 
owed duties as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, their duty of care, 
and undel the law to the corporation and its shareholders to preserve and protect the 
assets and businesses of the corporation, and since AIA Services Corporation was 
insolvent, to its creditors including Reed J. Taylor. As attorney for AIA Services 
Corporation, and in light of the claims made against R. John Taylor and others by the 
Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor, the Defendants owed a duty to their entity client not to assume 
representation of the interests of R. J o h  Taylor, individually and/or through a Joint 
Defense Agreement, or with any other interested parties. 
22. As attorneys for AIA Insurance, Inc., an entity, the Defendants owed 
duties as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, their duty of care and the 
law to the corporation and its shareholders including a creditor pledgee of the 
corporation's stock, Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor, with contractual rights to vote the shares and 
COMPLAINT - 8 
assume conbol and who had exercised his contractual rights and had voted the shares but 
whose rights were breached and rejected by interested directors and others who were in 
control of the corporation including R. John Taylor. As attorneys for AIA Insurance, lnc. 
md in light of the claims made against R. John Taylor and others by the Plaintiff Reed J. 
Taylor, the Defendants owed a duty to their entity client not to assume representation of 
the interests of R. John Taylor, individually and/or though any Joint Defense Agreement, 
andor of other interested parties (including Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., Connie 
Taylor, James Beck and Michael Cashman). 
23. As attorneys representing the interests of R. John Taylor through a Joint 
Defense Agreement, the Defendants owed their duties first and foremost to AIA Services 
Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional 
Conduct, duty of care and/or the law. As attorneys for R. John Taylor by and through 
taking directions and/or accepting decisions made by him knowing that he was interested 
and should have claims asserted against him, and in light of the claims against R. John 
Taylor by the Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor, the Defendants owed a duty to their corporate 
clients not to assume representation of the interests of R. John Taylor, Crop USA 
Insurance Agency, Inc. or other interested parties. The Defendants failed to notify or 
obtain appropriate informed consents or approvals from appropriate parties or 
disinterested shareholders in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the 
Defendants' duty of care, and the Bylaws and Articles of Formation of the corporations, 
all to the detriment of Reed J. Taylor. The Defendants inappropriately participated in a 
Joint Defense Agreement. 
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24. As present andlor fomer an;omeys?or AIA Services Coporation mdior 
AIA Insurance, Inc. (individually or though any Joint Defense Agreement) the 
Defendants owed duties of loyalty to the corporations and could not represent R. John 
Taylor or Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. in Taylor v. AIA Sewices Corporation, ef a]. 
or represent or assist R. John Taylor in D o ~ n f f  Taylor v. R. John %lor because the 
Defendants' loyalty belongs exclusively to AIA Services Corporation and/or A1A 
Insurance, Inc. Furthermore, the Defendants could in no way represent Crop USA 
Insurance Agency, Inc. or participate in any joint defense of Crop USA Insurance 
Agency, Inc. or other interested parties (such as R. John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James 
Beck, and/or Michael C a s h a n )  as AIA Services Corporation and/or AIA Insurance, Inc. 
should have been asserting claims against Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., each other, 
and other interested and uninterested parties. 
25. Defendants represented, and continue to represent, the interests of R. John 
Taylor (individually and/or through a Joint Defense Agreement) and with full knowledge 
that R. John Taylor is an interested party and director of AIA Services Corporation and 
AIA Insurance, Inc. and is personally inappropriately conducting and controlling the 
course of litigation involving the Defendants' clients, AIA Services Corporation and AIA 
Insurance, Inc., while also inappropriately representing Crop USA Insurance Agency, 
Inc. to the detriment of the corporations and Reed 5. Taylor. 
26. During the course of the civil action after March 28, 2007, the Defendants 
have coordinated and participated with Quarles & Brady LLP, the law firm that has 
represented AIA Services and AIA Services Corporation before and throughout litigation, 
and Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A., the law firm that formerly represented AIA 
COMPLAINT - 10 
Service Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. in Taylor v.  AIA Services Corporation, el  ~rl. 
During the course of the civil action after March 28, 2007, R. John Taylor and others 
have iitrther engaged in inappropriate andor wongh l  transactions involving themselves, 
AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Ine., 
which transactions have occurred with Defendants howledge and/or assistance, and to 
the detriment of AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., and Plaintiff Reed J. 
Taylor as creditor and stock pledgee. 
27. Defendants are liable to Reed J. Taylor for an amount to be proven at trial 
because the Defendants have provided substantial assistance and/or aided and abetted R 
John Taylor, AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., Crop USA Insurance 
Agency, Inc., and/or other interested parties in acts of fraud, fraudulent conveyances, 
conversion, civil conspiracy, and breaches of fiduciary duties. The acts of fraud, 
fraudulent conveyances, civil conspiracy, conversion, and breaches of fiduciary duties 
include, but are not limited to: 1) While purporting to represent AIA Insurance, Inc. and 
AIA Services Corporation, the Defendants assisted and/or aided and abetted R. John 
Taylor in the tortious interference with the assertion of Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's 
contractual rights to control and operate AIA Insurance, Inc., which has proximately 
caused damages to Reed J. Taylor; 2) While purporting to represent AIA Services 
Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc., the Defendants inappropriately assisted and/or 
aided and abetted R. John Taylor and other interested parties to engage in tortious 
transactions involving R. John Taylor, AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., 
and/or Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., which such transactions have been to the 
detriment of AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., and Reed J. Taylor, and 
COMPLAINT - 1 1 
proximately caused damages to Reed J. Taylor as creditor aszd stock pledgee; and 3) 
While representing R. John Taylor, individually or through a Joint Defense Agreement, 
the Defendants have had full knowledge that their client is an interested party and 
director of AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., and Crop USA Insurance 
Agency, Inc., and is personally conducting and controlling the course of litigation 
involving the Dekndants' former clients, AIA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, 
Inc., and Defendants have assisted and/or aided and abetted R. John Taylor and others 
(includitig, Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) and has coordinated and participated with 
the Wawley Troxelt and Quarles & Brady in R. John Taylor's engaging in tortious 
transactions involving himself, AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., and Crop 
USA Insurance Agency, Inc., which transactions have been to the detriment of AIA 
Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. and proximately caused damages to Reed 
J. Taylor as a creditor and stock pledgee. 
28. In connection witti the Defendants' inappropriate representation and/or 
joint defense of R. John Taylor, AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., Crop 
USA Insurance Agency, Inc., and other interested parties (including Connie Taylor, 
James Beck, and Michael Cashman) the Defendants accepted payments of attorneys fees 
and costs believed to exceed $500,000 in violation of the Idaho Rules of Professional 
Concluct, their duty of care, and as participating and/or assisting in inappropriate 
corporate acts and the aiding and abening of others. 
29. Over the course of the litigation in Reed J. Taylor v. AD1 Services 
Corporation, et al., Reed J. Taylor's attorney in that action, Roderick C. Bond of Smith, 
Cannon & Bond PLLC, advised the Defendants on numerous occasions that their conduct 
COMPLAINT - 12 
violated Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, their duty of care, was inappropriate, and 
constituted the aiding and abetting of other interested and uninterested parties (including 
R. J o b  Taylor and Crop USA Insurmce Agency, kc.), m o n g  other potential legal 
claims against them. En early 2007, Mr. Bond advised the Defendants that their 
inappropriate actions would result in claims being filed against them by Reed J. Taylor. 
Mr. Bond reiterated these warnings orally and in writing on numerous occasions. Despite 
Mr. Bond's warnings, the Defendants conduct persisted thereby further damaging Reed J. 
Taylor. The Defendants disregard of Mr Bond's warnings can only be construed as 
intentional improper acts to assist R. John Taylor and other interested parties to the 
detriment of Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor. 
30. The Defendants wrongfully assisted R. John Taylor and other interested 
parties in operating Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. with the -Funds, assets, employees, 
trade secrets and other things of value inappropriately obtained from AIA Services 
Corporation and/or AIA Insurance, Inc., and by assisting R. John Taylor and other 
interested parties (including Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) in preventing claims 
from being asserted and prosecuted against them. The Defendants wrongfklly assisted 
and/or failed to prevent interested parties (including R. John Taylor) in transferring the 
long-term employees of AIA Insurance, Inc. to Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., while 
at the same time representing to the Court in Taylor v. AIA Services Corporation that the 
corporations were being operated properly and/or failing to advise the Court of the 
inappropriate acts and transactions. All the while the Defendants were aware of and/or 
assisted in the inappropriate payment of salaries, benefits, compensation, and director 
fees of $20,000 per year when AIA Services Corporation was insolvent. 
COMPLAINT - 13 
31. Despite Reed 5. Taylor's demands (made personally and thsough his 
attorney Roderick C. Bond) that the Defendants take action to protect the assets and 
knds  of AIA Services Cotporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. and recover Funds and assets 
from R. John raylor, Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. and other interested and 
uninterested parties for the benefit of the corporations and Reed J. Taylor, the Defendants 
refused to act in accordance with the Rules of Profession Conduct, their duty of care, and 
the law. Despite Reed J. Taylor's demands (made through his attorney Roderick C. 
Bond) that interests of the minority disinterested shareholders be considered and/or 
protected beca:rse of the wrongful acts of R. John Taylor and other interested parties, the 
Defendants refused to act and failed to fully and properly disclose all pertinent facts to 
the disinterested shareholders and request their votes 
32. In various motions, responses and affidavits submitted to the court in 
Taylor v. AIA Services Corporation, et al., the Defendants made arguments that did not 
benefit AIA Services Corporation, AIA Inswance, Inc., or Reed J. Taylor, 
inappropriately made other arguments preventing valid claims from being asserted 
against R. John Taylor, James Beck, Connie Taylor, Michael Cashman, and other 
interested and uninterested parties, and failed to take action against responsible parties 
(includi~g R. John Taylor, Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., Connie Taylor, James 
Beck, Michael Cashman, Lancelot Investors Fund, and others). In the instance of 
Michael Cashman, the Defendants successfully argued to the Court in Taylor v. AIA 
Services Corporation, et al. that Mr. Cashman should not be named as an individual 
when the Defendants should have been taking action against Mr. Cashman and others. 
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33. Despite Reed J. Taylor's demands (made through his attorney Rodend; C. 
Bond) that disinterested directors and/or parties must direct the litigation on behalf of the 
corporations, the Defendants refused and pemiged and/or assisted R. John Taylor and 
other interested parties to direct the litigation to the detriment of the corporations and 
Reed J. Taylor. Despite Reed J. Taylor's demands (made lInrough his at%orney Roderick 
C. Bond) that action be taken to terninate AIA Insurance, Inc.'s improper guarantee of a 
$1 5,000,000 line-of-credit for Crop USA Insurance Agency, Ine., the Defendants refused 
to act, failed to inform or fully disclose to disinterested parties or shareholders the 
existence of such inappropriate loan guarantees, and threatened to take legal action 
against Reed J. Taylor if he tried to rescind or terminate the improper guarantee (since 
Defendant Gary D. Babbitt's threat, the balance of the loan has increased by over 
$5,50O,f)00 to over $10,500,000).' 
34. The Defendants' conduct has violated Idaho Rules of Professional 
Conduct and their duty of care, which require the Defendants to disgorge all attorneys' 
fees artd costs paid to them in Taylor v. AIA Services Corporation, et al. and for other 
related and/or unrelated legal services. Despite Reed J. Taylor's demands (made through 
his attorney Roderick C. Bond) to comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct and 
their duty of care, the Defendants refused to do so. 
35. Through the acts of the Defendants, the value of AIA Insurance, Inc. and 
the assets of AIA Services Corporation and/or AIA Insurance, Inc. have plummeted in 
value, the corporations' value and assets have been impaired, and/or the assets and -Funds 
have been trarisferred to Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. Through the acts of the 
I The $15,000,000 loan subject to the guarantee is believed to be in technical default. Damages for any loss 
from the guarantee would accrue upon the time of the loss or threatened litigation by the lender and, 
accordingly, would be additional damages asserted against the Defendants at that time. 
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Defendmts, o\mership of Crop USA insurance Agency, Inc. was vested and has 
remained vested in interested parties (including R. John Taylor), while the major creditor 
Reed J. Taylor and rninori'cy shareholders were left with nothing. Despite Reed J. 
Taylor" demands ( ~ o u g h  is anorney Roderick C. Bond) that action should also be 
taken Ibr the interests of the imocent minority shareholders and creditors, the Defendmts 
have refused to take action and inappropriat-ely assisted the interested parties (including 
R. J o h  Taylor, Connie Taylor, Jarnes Beck and Michael Cashman). 
36. Despite the Defendants having made several legal arguments that lacked 
ment, lacked good faith andlor were not grounded in facts, the Defendants provided a 
settlement offer to Reed J. Taylor in T i l o r  v. A;IA Services Corpar~tior?, et al , which 
included a provision that he release all claims against the Defendants as a conditson of the 
settlement. The inclusion of such a provision was a violation of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct and Defendants' duty of care. The Defendants also rehsed to make any 
provisions for disinterested minority shareholders of AIA Services Corporation as 
requested by Reed J. Taylor. 
37. The Defendants have assisted in the inappropriate acts of R. John Taylor 
and other interested parties in stopping all payments to Reed J. Taylor and Donna J. 
Taylor, Reed J. Taylor's fomer wife and the holder of all outstanding Preferred A Shares 
of AIA Services Corporation. Like Reed 5. Taylor, Donna J. Taylor is required to be a 
member of the board of directors of AIA Services Corporation. Like Reed J. Taylor, the 
Defendants have assisted R. John Taylor and other interested parties in preventing Reed 
J. Taylor and Donna J. Taylor from being members of the board of directors of AIA 
Services Corporation, which has firther far reaching ramifications and results in 
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additional &dinages against the Defendants. 
38. With full knowledge of AIA Semices Corporation's obligations to ensure 
that Reed J. Taylor and Donna J. Taylor are members of AIA Services Co~oration's  
board until they were paid in full, the Defendants proceeded to attend and participate in 
inappropriate board meetings andior take inappropriate action based upon board meetings 
held by interested directors without Reed J. Taylor or Donna J. Taylor being present and 
without providing them the oppo-ity to be present, which further results in all such 
meetings and decisions being null and void, and the Defendants being liable for the 
associated damages. 
39. The Defendants represented AIA Services Corporation and AIA 
Insurance. Inc. in litigation with the state of Idaho. The litigation was funded by AIA 
Insurance, Inc. by and through commission in which Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor held a 
security interest of which the Defendants had full knowledge. The litigation was 
resolved, however, instead of titling the $1,200,000 Mortgage that was received as 
settlement in the name of AIA Insurance, Inc., the Defendants titled the mortgage only in 
the name of 41A Services Corporation in an inappropriate scheme to keep the mortgage 
from AIA Insurance, Inc. and Reed J. Taylor. The Defendants then inappropriately 
represented AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc. and Crop USA Insurance 
Agency, Ine. by drafting documents to assist in the inappropriate pledge of the 
$1,200,000 Mortgage to Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. to facilitate the payment of 
the Defendants' services in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, their duty of 
care, and the law. The Defendants assisted and/or failed to prevent and/or notify 
disinterested parties or the Court that AIA Services Corporation had inappropriately 
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pledged its sole remaining other significant asset, the $1,200,000 mortgage, to Crop USA 
Insurmce Agency, Inc. to facilitate the paymerrt: of $500,000 for the Defendanl;s\ervices 
in vio1stl;ion of the Rules of Professional Conduct, their duty of care, and the law. 
40. The Defendanls omitted andlor misrepresented material facts to the Court 
in T ~ y l o r  v. AIA Services Corporation, eb a(, to the detriment of Reed J. Taylor. In 
several instances, the Defendants persuaded the Court to take action that was not in the 
best interests of the corporations or Reed J. Taylor, to the detriment of the corporations 
and Reed J. Taylor (including consenting to the issuance of only a $200,000 bond when 
the Defendants knew that the corporations were not being operated properly or their 
assets safeguarded). 
41. The Defendants have inappropriately assisted R, John Taylor and other 
interested parties in misallocating and not allocating expenses and/or services provided 
and borne by AIA Insurance, Inc. and/or AIA Services Corporation for the benefit of 
Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., R. John Taylor and other interested parties. Upon 
idomation and belief, the Defendants have assisted in issuing inappropriate opinion 
letters to auditors of AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc. and/or Crop USA 
Insurance Agency, Inc. to assist R. John Taylor and other interested parties in transferring 
and utilizing the assets, employees, labor, funds and resources of AIA Insurance, Inc. 
and/or AIA Services Corporation for the benefit of Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc 
while providing no or little consideration in return. 
42. The Defendants had full knowledge of R. John Taylor's Executive 
Officer's Agreement, which, upon infomation and belief, was drafted by Defendant 
Richard A. Riley. Regardless, Defendant Richard A. Riley had full knowledge of the 
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existence and terns of R. John Taylor's Executive Officer? A~greemerat with AIA 
S e ~ ~ i c e s  Corporation. Even though R. John Taylor bas breached the a rms  of his 
employment contract with AIA Services Co~ora t ion  by competing against AIA Services 
Corporation though Crop USA insurance Agency, Inc. (and violating the corporate 
oppomi ty  doctrine), by soliciting employees of AlA Idpsurance, Inc., and other 
inappropriate actions, the Defendants have intentionally rehsed to act in the best interests 
of AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., their shareholders, and/or Reed J. 
Taylor, to the detrinient of Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor. 
43, The Defendants assisted in inappropriately transferring and retaining 
fimds, assets and property to Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. to defraud AIA Services 
Corporation's creditor Reed J. Taylor (including, without limitation, over $95,000 owed 
by Pacific Empire Radio Corporation to AIA Insurance, Inc., assistance in transferring 
shares of the Pacific Empire Radio Corporation to R. John Taylor, and failing to collect 
the over $300,000 owed by R. John Taylor) by not reporting such acts to disinterested 
parties or other appropriate parties as required by the Rules of Professional Conduct and 
their duty of care. 
44. In April 2007, the Defendants pemitted andlor assisted interested parties 
in holding a joint board meeting of AIA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. 
with full knowledge that Reed J. Taylor and Donna J. Taylor were being intentionally 
denied their right to be on the board of AIA Services Corporation and participating in 
such meetings (Donna Taylor has subordinated her right to payment in favor of Reed J. 
Taylor). At the meeting held in April 2007, the Defendants permitted and/or assisted R. 
John Taylor to appoint Connie Taylor and James Beck to the boards of AIA Services 
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Govoration and AIA Insurance, Inc. knowing that they were interested parties who AIA 
Services Corporation and/or AIA Insurance, Inc. should be pursuing claims against, that 
they inappropriately held shares in Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., that they were 
inappropriately being paid $20,000 per year to attend the board meeting of an insolvent 
corporation, and that they did not meet the required standards necessary to be members of 
such boards as set forth under the corporations3yla\vs. The Defendants inappropriately 
permitted andlor assisted two interested parties, Connie Taylor and James Beck, to 
approve andor consent to a Joint Retainer and Joint Defense Agreement with Nawley 
Troxell and others, which also facilitated the inappropriate joint legal representations of 
interested parties with conflicting irreconcilable interests and the payment of attorneys' 
fees and costs to various attorneys in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and 
their duty of care. 
45. Despite demands to the contrary, the Defendants continued to take 
inslructions and/or directives from the unauthorized boards (or R. John Taylor) of AIA 
Services Corporation and/or AIA Insurance, Inc. knowing that the boards are not properly 
seated and are comprised of interested parties (including R. John Taylor) with significant 
claims that should be asserted against them in violation of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, their duty of care, and/or the law. 
IV. FIRST CAUSES OF ACTIONS 
46. The Defendants have damaged Reed J. Taylor by aiding and abetting 
and/or assisting others (including R. John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Ine.) 
in the commission of tortious acts. 
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47. The Defendants commiaed t o~ ious  acts in concert with others (including 
R. John Taylor and Crop USA insurance Agency, Inc.) and/or pursuant to a common 
design or civil conspiracy with others (including R. John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance 
Agency, Inc.). 
48. The Defendants knew that the conduct of others (including R. John Taylor 
and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) constituted breach of duties and gave substantial 
assistance and/or encouragement to others (including R. John Taylor and Crop USA 
Insurance Agency, Inc.) in breaching said duties. The Defendants' conduct also 
constitutes the assistance of interested parties (including R. John Taylor and Crop USA 
Insurance Agency, Inc.) with the tortious interference of AIA Services Corpordtion and 
Reed 5. Taylor's contractual rights, which such contractual rights the Defendants had 
intimate knowledge. 
49. The Defendants gave substantial assistance to others (including R. John 
Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) in committing and/or accomplishing 
tortious conduct and/or acts, and the Defendants' conduct, separately considered, 
constitutes the breaches of duties owed to the corporations and/or Reed J. Taylor. 
50. The Defendants conduct constitutes aiding and abetting of others 
(including R. John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) and/or constitutes the 
conduct of a contributing tortfeasors, and such conduct has damaged Plaintiff Reed J. 
Taylor in an amount to be proven at trial or on summary judgment. 
V. SECOND CAUSES OF ACTIONS 
5 1. Reed J. Taylor holds and has held a valid and perfected security interest in 
all of the commissions and related receivables of AIA Services Corporation and AIA 
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Insurance, Inc 
52. All of the shares of AIA Insurance, Inc. were pledged to Reed J, Taylor as 
collateral for the over $8,500,000 owed to him by AIA Services Corporation. By way of 
this pledge and his prior vote of the stock in February 2007, Reed J. Taylor is entitled to 
possession and control of all of the assets of AIA Insurance, Inc. 
53. The Defendants were fully aware of Reed J. Taylor's rights to property in 
which he held a security interest and was pledged to him as collateral. In fact, Defendant 
Richard A. Riley represented RIA Services Corporation in the redemption of Reed J. 
Taylor's shares and the drafting of the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement 
and other applicable agreements, Defendants were responsible for issuing opinion letters 
relating to the transaction, which include various applicable representations and 
warranties. Defendants are now asserting arguments counter to the representations made 
in the opinion letter drafted by Defendants by and through Defendant Richard A. Riley. 
Defendants also assisted in the commission of torts by R. John Taylor, Crop USA 
Insurance Agency, Inc., and other interested parties by representing the corporations in 
various inappropriate transactions. 
54. The Defendants have received substantial payments believed to exceed 
$500,000 for the payment of attorneys' fees and costs, which such payments the 
Defendants had no lawful right to possess or retain and were received in violation of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct and their duty of care. 
55. The Defendants also knew that the disinterested minority shareholders of 
AIA Services Corporation (innocent shareholders) were never advised of the significant 
claims against the interested parties (including R. John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance 
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Agency, Inc.) and the significant misappropriation of the corporations' assets, but 
provided legal services on behalf of the interested parties and accepted payment frorn 
AIA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. In connection with the payment of 
attorneys' k e s  and costs to other named parties in Taylor v. AIA Sewices Carpovation, et 
al., the Defendants Failed to obtain the necessary approvals frorn Reed J. Taylor or other 
disinterested parties to the detriment of the corporations and Reed J. Taylor. The 
Defendants also assisted in the inappropriate titling and pledging of a $1.2 Million 
Mo&gage owned by AIA Services Corporation to facilitate the payment of funds to them. 
The Defendants have also accepted the payment of services for attorneys' fees and costs 
rendered for Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., which were paid by the money and/or 
assets of AIA Services Corporation and/or AIA Insurance, Inc. 
56. The Defendants' conduct constitutes the willful interference with property 
and money belonging to AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc. andlor Reed 3. 
Taylor and/or which such property and money should be under the possession and/or 
control of Reed J. Taylor, as the person entitled to such money and property as a creditor 
and pledgee. The Defendants deprived Reed 3. Taylor possession of such property and 
money. Despite Reed J. Taylor's demands, the Defendants have refused to return such 
property and money 
57. The Defendants' conduct constitutes conversion and such conduct has 
damaged Reed J. Taylor in an amount to proven at trial or on sumrnary judgment. 
VI. THIRD CAUSES OF ACTIONS 
58.  The Defendants' conduct has been unconscionable. The have engaged in 
acts, conduct, and representations that were false, misleading, deceptive and/or a 
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violat~oii of I.C. 4 48-601, et seg. The Defendants' acts, omissiori, representations and 
conduct constitute unfair and/or deceptive acts andlor practices in trade pertaining to the 
practice of law pursumt to 1.C. 5 48-601, et seg. 
59. The Defendants' actions have resulted in the loss of over 25% of Reed J. 
Taylor's retirement funds and/or such other harm as set forth under I.C. § 48-608(2)(a). 
As such, Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor is entitled darnages, which such amount is also subject 
to treble damages pursuant to I.C. Fj 48-608. 
VII. FOIJRTH CAUSES OF ACTIONS 
68. AIA Services Corporation is a trustee of Reed J. Taylor in light of its 
insolvency and the fact that it owes Reed J. Taylor over $8,500,000. At the very least, 
AIA Insurance, Inc. is a trustee of Reed J. Taylor because all of its shares are pledged to 
Reed J. Taylor and he voted the shares in February 2007 naming himself the sole director 
and officer of AIA Insurance, Inc. 
61. The Defendants' clients were trustees and/or fiduciaries performing 
similar functions for a non-client, Reed J. Taylor. The Defendants knew that their 
appropriate actions were necessary with respect to the representation of AIA Services 
Corporation and/or AIA Insurance, Inc. to take action to prevent and/or rectify the 
breaches of fiduciary duties owed by AIA Services Corporation and/or AIA Insurance, 
Inc. to Reed J. Taylor when such breaches were crimes and/or fraud and/or the 
Defendants assisted and/or are assisting in the breaches. Reed J. Taylor was not able to 
protect his rights because of the Defendants' actions and the Defendants' obligations to 
AIA Services Corporation and/or AIA Insurance, Inc. would not be significantly 
impaired because the best interests of all the foregoing is to collect sums owed by others 
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and recover damages for the improper tortious conduct of others (including R. Jchn 
Taylor and Crop USA I n s u a ~ c e  Agency, Inc.). 
62. The Defendants owed AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc. 
and/or Reed J. Taylor a duty of care to provide, including, but not limited to, reasonable, 
prudent, ethical, unconflicted, loyal and professional legal advice and legal representation 
in keeping with the standard of care in the legal profession and as owed to the 
corporations (referred to herein and above as "duty of care"). The Defendants breached 
their duty of care as a result of their acts and/or omissions thereby damaging the 
corporations and Reed J. Taylor, to the detriment of Reed J. Taylor. 
63. The Defendants breached their fiduciary duties owed to AZA Services 
Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., and/or Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor, including, without 
limitation, the duties of care and loyalty. 
64. The Defendants' acts constitute professional negligence and/or breach of 
the Defendants' fiduciary duties, and such conduct has damaged the corporations and 
Reed J. Taylor, in an amount to be proven at trial or on summary judgment. 
VIII. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
1. Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor demands a trial by jury of not less than twelve 
(12) on all claims and damages so triable. 
IX. PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
W E W F O W ,  Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor prays for the following relief: 
1. For a judgment against Defendants, jointly and severally, for $10,500,000 
in damages ($3,500,000 in actual damages and $7,000.000 in treble damages), the exact 
amount of which wilt be proven at trial and/or on summary judgment, plus an award of 
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pre.-judgment and post-judgment interest; 
2. For a judgment against the Defendants, jointly and severally, for treble 
damages of $7,000,000, the exact mount  to be proven at trial pursuant to I.C. fj 48- 
608(2); 
3. For a judgment requiring the disgorgement of the payments of all 
aeorneys' fees and costs paid to the Defendants by AIA Services Corporation andor AIA 
Insurance, Inc.; 
4. For judgment against the Defendants, jointly and severally, for additional 
damages as provided under I.C. 5 48-608; 
5. For such other relief as may be available to Reed J. Taylor pursuant to I.C. 
$ 48-601, et seq. or the law, including, without limitation, obtaining a preliminary 
injunction to restrain the Defendants from undertaking further representation; 
6. For an award of Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's attorneys fees and costs 
incurred in this action pursuant to Idaho Law, including, without limitation, I.C. 5 48- 
608, I.C. 5 12-120 andor I.C. 5 12-121; and 
7. For such other relief as the Court deems just and equitable. 
/;4'day of August, 2008. DATED this 
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & Y;IRRY PLLC 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor 
James D, LaRuc ISB tit1780 
Loren @. Ipscn ISB #I767 
25 1 E. Front Street, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
TeIepbone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844 
E & B File No. 7082-0013 
Atrtorneys for Defcndmts 
IPJ THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, lN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
W E D  J. TAYLOR, an individual; I 
Plaintiff, I Case No. CV 08-01 765 
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN 
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V. 
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A. 
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL 
ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X, 
unknown individuals; 
v. 
Defendants. I 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, E l m  & Burke, P.A., hereby move, 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, to dismiss plaintiffs complaint 
with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
MOTION TO DISMISS - 1 
G:\7082\0013\Pleadings\Motion to Dismiss ver-02.wpd 
DATED this 9 day of September, 2008. 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
By: 
By: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 9 day of September, 2008, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the 
manner indicated below: 
Michael S. Bissell U.S. Mail 
CAMPBELL BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC Hand Delivery 
7 South Howard Street, Ste. 416 J Federal Express 
Spokane, WA 99201 Facsimile Transmission (509) 455-7 1 1 1 
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J m e s  D, LaRue ISB #I780 
Loren C. Ipsen ISB #I767 
ELAM & BUME, P.A. 
25 1 E. Front Street, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 3 84-5 844 
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AMorneys for Defendanls 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual; I 
Plaintiff, I Case No. CV 08-01 765 
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN 
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V. 
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A. 
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL 
ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X, 
unkxown individuals; 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Defendants. I 
Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, E l m  & Burke, P.A., hereby submit the 
following memorandum in support of their motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This case presents the unusual issue of whether one party may sue another's attorneys for 
decisions made during the course of litigation or for alleged malpractice. The plaintiff in this case, 
Reed Taylor, is not and was not represented in connection with any of the events alleged in the 
complaint by the defendants, the law firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley and individual 
attorneys employed by that firm (the firm and its individual attorneys will be referred to herein as 
"HTEH"). Lacking privity of contract, Reed Taylor cannot assert a direct claim for malpractice 
against HTEH. Rather, he premises his complaint on positions advanced by HTEH on behalf of its 
clients in the case of Taylor v. AL4 Sewices Corporation, et al., Case No. CV-07-00208, in the 
Distrid Court of the State of Idaho, Nez Perce County (hereinafter referred to as the "Underlying 
Litigation"). Additionally, he attempts to assert claims for malpractice against HTEH for advice 
given or legal services rendered, not to him, but to clients of EJTEZT who are parties in the 
Underlying Litigation. 
ReedTaylor is suing AIA Services, Inc. ('XIA Services"), in the Underlying Litigation upon 
a contract to redeem his stock. He has also named as defendants AIA Insurance, Inc. ("AIA 
Insurance"), a wholly-owned subsidiary of AIA Services, CropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc. 
("CropUSA"]b, and various officers and directors of the three corporations. HTEH represents AIA 
Services and AIA Insurance and has appeared as local counsel for CropUSA in the Underlying 
Litigation. The individual defendants are represented by counsel of their choice. In vague and 
conclusory terms, the complaint in the present action attempts to assert claims against HTEH for 
malpractice or wrongful actions arising out of the defense of their clients in the Underlying 
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Litigation or related matters. Reed Taylor has also filed sepaak but substantially similar lawsuits 
against counsel who have appeared in behalf of other defendants in the Underlying Litigation. 
It cannot escape notice that by filing suits against opposing counsel, Reed Taylor implicates 
ethical issues regarding whether they can continue to represent their clients in the Underlying 
Litigation. If the present lawsuit and the companion lawsuits against defense counsel are not 
dismissed, defense counsel may be required to withclraw from representing their respective clients 
in the Underlying Litigation after nearly a year and a half of proceedings. In effect, Reed Taylor 
seeks to strip the opposing parties of their chosen counsel. See Alumet v. Bear Lake Grazing Co., 
I 12 Idaho 441,732 P. 2d 679 (Ct.App. 1987), noting that filing suit against opposing counsel may 
have the effect of requiring them to withdraw because privileged matters between Wgants and their 
counsel may have to be revealed in order for counsel to defend themselves, thus possibly 
jeopardizing the litigants' p,>sitions. 
Shortly after filing this action, Reed Taylor moved to disqualify defense counsel in the 
Underlying Litigation.' Strategies to disqualifL opposing counsel are disfavored by the courts. 
Tisby v. Buffalo GeneraEHospital, 157 F.R.D. 157, 163 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) ("Motions to disqualify 
opposing counsel must be viewed in the context of favoring a party's right to be represented by 
counsel of its own choice, as opposed to disqualification as a strategic weapon."); Spence v. Flynt, 
8 16 P.2d 77 1 (Wyo. 199 1) ("Disqualification motions are ofien simply common tools of litigation 
process used for strictly strategic purposes.") (citations and internal quotations and ellipses omitted) 
1 See Reed Taylor's Motion to Disqualify the Attorneys and Law Eirms of Hawley Troxell Emis & 
Hawley LLP; Clements, Brown & MeNichols, P.A.; and Quarles and Brady LLP, dated September 4,2008. 
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For the reasons discussed in this memormdm, it will be seen that the complaint against WTEH is 
merely pretexwal and fails to state a claim upon which relief can be @granted. 
11. STANDAW OF ABJUDICATlON 
m e r e  a complaint contains no allegations which, ifproven, would entitle the plaintiff to the 
relief claimed, it is subject to dismissal pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Wells 
v. UnitedStutes Lve Ins. Co., 119 Idaho 1 60,804 P.2d 333 (Ct. App. 1991). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim, without affidavits or deposition testimony introduced into the 
record either in support or in opposition, is addressed soley to the suficiency of the complaint. 
Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 126 Idaho 960,962, 895 P.2d 561,563 (1995). All inferences from 
the facts pleaded in the complaint must be drawn in favor of the party opposing the motion; and the 
issue presented is "whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Id. 
However, the court need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences. 
Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 636 n. 3, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 1921 n. 3., 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980). 
When ruling upon a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the question is whether the nonmoving party has alleged 
sufficient facts to support his claim which, if true, would entitle him to relief. Rincover v. State of 
Idaho, Dept. of finance, Securities Bureau, 128 Idaho 653, 91 7 P.2d 1293 (1 996). For example, 
standing is a preliminary question to be determined by the court as a matter of law; if the plaintiff 
lacks standing to bring the claim, his complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). 
Young v. City of Ketchurn, 137 Idaho 102, 104,44 P.3d 1 157, 1 159 (2002). 
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111. FIRST GAUSE(S) OF ACTION - AIDING AND AIBETTING TORTIOUS ACTS 
AND, CIVIL CONSPIUCS 
A. The Complaint Is FacbaUy Deficient. 
As a general rule, aEorneys who represent clients in litigation cannot be held liable to their 
cljents' adversary based on the altomeys' conduct of the litigation. V h l e  there are exceptions to 
the general rule, the plaintiff has failed to plead any facts which would fall within any of such 
exceptions. Therefore, the plaintiffs first cause of action should be dismissed for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted. 
A party may not rely on pleadings which assert only legal conclusions, but must allege facts 
whicli, if true, state a claim for relief. Resolution Tmst Corp., v. firmer, 823 F.Supp. 302, 309 
(E.D.Pa. 1993). While well-pled facts alleged in the complaint are viewed in the light most* 
favorable to the plaintiff, conclusory allegations are not accepted as true without specific factual 
allegations to support them. Production Resources Group, L.L.C. v. NC7: 863 A.2d 772, 781 
(De1.Ch. 2004); Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., Litiguton, 634 A.2d 3 19, 326 (Del. 1993) (articulating the 
Rule 12 (b)(6) standard). If a factual basis for the relief is not alleged, then the pleading is subject 
to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). In the case at bar, plaintiff merely states a number of conclusory 
allegations but fails to piead any facts which would justify an award of damages against HTEH. 
B. The Complaint Fails to State a Cause of Action for Aiding and Abetting. 
The first cause of action of the complaint is conceptually muddled because it attempts to plead 
a cause of action for (1) civil conspiracy, or (2) aiding and abetting without distinguishing between 
the two theories. In actuality, they are separate and distinct causes of action with different elements, 
and each will be discussed below. 
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A claim for aiding md abetting the tortious act of mother has three basic elments: 
(1) the primary tod-kasor must commit a tort that causes an injury to the plaintifc 
(2) the defendant must h o w  that the p ~ m a r y  torl-feasor's conduct constitutes a 
breach of duty; and 
(3) the defendant must substantially assist or encourage the primary tort-feasor in 
the achievement of the breach. 
Ezzone v. Riccardi, 525 N.W.2d 388,389 (Iowa 1994); see also SumuelM Feinberg Testamentary 
Trust v. Carter, 652 F.Supp. 1 066, 1082 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
The Idaho courts have recognized that a party may in certain circumstances be held liable for 
aiding and abetting the tortious acts of another. For example, in Smith v. Thompson, 103 Idaho 909, 
655 P.2d 116 (Ct.App. 1982), it was held that an employer was liable for aiding and abetting his 
employee to burn down the plaintiffs' home where the employer urged the employee to commit the 
arson and suggested it should be done while the employer was out of town. In support of its 
conclusion that the employer was liable for inciting the wrongful act of his employee, the Idaho 
Court of Appeals cited the 1977 version of Restatement (Second) ofTorts $ 876(b). The employer's 
liability was expressly based on the act of aiding and abetting the wron&l act rather the master- 
servant doctrine, since it was not part of the employee's job to bum houses. 
In Price v. Aztec, 108 Idaho 674,701 P.2d 294 (1 985), the owner of a subdivision was held 
liable for inciting a third party to destroy an irrigation ditch. Relying in part on $876 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, the court held that " 'all persons who command, instigate, encourage, 
advise, countenance, co-operate in, aid or abet the commission of a trespass of another, are 
cotrespassers with the person committing the trespass. . . .' (citation omitted)." Id. at 677,701 P2d. 
at 297. The court noted that the comments to $876(b) of the Restatement provide that if the 
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encouragement or assistmce of one person is a substmtiaf factor in causing the resulting tort, then 
the one giving it is himself a tortfeasor and is responsible for the consequences of the other's act. 
Id. at 678, 701 P.2d at 298. 
No Idaho case has been found dealing with the issue whether a lawyer can be found liable 
for aiding and abetting the cctmission of an allegedly tortious act by giving advice to his or her 
client, whether in connection with litigation or otherwise. Other judsdictions that have grappled 
with the issue have predominantly (that is, with limited exceptions not applicable here) held that the 
attorney-client relationship precludes aider-abettor liability. 
Section 876(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1979) states: 
For harrn resulting to a third person fiom the tortious conduct of another, one is 
subject to liability if he 
* * * 
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial 
assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himsc1Q.l 
To state a cause of action, the plaintiff must also sufficiently allege that his injury was "a 
direct or reasonably foreseeable result" of the conduct complained of Bloor v. Carro, Spanbock, 
Londin, Rodman & Fass, 754 F.2d 57,63 (2d Cir. 1985). Damages caused by the alleged tort must 
be alleged and proved. Britestarr Homes, Inc. v. Piper Rudnick LLP, 453 F.Supp. 52 1, 528 
(D.Com. 2006). 
Plaintiff Reed Taylor's attempt to plead a cause of action for aiding and abetting fails at the 
outset because he fails to plead facts which, if true, would constitute a tortious act or to allege 
damages proximately caused by a tortious act of AIA Services, AIA Insurance or CropUSA. Merely 
mislabeling alleged contractual breaches does not convert them into torts. See Decker v. Massey- 
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liable for seceties violations under $j 10(b) of &e Secuities a-nd Exehmge Act of 1934 and RuIe 
A thrd party's claim against a lawer  puts t3ne lawyer at odds with his or her client in a 
m m e r  which compromises the attorney-client relationship, Protecting that relationship protects 
more than just an individual or entity in any particular case or transaction; it is hdamental  to the 
integrity of the judicial process itself. As pointed out in Durham v. C;uest, 142 N.N. 8 17,823, 17 1 
P.3d 756,761 (20071, to permit claims against attorneys byadversaryparties in civil litigation would 
have a chilling effect on representation because: 
[Alnytime a plaintiff alleged that a defendant had breached a fiduciary duty to the 
plaintiff, an additional claim against the defendant's counsel for aiding and abetting 
would withstand a Rule [12(b)(6)] motion, even though the defendant's counsel had 
simply been representing the client's position in an adversarial proceeding. Before 
agreeing to represent a client, an attorney faced with this dilemma would have to 
evaluate the merits of his client's position and the attendant risks, then would have 
to mon~tor the case during the representation in order to evaluate the risk of liability. 
This would have a detrimental effect on the representation. . . . 
Few rules, of course, are absolute. An attorney, even acting the course of litigation, can be 
liable for egregious conduct that amounts to an abuse of process or malicious prosecution. Kahala 
Royal Corporation v. Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel, supra, at 270, 15 1 P.3d at 75 1. However, 
no factual allegations are contained in the complaint which support these exceptions. The plaintiff's 
claims against HTEH for purportedly aiding and abetting its clients' actions relate only to advice 
Recently, the Stoneridge holding has been extended to attorneys. See In re D V  Inc. Securities 
Litigation, 249 F.R.D. 196,216-2 18 (E.D.Pa. 1008), holding that attorneys of a corporation owe no independent 
duty of disclosure to investors and cannot be held liable for failure to divulge or prevent a scheme on fhe part of their 
client to violate $ 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act. 
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rendered md positions taken in the m u s e  cifzcalous representation and, as such, must be dismissed 
for failure to state a cause of action. 
C .  Reed Taylor Has No Standing as a Creditor of AIA Services to Bring a Direct Cause 
of Action Against the Directors of the Corporation for a Breach of Fiduciary Duty or 
Against HTEE for AUegedly Aiding and Abetting any such Breach. 
Liabiliw for aiding and abetting does not exist in a vacuum; in order for to liability to attach, 
the alleged aider and abettor must be found to have materially assisted in perpetrating the wrongful 
act of another. If the predicate act is not actionable, there can be no cause of action for aiding and 
abetting. Reed Taylor alleges that because he is a creditor of AIA Services, which is insolvent, the 
directors of that company owe a fiduciary duty to him. He avers that HTEH aided and abetted the 
directors in diverting h d s  of the corporation to other purposes, thereby precluding the corporation 
&om making payments to him. Assuming arguendo these allegations are true, they do not state a 
claim against opposing counsel upon which relief can be granted. 
It is often stated that directors stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation, hence, to the 
stockholders. Nanny v. Sunnyside Ditch Co., 82 Idaho 271,276,353 P.2d 406,409 (1960); Coeur 
d2ZenesLead Co. I? Kingsbuvy, 59 Idaho 627,630,85 P.2d 691,692 (1938). It is said that should 
the corporation become insolvent, this fiduciary duty runs also to the creditors of the corporation. 
Torch Liquidating Trust ex rel. Bridge Associates, LLC v. Stockstill, 2008 WL 696233 (E.D.La. 
2008). The reason for this is that directors have the task of attempting to maximize the economic 
value of the company. "By definition, the fact of insolvency places the creditors in the shoes 
normally occupied by the shareholders - that of residual risk-bearers." Production Resources 
Group, L.L. C. v. KT, 863 A.2d 772, 791 (Del.Ch. 2004). 
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However, this does not mean that either shxeholders or creditors have a direct cause of 
action against the directors. See Weatherhead v. GrEtjen, 123 Xdalzo 697, 705, 851 P.2d 993, 1001 
(Ct.App. 1993);McGiver-n v. A M S A  Lumber Co., 77 Wis.2d 241,156,252 N.W.2d 37,378 (1977). 
An infornative case illustsating the current evolution of the law is North American Catholic 
Edacatio~ral Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Geewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del.Supr. 2007). There, 
the Delaware Supreme Court held that creditors of an insolvent6 corporation or a corporation 
operating in the zone of insolvency7 could not bring a direct breach of fiduciary duty action against 
such corporation's directors. 
In meewalla, creditors of an insolvent, or at least financially challenged, corporation sought 
to bring direct, not derivative, claims ofbreach of fiduciary duties against the directors for allegedly 
causing the corporation to enter into improvident transactions, rather than preserving the assets of 
the corporation for the benefit of its creditors. The trial court entered judgment under Rule 12(b)(6) 
dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The 
Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, noting: 
It is well-settled that directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation. When a 
corporation is solvent, those duties may be enforced by its shareholders, who have 
standing to bring derivative actions on behalf of the corporation because they are the 
ultimate beneficiaries of the corporation's growth and increased value. When a 
corporation is insolvent, however, its creditors take the place of the shareholders as 
the residual beneficiaries of any increase in value. 
6 The Gheaualla court noted that insolvency of a corporation ". . . may be demonstrated by either showing 
(1) a deficiency of assets below liabilities with no reasonable prospect that the business can be successfully continued 
in the face thereof, or (2) an inability to meet maturing obligations as they fall due in the ordinary course of 
business." Id. at. 98, n. 17. (footnotes and internal quotations deleted) 
This term does not appear to have been precisely defined by the courts but has been used to indicate that 
the corporation is in the "vicinity" of insolvency. JayellRecovery, L.P. v. Gordon, 196 B.R. 348,355 (N.D.Tex. 
1996). 
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Consequently, the creditors of an insolvent corporation have standing to znaintain 
derivative claims against the directors for breaches of fiduciasy duties. The 
corporation's insolvency makes the creditors the principal constituency injured by 
m y  fiduciasy breaches that diminish the firm's value. Therefore, equitable 
considerations give creditors standing to pursue derivative claims against the 
directors of an insolvent corporation, hdividual creditors of an insolvent corporation 
have the same incentive to pursue valid derivative claims on its behalf that 
shareholders have when the corporation is solvent. (internal quotations omitted; 
emphasis in original) 
The fact that a corporation has become insolvent does not kux derivative claims into direct 
creditor claims. Id. at 102. "To recognize a new right for creditors to bring direct fiduciary claims 
against. . . directors would create a conflict between those directors' duties to maximize the value 
of the insolvent corporation for the benefit of all those having an interest in it. . . ." Id. at 104, n. 46, 
quoting Production Resources Group, L. L. C. v. NCT Group, lizc., 863 A.2d at 797. Thus, Reed 
Taylor's attempt to assert a direct claim8 in the present case is ill-founded, particularly because he 
seeks to bring a direct suit not against the directors, but against defendants who are one step further 
removed, lawyers who allegedly advised the  director^.^ If he has no standing to sue the directors 
directly, he certainly has no standing to sue the corporations' counsel directly. 
D. The Complaint Fails to State a Cause of Action for Civil Conspiracy. 
The distinction, which plaintiff Reed Taylor ignores in his complaint, between civil 
conspiracy and aiding and abetting is that an action for civil conspiracy cannot arise unless the 
parties to the alleged civil conspiracy each independently owe a duty to the aggrieved party. 
His complaint states at 1/ 10 that it is not a derivative action; rather, he is seeking to bring claims directly 
against HTEH. 
The plaintiff consistently fails to distinguish in his complaint between counsel for the corporations and 
counsel for the individual directors. 
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A civil conspiracy, however atrocious, does not per se give rise to a cause of 
action unless a civil wrong has been c iMed resulting in damage. The elements 
of an action for civil conspiracy are the fornation and operation of the conspiracy 
and dmage resulting to plaintiff from an act or acts done in hrthermce of the 
c o m o n  design. . . . In such an action the major significance of the conspiracy lies 
in the fact that it renders each participant in the wrongkl act jointly responsible as 
a joint tortfeasor for all darnages ensuing Gom the wrong, irrespective of whether or 
not he was a direct actor and regardless of the degee of his activity. 
A cause of action for civil conspiracy may not arise, however, if the alleged 
conspirator, though a pdicipmt in the ageement undalgng the injury, was not 
personally bowrd by the duty violated by the wrongdoing and was acting only as the 
agent or employee of the party who did have the duty. (citations and internal 
quotations deleted) 
Doctor's Co. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.3d 39,44,260 Cal.Rptr. 183, 185-1 86, 775 P.2d 508,510- 
Thus, in the Doctor's decision it was held that an attorney retained to assist in the defense 
of an insured against a third-party claim was not Liable to the claimant for dmages allegedly 
resulting from a conspiracy to violate provisions of the state insurance code which made it an unfair 
practice for an insurer to delay prompt and fair settlement of a claim where liability has become 
reasonably clear. The court reasoned that "[algents and employees of a corporation cannot conspire 
with their corporate principal or employer where they act in their official capacities on behalf of the 
corporation and not as individuals for their individual advantage." (Citations and internal quotations 
omitted) Id. at 44, 260 Cal.Rptr. at 186, 775 P.2d at 5 1 1. 
In Skarbrevik v. Cohen, England & mitJfieEd, 231 Cal.App. 3d 692, 282 Cal.Rptr. 627 
(1 991), it was alleged that an attorney for a closely held corporation was liable for civil conspiracy 
to conceal information from a minority shareholder. The California Court of Appeal, however, held 
that, absent either an individual duty to the plaintiff or a personal financial interest, the attorney 
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could not be held liable on a theory of civil conspiracy based on his actions as aeomey for the 
corporation. Id.., at 71 1,282 Cal.Rptr. at 640, Receipt by an aEomey of reasonable wmpensation 
for legal services pedomed does not constitute such financial interest as will support a cause of 
action for conspiracy to de-ti-aud. Id., at 710,282 Cal.Rptr. at 639; see also Camp v. Dema, 948 F.2d 
455,463 (8' Cir. 1991). 
Similarly, in Fischev v. Estate of Flax, 816 A.2d 1 (D.C. 20031, it was held that an attorney 
does not "conspire" with his own client merely by giving advice. The court stated, "To hold 
otherwise would be akin to saying that 'a defendant could conspire with his right m, which held, 
aimed, and fired the fatal weapon.' " Id. at 5, n. 4. The complaint in the present case fails to state 
a cause of action against HTEM for civil conspiracy. "[Tlhere can be no 'conspiracy' with a client 
if an attorney merely acts within the scope of his employment as an advisor to, or an advocate on 
behalf of, the client." Id. at 5. 
E. The Complaint Fails to State a Cause of Action for Interference with Contract 
Plainties first cause of action does not specifically allege intentional interference with 
contract. However, the general allegations of the complaint contain averments that could be 
construed as attempting to plead interference with contract. See, e.g., Complaint 14, alleging 
"intentional violation and interference with Reed J. Taylor's contractual rights" by, among other 
things, obtaining a TRO and preliminary injunction in the Underlying Litigation. 
Since the analysis of interference with contractual relations is similar to that of civil 
conspiracy, HTEH will respond here to the allegations that they improperly interfered with one or 
more contracts between their clients and Reed Taylor. 
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' f ie  elements of the tort of intentional iaterkrence with contract rue: 
(a) the existence of a contract, (2) howledge of the contract on the past- of the 
defendant, (3) intentional intefierence causing a breach of the contract, and (d) injury 
to the plaintiff resulting Erom the breach. 
Barlow v. Inter~zzational Hamester Co., 95 Idaho 881, 893, 522 P.2d 1102, 11 14 (1 9'74). 
A party c m o t  tortiously interfere with its own contract. Ostrander v. Farm Bureau f i t .  
Ins. Co. offdaho, Inc., 123 Idaho 650,654,85 1 P.2d 946,950 (1993). The actions of an agent acting 
within the scope and course of his authority are imputed to the principal. In Ostrander, a former 
employee of F m  Bureau alleged that her supervisor, Hart, had interfered with her employment 
contract by making an inaccurate evaluation of her performance which led to termination of her 
employment. The court held: 
As an agent of F m  Bureau, Hart had the authority to evaluate Ostrander and 
terminate her contract. Since Hart's actions with respect to Ostrander were within 
the scope of his authority as an agent of Farrn Bureau, there was no thrd party to the 
contract. Accordingly, Ostrander has not stated a claim for tortious interference with 
contract. 
Id. at 950, 85 1 P.2d at 654. 
In BECO Const. Co., Inc. v. J-U-B Engineers, kc. ,  145 Idaho 719, 184 P.3d 844 (2008), a 
contractor claimed that an engineering firm tortiously interfered with its contract with the City of 
Pocatello by failing to approve its application for final payment until perceived defects in 
construction were remedied. The court held the engineers were acting within the scope of their 
authority as project engineers for the city. Fulfillment of their duty to monitor the progress of 
construction and advise the city progress payments did not constitute interference with contract: 
Although J-U-B was not a party to the Construction Contract in the traditional sense, 
it acted as the City's agent by the very terms of the contract between BECO and the 
City. Ths case falls within 'the purview of Ostrander where an intentional 
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interference claim was found not to lie against an agent of a party who was acting 
within the scope of his authorit-y. 
Id., 1184 P.3d at 850. 
Other cases in accord with Ostrander and J-U-B are Leon v. Boise State UniversiQ, 125 
Idaho 365, 870 P.2d 1324 (1994) (the chair of a ~Gversity dep-ent could not be held liable for 
interfering witha professor" employment contract); Cunter v. Murphy 's Lounge, LLC, 14 1 Idaho 
16,105 P.3d 676 (2005) (the managing member of a limited liability company was not liable for the 
company's decision to terminate a contract); Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp. 141 Idaho 233, 108 
P.3d 380 (2005) (former employee's managers were acting within the scope and course of their 
employment and thus could not constitute third parties for purposes of a claim for intentional 
interference with contract); Thomas v. Medical Center Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200'6 1 P.3d 557 
(2002) (professional corporation could not be held liable for interference with its own contract); 
Cantwelt v. City of Boise, 2008 WL 2'757046 (Idaho 2008) (employee failed to establish claim for 
tortious interference with prospective economic advantage when employee's supervisors 
recommended termination of his employment contract). 
The relationship between an attorney and his or her client is that of principal and agent. An 
attorney cannot be held liable for interference with contract by giving advice to the client within the 
scope of the attorney's representation of the client. Therefore, Reed Taylor's complaint fails to 
plead a cause of action for intentional interference with contract. 
IV. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION - CONVERSION 
Plaintiffs second cause of action is for alleged conversion of an indeterminate sum of 
money. Conversion has been defined as "a distinct act of dominion wrongfully asserted over 
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mother's personal propem in denial [ofl or inconsistent with [the] rights berein. " Torh v Allr~d, 
100 Idaho 905,919,606 P.2d, 334,339 (1980); see also Peasley Tramfer & Storage Co. v. S ~ ~ i f h ,  
132 Idaho 732,743,979 P.2d 605 (1999) reh 'g denied (citation omitted) "Conversion in the legal 
sense applies only to personal property.'' Rowe v. Burrup, 95 Idaho 747,750,s 18 P.2d 1386 (1974). 
Plaintiff c m o t  state a valid claim for conversion against HTEH, however, for three reasons: 
(1) plaintiff does not own or have a possessory interest in the money claimed; (2) HTEH has not 
wronghlly asserted dominion over the money claimed; and (3) the money claimed by plaintiff is not 
identifiable as a specific chattel. Plaintiff's conversion claim therefore fails as a matter of law and 
should be dismissed. 
A. Plaintiff Does Not O m  the Sum of Money Claimed, 
In order to state a valid daim for conversion, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she has 
title to the property claimed, or a right of possession. Portland Seed Co. v. Clark, 35 Idaho 44,46- 
47,204 P. 146,146-47 (1922); Bowman 1). Adams, 45 Idaho 217,227,261 P. 679,682 (1927) reh 'g 
denied (citation omitted). "Generally, a plaintiff must establish legal ownershp or right to 
possession in the particular thing, the specifically identifiable moneys, that the defendant is alleged 
to have converted." Macomber v. Travelers Propert and Cizsual~ Cnrp., 804 A.2d 180,199 (Conn. 
2002) (internal quotations and citations omitted). No action for conversion of money may be 
brought if the plaintiff did not have ownership, possession or control of the subject money. Flute, 
Pnc. v. Rubel, 682 F.Supp. 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
The allegations of plaintiff's complaint do not clearly identifjr what specific sum of money 
plaintiff purportedly owns or is entitled to possess or control. It appears plaintiff is a creditor of AIA 
Services (Complaint, 77 51-55) whose right to payrnent of the debt has not been completely 
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established and is currently at issue in the Underlying Litigation. (See Camplairzt, 15-16.) At 
best, plaintiffhas a claitrz to a sum of money. Until plaintips claim is adjudicated and his alleged 
rights are asmatively established, plaintiff has IIO rigbt to any liquidated sum. Plaintiff therefore 
cannot establish a necessary element of his cause of action for conversion. 
B. Defendants Have Not Wrongfully Asserted Domkion Over the Property. 
A claim for conversion fails if the plaintiff cannot establish that the defendant wrongfklly 
exerted dominion over the subject personal property. See fir& V. Allred, 100 Idaho 905, 91 0,606 
P.2d 1334, 1339 (1 980). ""No conversion action can exist against a defendant who did not exercise 
any form of dominion or control over the property that was allegedly converted." US. Claims, Inc. 
v. Flomenhaft, 519 F.Supp.2d 532,536 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
In this case, HTEH is not alleged to have taken any property directly from plaintiff Instead, 
plaintiff's complaint alleges HTEH was compensated for attorney fees and costs incurred in 
defending its clients in the Underlying Litigation filed by plaintiff. (Complaint, 7 54.) Idaho law 
clearly permits corporations to hire attorneys to represent the corporations' interests and to 
compensate those attorneys for their services. See I.C. 5 30-1 -302(1) (establishing general corporate 
power to defend in its name); I.G. fj 30-1-302(7) (establishing general corporate power to make 
contracts and to incur liabilities); I.C. 5 30- 1 -302(15) (establishing general corporate power to make 
payments that further the business and affairs of the corporation); I..C. 4 30-1-850 et seg. 
(establishing general corporate power to indemnifjr directors and advance litigation expenses); see 
also Wayne v. Murphey-Favre h Co., 56 Idaho 788,791,59 P.2d 721,722 (1 936). AIA Services, 
AIA Insurance and CropUSA are legally authorized to hire HTEH and to pay the attorney fees and 
costs incurred relating to the defense of the claims asserted against the corporations in the 
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Underlying Litigation, nerefore, any exedion of dominion or control over &e attorney fees and 
costs paid to EXTEH, whether by AIA Services, AM hsurance, or CropUSA cannot be wrong(ik1 such 
that a claim for mnversion arises in favor of plaintiff. 
C. PlaiolafPs Claimed Sum of Money Is Not Identifiable as a Specific Chattel. 
Plainties conversion claim against HTEH alleges only the conversion of an indeteminate 
mount  of money. Wormally conversion for misappropriation of money does not lie unless it can 
be described or identzjed as a speczfic chattel." Warm Springs Properties, Inc. v. Andora Villa, Ine., 
96 Idaho 270, 272, 526 P.2d 1106 (1974) (emphasis added). "More particularly, if the alleged 
converted money is incapable of being described or identified in the same manner as a specific 
chattel, it is not the proper subject of a conversion action." High Eew Fund, L.P. v. Hall, 27 
F.Supp.2d 420,428 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (citation and internal quotations omitted). 
An action for conversion of money is insufficient as a matter of law unless it is 
alleged that the money converted was in specific tangible funds of whch claimant 
was the owner and entitled to immediate possession. An action for conversion does 
not lie to enforce a mere obligation to pay money. 
EIzrlich v. Howe, 848 F.Supp. 482,492 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (citations omitted); see also Landskroner 
v. Landskroner, 797 N.E.2d 1002 (Oho App. 8 Dist., 2003). "In other words, an action alleging 
conversion ofmoney Iies only where there is an obligation to deliver the specific pieces ofthe money 
in question or money that has been specifically sequestered, rather than a mere obligation to deliver 
a certain sum." Southlizrst Bank v. Donley, 925 So.2d 934,940 (Ala. 2005) (citations and internal 
quotations omitted) Even if Reed Taylor were a shareholder of A N  Services or A N  Insurance, he 
would have no personal right to possess or exert dominion over the assets of either corporation. 
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V. THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION - IDAHO CONSUAMER PROTECTION ACT 
Plaintiffs third cause of action is for an alleged violation of the Idaho Consmer Protection 
Act (hereinafier the "Act"). Plaintiff, however, has not asserted -- and indeed cannot assert - a valid 
claim under the Act against HTEH because plaintiff had no contract with HTEH from which an 
alleged claim could possibly arise. Accordingly, plaintiff's thrd cause of action must be dismissed 
as a matter of law. 
The Act, Idaho Code $ 8  48-601 through 48-61 9, prohbits unfair methods of competition and 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce within the State of Idaho. 
The purpose ofthe Idaho Consmer Protection Act is "to protect both consumers and 
businesses against unfair methods of competition and unfair and deceptive practices 
in the conduct of trade or commerce, and to provide efficient and economical 
procedures to secure such protection. It is the intention of the legislature that t h s  
chapter be remedial and so construed." I.C. 8  48-601. Idaho Code 5  48-603, which 
contains a knowledge requirement, provides an enumeration of unfair methods of 
competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or 
commerce that the legislature declared to be unlawful. I.C. 5  48-603C also declares 
any unconscionable method, act or practice in the trade or commerce to be a violation 
of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act whether it occurs before, during, or afier the 
conduct of the trade or commerce. 
While v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882, 890, 104 P.3d 356,364 (2004). 
Idaho Code 5 5  48-603 and 48-603A set forth certain practices whch are prohbited under 
the Act. Idaho Code 5  48-608(1) allows individuals to pursue a cause of action for an alleged 
violation of the Act and provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
Any person who purchases or leases goods or sewices and thereby suffers an 
ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or 
employment by anotherperson of a method, act orpractice declared unlawful by this 
chapter, may treat any agreement incident thereto as voidable or, in the alternative, 
may bring an action to recover damages or one thousand dollars ($1,000), whch ever 
is greater.. . . 
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are even further removed from those at issue in Husk-in because in this case plaintiff has not alleged 
that any transaction was even "contemplated" between the parties. 
Further, the Court of Appeals of Washington recently held that allowing a plaintiff to sue lus 
or her adversary's attorney mder a consumer protection act theory inhnges on the attorney-client 
relationskip. deckle v. Grotty, 85 P.3d 93 1 mash.App.Div. 3,2004). In support of that finding, the 
court relied on Connecticut case law, holding as follows: 
Providing a private cause of action under [the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices 
Act] to a supposedly aggrieved party for the actions of his or her opponent's attorney 
would stand the attorney-client relationship on its head and would compromise an 
attorney's duty of undivided loyalty to his or her client and thwart the exercise of the 
attorney's independent professional judgment on h s  or her client's behalf. SujGeld 
Dev. Assoc. Ltd. P 'ship v. Nut ' I  Loan Investors, L.P., 260 Conn. 766, 783 -84, 802 
A.2d 44. 
Id., 85 P.3d at 384-85 (other citations omitted). 
Not only is there a complete absence of any contract or consumer relationship between Reed 
Taylor and HTEH which would form the basis for a claim, see I.C. 4 48-608(1); Haskin, 102 Idaho 
at 788, but Reed Taylor should not be permitted to sue his adversaries' attorneys under the Act. 
VL. FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION - LEGAL MALPRACTICE 
A. There Is No Attorney-Client Relationship between Plaintiff and Defendants. 
The plaintifp s fourth cause of action is for legal malpractice. 
To establish a claim for attorney malpractice/professional negligence, the 
plaintiff must show: (1) the creation of an attorney-client relationshp; (2) the 
existence of a duty on the part of the lawyer; (3) the breach of the duty of the 
standard of care by the lawyer; and (4) that the failure to perform the duty was a 
proximate cause of the damages suffered by the client. 
Becker v. Cullahan, 140 Idaho 522,526,96 P.3d 623,627 (2004), citingMcColm-Trash v. Baker, 139 
Idaho 948, 951, 88 P.3d 767, 770 (2004); Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 590, 21 P.3d 908, 912 
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(2081); M r i a s  v. Marano, 120 Idaho 11, 13,813 P.2d 350,352 (1991); Johmotz v. Junes, 103 Idaho 
702,652 P.2d. 650 (1982). 
The first impediment to plaintiffs malpractice claim is the failure to allege the existence of an 
attorney-client relationship - the so-called privity rule. The complaint does not allege that HTEM 
represented the plaintiff in comection with any events alleged therein.'' ordinarily, one not in privity 
of contract with an attorney c m o t  bring suit for legal malpractice against the attorney. Stated 
otherwise, the care and skill an attorney owes his or her client ordinarily do not extend to t h d  parties. 
Nhtional Sav. Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195,205-206,25 L.Ed. 621 (1879); Buseher v. Boning, 114 
Hawai'i 202, 159 P.2d 814 (2007); Rhode v. Adams, 288 Mont. 278,957 P.2d 1124 (1998); Lilyhorn 
v, Dier, 214 Neb. 728, 335 N.W.2d 554,555 (1983). 
The reasons for the privity rule are manifold: "The scope of an attorney's contractual duty to 
a client is defined by the purposes for which the attorney is retained." Johnson v. Jones, 103 Idaho 702, 
703,652 P.2d 650,652 (1 982). Absent the privity rule, "clients would lose control over the attorney- 
client relationship, and attorneys would be subject to almost unlimited liability." Barcelo v. Elliott, 923 
S.W. 2d 575,580 (Tex. 1996). Allowing a broad cause of action in favor of third parties would create 
a conflict of interest between an attorney's client and such thrd parties, thereby limiting the attorney's 
ability to zealously represent his or her client. Id. at 578. "Attorneys owe hndamental duties to their 
clients. Among the most important of these duties are the duties of zealous representation and loyalty." 
McKlveen, 
Incident to 
In approximately 1987 Mr. Riley was employed by the fm of Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Tmbow & 
Chtd., a law fm that represented Reed Taylor in connection with his divorce from Donna Taylor. 
the divorce, Series A preferred stock in MA Services was issued to Mrs. Taylor. The complaint does not 
allege any act or omission of Mr. Riley in connection with the divorce or the issuance of the Series A preferred stock 
as the basis for damages allegedly sustained by Reed Taylor. Even if such allegation were to be made, the applicable 
two-year statute of limitation, Idaho Code Ej 5-219, has long since m. 
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Ilrfeinze v. Bauer , 145 Idaho 232, 1 78 P,3d 597, 603 (2008). Those duties would be i~revocably 
compromised if attorneys were required to temper their representation by taking into account the 
economic interests of third parties. Finally, the aRorney-client relationship, although based on contract, 
involves a highly personal and confidential relationship '" . . more analogous to a contract of a personal 
nature than to an ordinafy comercia1 contract." Juchon v. Rogers d; Tells, 210 Cd.App.3d 336, 
342,258 Cal.Rptr. 454 (1 989). Imposing duties to non-clients would give rise to increased malpractice 
suits and cause attorneys to practice in a manner calculated to protect tlzmselves personally rather than 
advance the interests of their clients,, 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Harrigfeld v. Huncock, 140 Idaho 134, 90 P.3d 884 (2004), 
confkonted the issue of whether a legal malpractice action must arise out of an attorney-client 
relationship. In that case disappointed heirs sought to bring a legal malpractice action against the 
attorney who drafted a decedent's will and three codicils. Each of the two later codicils revoked prior 
codicils. The heirs contended the codicils were intended by the testatrix to be cumulative. The court 
acknowledged: "As a general rule, an attorney will be held liable for negligence only to h s  or her client 
and not to someone with whom the attorney does not have an attorney-client relationshp." Id. at 137, 
90 P.3d at 887. However, the court held this is not an invariable rule and that in deciding whether to 
recognize a new duty or extend a duty beyond the scope previously imposed the court would adopt what 
it called a "balance-of-the-harms" test. 
The Harrigfeld test involves weighing the following policy considerations: 
[Tlhe foreseeability of the ham to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the 
plaintiff suffered injury; the closeness of the connection between the defendant's 
conduct and the injury suffered; the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct; 
the policy of preventing fidture ham; the extent of the burden to the defendant and 
consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting 
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liability for breach; and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance .for the risk 
involved. 
Id. at 138, 90 P.3d at 888. 
C o n s i d e ~ g  those factors, the court held that an at2orney preparFng testamentary instruments 
owes a duty to the beneficiaries named in the instruments to effectuate the testator's intent. Tlxs is the 
only instance to date in whch the requirement of privity in a legal malpractice action has been 
abrogated under Idaho law. The Harriafeld court cautioned: 
A direct attorney-client relationship is required to exist between the plaintiff and the 
at-tomey-defendant in a legal malpractice action except in this very narrow 
circumstance. 
The reason for such cautionary limitation was aptly expressed by the Harrigfeld court, quoting 
While privity of contract has been abolished in many areas of tort law, the concern 
is still that liability for negligence not extend to an unlimited and unknown number 
of potential plaintiffs. In the area of legal malpractice the attorney's obligations to 
his client must remain paramount. In such cases the best approach is that the 
plaintiffs must allege and prove facts demonstrating that they are in the nature of 
third-party intended beneficiaries of the relationship between the client and the 
attorney in order to recover in tort. By this we mean that to establish a duty owed by 
the defendant attorney to the nonclient the nonclient must allege and prove that the 
intent of the client to benefit the nonclient third party was the primary or direct 
purpose of the transaction or relationship. 
Id. at 137, 90 P.3d at 887. 
The Idaho Supreme Court, in a case decided after Harrigfeld, declined to create an additional 
exception to the privity requirement. In Taylor v. Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 127 P.3d 156 (2005), the 
Taylors, as remainder beneficiaries of a trust, attempted to sue the trustee's attorney for legal 
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malpractice. After a thorough discussion of the Harri&ld factors, the court affimed dismissal under 
Rule 12@)(6) of the claim of malpractice against the attorney: 
The ~ r d  count of the complaint asserts a professional malpractice claim 
against Mr. Maile and this count is precluded by the general rule espoused in 
Harrigfeld that an attorney-client relationship with the plaintiff is a prerequisite for 
holding the attorney liable for negligence in the perfomance of legal services. 
Id. at 259, 127 P.3d 156. 
The court in Maile also upheld dismissal of the claim of breach of fiduciary duty against the 
attorney because he bad assumed no fiduciary duty to them; he was acting as counsel for the fiduciary 
rather than as a fiduciary hmself - an important distinction. C.' Jones v. Runft, Leroy, CoSJin & 
Matthews, 125 Idaho 607,613, 873 P.2d 861.867 (1994), where an attorney assumed fiduciary duties 
by agreeing to be the disbursing agent of money in a commercial transaction. In Maile, the court did 
find that a constructive trust could be imposed on property the attorney purchased from the trust with 
knowledge that the trustee was acting improperly. Taylor v. Maile, supra at 259,127 P.3d 156 at 162. 
There Is no allegation in the present case that HTEH improperly purchased assets from any party. 
B. Plaintiff Reed Taylor Lacks Standing to Bring Suit Against Opposing Counsel. 
Plaintiff lacks standing to sue the attorneys for AIA Services, AIA Insurance and CropUSA. 
Plaintiff concedes in h s  complaint that he is not bringing a shareholder derivative action (Complaint 
fi 10) but rather seeks to plead a direct cause of action against the corporations' attorneys. His theory 
seems to be that because he is an alleged creditor of one or more of the corporations, he is entitled to 
bring suit directly against opposing counsel." 
' ' If this theory were valid, every action in wbich a debt is contested would devolve into a lawsuit against 
the alleged debtor's counsel for having the temerity to represent their client in defending against the debt. 
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A person wishing to invoke the court's jjurisdiction must have swding. Van Phlkenl%enburgh 
v. Citizensfir Term Limits, 135 Idaho 121, 124, 15 P.3d 1129, 1132 (2000). As noted inMiles v. 
Idaho Power Go., 116 Idaho 635, 639, 778 P.2d 757, 761 (19891, the doctrine of standing is a 
subcategory of justiciability. "Standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the issues the 
party wishes to have adjudicated." Young v. City ofketchurn, 137 Idaho 102,106,44 P.3d 1 157,1159 
(2002). See also Boundary Backpackers v. Boundavy County, 128 Idaho 371,913 P.2d 1 141 (1 996). 
The court in Young; supra, elucidated the applicable principle as follows: 
To satisfy the case or controversy requirement of standing, a litigant must "allege or 
demorlstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood the relief requested will 
prevent or redress the claimed injury." (Citations omitted) This requires a showing 
of a "distinct palpable injury" and "fairly traceable causal connection between the 
claimed injury and the challenged conduct." (Citations omitted) 
Id. at 106,44 P.3d at 1159. 
' R e  requirement of standing was fivther explicated in the case of Bowles v. Pro Indiviso, Inc., 
132 Idaho 371, 973 P. 2d 142 (1999) as follows: 
In order to fulfill the standing requirement, the plaintiff must "'allege such a 
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy' as to warrant his invocation of the 
court's jurisdiction." Bentel, 104 Idaho at 135-36,656 P.2s at 1388-89 (quoting Life 
of the Land, 623 P.2d at 438) (emphasis in original). The party seeking to invoke the 
court's jurisdiction must allege such a personal stake in the outcome of the 
controversy as to assure the concrete adversariness which sharpens the presentation 
upon which the court so depends. See Miles, 116 Idaho at 641, 778 P.2d at 763 
(quoting Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59,72,98 S.Ct. 
2620, 2630, 57 L.Ed. 2d 595 (1978). This "personal stake" requirement demands 
that the plaintiff allege a distinct palpable injury to himself. 
Id. at 377, 973 P.2d at 146. 
Reed Taylor has failed to demonstrate a personal stake in any theoretically posited controversy 
among AIA Services, AM Insurance, CropUSA and their defense counsel. Accordingly, he lacks 
standing to assert any direct claim for professional negligence against the defendants in this case. 
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VXI. TEE CLAIMS OF LEGAL MALPWCTIGE, AIDING AND mETTING, 
AND CIVIL CONSPIUCY ARE BA D BY LITIGATION P 
It would be particularly peficious and desmctive of the attomey-client relationship if 
attorneys in a litigated matter were held to have a duty of care or loyalty to the adverse party - in 
ei'fect, that they become co-counsel for the opponent. The defendants c m o t  possibly act as zealous 
advocates of AIA Services, AIA Insurance and CropUSA if they are also deemed to owe duties of care 
and loyalty to Reed Taylor. "An attorney owes no duty to a third party in an adversarial relationship." 
Bowman v. Two, 104 Wash.2d 181, 188,704 P.2d 140 (1 085). "'Existence of a duty to an adversary 
party beyond the courtesy and respect owed all participants in the legal process. . . would interf'ere with 
the undivided Loyalty an attorney owes a client and would diminish an attorney's ability to achieve the 
most advantageous position for a client." Id. at 189. Accord, The Chapman Children 's Trust v. 
Porter & Hedges, L.L.P., 32 S.W.3d 419 (Tex.App. 2000); Rhode v. Adam, 288 Mont. 278,957 P.2d 
1124 (1998); Garcia v. Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A., 106 N.M. 757, 750 P.2d 118 
(1988); Friedman v. Dozorc, 412 Mich. 1,312 N.W.2d 585 (1981). 
Section 890 of theliestatement (Second) of Torts (1979) provides: "One who would otherwise 
would be liable for a tort is not liable if he acts in pursuance of and within the limits of a privilege of 
his own or of a privilege of another that was properly delegated to him." The statements and conduct 
of an attorney who participates in the judicial process are protected by the litigation privilege, or as 
it is sometimes is called, litigation immunity. The privilege is not absolute; for instance, it does not 
permit a lawyer to steal documents, IBP, Inc., v. Klumpe, 101 S.W.2d, 461 (Tex-App. 2001), to 
physically assault another party, Miller v. Stqnehenge/FA~A - Texas, 993 F.Supp. 461 (N.D. Tex. 
1998), or to commit acts which constitute abuse of process or malicious prosecution. Otherwise, the 
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privilege is broad. "['T[he litigation pr~vilcge protects l a v e r s  not only against defmation adions but 
against a host of other tort-related clairns." L o i p a n  v. Middletown, 185 N.J. 566,889 A.2d 426,436 
It was held in Loigwzan that an attomey who excluded a spectator and self-styled community 
watchdog from a hearing on the allegedly specious ground that the person was a potential witness was 
held to be i m m e  &om a 42 U.S.C. $1983 suit brought by the disgruntled watchdog. The court 
observed that "[tlhe common policy thread that m s  through judicial, prosecutorial and witness 
i m ~ t y  is the need to ensure that participants in the judicial process act without fear of the threat 
of nrinous civil litigation when performing their respective functions." Id., at 581, 889 A.2d at 436. 
The privilege applies even where the theories advanced by counsel are new or innovative: 
Typically, the litigation privilege has been invoked by attorneys to safeguard 
them from defamation suits arising from comments made in the course of judicial 
proceedings. However, to address creative pleading, courts have extended the 
litigation privilege to cover unconventional and sometimes novel causes of action 
against attorneys acting within the judicial process. As one scholar put it, as new tort 
theories have emerged, courts have not hesitated to expand the privilege to cover 
theories, actions, and circumstances never contemplated by those who formulated the 
rule in medieval England. (Citations and internal quotations deleted) 
Id. at 583, 889 A.2d at 435-436. 
If attorneys must work in constant fear of civil liability, then the rights of all clients will suffer. 
Thus, it has been recognized that counsel owes no duty to a party opponent in litigation: 
Historically, our court system has always been adversarial in nature. The role 
of the attorney therein is to represent and advocate a client's cause of action as 
vigorously as the rules of law and professional ethics will permit. For that reason 
an attorney's exclusive and paramount duty must be to the client alone and this duty 
cannot run to the client's adversary. Not only would the adversary's interests 
interfere with the client's interests: but the attorney's ongoing and justifiable concern 
with being sued would detrimentally interfere with the attorney client relationship. 
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Thus, an attorney in dischmging professional duties on behalf of his c l i enkmot  be 
held liable for negligence toward m adverse party. As a matter of public policy in 
order to rnairltain and enforce the fide1it.y and duty of the attorney toward the client, 
we c m o t  jeopasdize the hte@ly of the adversarJa1 system by imposing a 
professional duty on an attorney towad an adverse party. (Citations omitted) 
Garcia v. Rody, Diclkason, Sloan, Akin & Rabb, 106 N.M. 757,761,750 P.2d 118, 122 (1988). 
Nor does violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility give rise to a private cause of 
action, either in favor of the lawyer's o m  clients or third pmies. "The rules are designed to provide 
pidance to lawyers and to provide a struchue for regulating conduct thou& disciplinary agencies. 
They are not desiaed to be a basis for civil liability." Id. at 762,750 P.2d 123. 
Numerous reported cases support the proposi~on that the privilege attaches where attorneys 
represent clients in litigaticrn or other contested or adversarial matters. See, e.g., Atpert v. Cmin, Caton 
& James, P.C., 178 S.W. 2d 398 (Tex.App. 2005); CSXTransportatian, bnc. v Gilkinson, 2007 
858423 (N.D.W.TJa. 2007), Weaver v. Superior Court, 95 Cal.App. 3d 166,156 Cal. Rptr. 745 j1979), 
Clark v. Dmckmarz, 28 1 W.Va. 41 7,624 S.E. 2d 864 (2005); Friedman v. Dozorc, 412 Mich. l , 3  12 
N.W.2d 585 (1981). 
The case of Kahala Royal Corp. v. Coodsill Anderson Quinn & Stgel, 1 13 Hawai'i 25 1, 15 1 
P.3d 732 (2007), contains an extensive review of the authorities and the policy reasons for barring a 
litigant's claim for civil damages against an opposing attorney for statements made or actions taken 
in the course of the attorney's representation of an opposing party related to the civil litigation. The 
policy reasons include: 
(I) promoting the candid, objective, and undistorted disclosure of evidence; (2) 
placing the burden of testing evidence upon the litigants during trial; (3) avoiding the 
chilling effect resulting from the threat of subsequent litigation; (4) reinforcing the 
fir~ality of judgments; (5) limiting collateral attacks upon judgments; (6) promoting 
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zealous advocacy; (7) discouraBng abusive i~tigation practices; and (8) encourasng 
settlen~enl. 
Id. at 268, 15 1 P.3d at 750. 
The allegations in the present case relate to theories advanced, positions taken, comments 
made and defenses raised by HTEH in Litigation or related adversarial matters relating to disputed 
control of closely held corporations. Those corporations are entitled to zealous representation by 
attorneys of their own choosing, who should not be required to labor under constant threats of 
vindictive and retaliatory litigation by the adverse party. The litigation privilege applies not only to 
plaintips cause of action for professional malpractice, but to those of aiding and abetting and civil 
conspiracy, which should be dismissed in their entirety on the ground that the actions of HTEH as 
litigation counsel for AIA Services, AIA Insurance and CropUSA are privileged. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The complaint fails to state a cognizable claim. The plaintiffs cause of action for aiding and 
abetting does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted because he fails to allege any facts 
that, if true, would establish that HTEH owed my duty to him or that he has any standing to sue HTEH 
directly. His claims of civil conspiracy and intentional interference with contract also fail because, 
as a matter of law, an agent, such as an attorney, is incapable of conspiring with his principal or 
interfering with the principal's contract. His claim under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act fails as 
a matter of law because he does not allege he has purchased any goods or services from HTEH. His 
claim for conversion is legally deficient because he fails to allege any specific chattel of which he was 
wrongfully dispossessed by HTEH. He fails to allege any facts which would show that he is in privity 
with HTEH or has any standing to sue that f i m  or its attorneys for malpractice. Finally, plaintiffs 
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complaint is deficient because the actions of HTEH in comectian with the Underlying Litigation are 
protected by the litigation privilege. 
DATEDthis 9 dayof ~ P T ~ ~ Q R  ,2008. 
ELAM & BURKE?, P.A. 
By: 
Atto eys for ~efendat&(s P' 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 9 day ofG& & m hp*f ,2008, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to bk served upon the following in the manner 
indicated below: 
Michael S. Bissell -- U.S. Mail 
CAMPBELL BISSELL & WY, PLLC Hand Delivery 
7 South Howard Street, Ste. 416 J Federal Express 
Spokane, WA 99201 Facsimile Transmission (509) 455-71 1 1 
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J m e s  2). L a u e  TSB #I780 
Loren C. Ipsen ISB N1767 
251 E. Front Stwet, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Faesinriile: (208) 384-5844 
E & B File No. 7082-001 3 
Attorneys for Defendmts 
ZN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICLAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, ;in individual; 
Plaintiff, 
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. 
JOHN ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V. 
COLLINS, an individual; R I C W  A. 
RILEY, an indvidual; HAWLEY TROXELL 
ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X, 
unknown individuals; 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 08-01765 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT 
FOR DAMAGES 
COME NOW Defendants Gary D. Babbitt, D. John Ashby, Patrick V. Collins, Richard 
A. Riley and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP ("Hawley Troxell"), (collectively referred to 
as "answering Defendants"), by and through their counsel of record, Elam & Burke, P.A., and 
, , 
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fortheir Answer to Pl&tiFs Complaint for Dmages ("Complaint"), admit, deny and allege as 
fillows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's Complaht fajls to state a cause of action against these mwering Defendants 
upon wbich relief can be granted, 
SECOW DEFENSE 
These answ*g Defendants deny each and every allegation contained in Plainties 
Complaint not specifically admitted herein. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
Plaintiff lacks standing to assert the causes of action alleged in his Complaint. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
1. In answer to paragraph 1 of Plainties Complaint, these answering Defendants 
respond that the second sentence states a legal conclusion to which no response is required and 
admit the rem&der of the allegations contained therein. 
2. In answer to paragraph 2 of Plainties Complaint, these answering Defendants 
admit that Hawley Troxell is an Idaho limited liability partnership engaged in the business of 
practicing law, but deny the remaining allegations contained therein as legal contentions of the 
pleader. 
3. In answer to paragraph 3 of Plaintiff's Complaint, these answering Defendants 
admit the allegations contained therein. 
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4. In answer to paragaph 4 of Plaintiffs Complaint, these answekg Defex~dants 
admit the allegations contained therein, 
5. In m w e r  to paragraph 5 of Plaintiffs Complaint, these answering Defendants 
admit the allegations contained therein. 
6. In mswer to paraga$6 of Plaintiff's Complaint, these answering Defendants 
a&t the allegations contained therein. 
7. In answer to paragraph 7 of Plaintiff's Complaint, these answering Defendants 
deny the allegations contained therein. 
8. In answer to paragraph 8 of Plaintiff's Complaint, these answering Defendants 
a&t they have engaged in the business of practicing law in Nez Perce County, Idaho, but deny 
the remaining allegations contained therein. 
9. In Answer to paragraph 9 of Plaintiff's Complaint, these answering Defendants 
admit that jurisdiction and venue for this matter are proper in Nez Perce County District Court, 
but deny the remaining allegations contained therein. 
10. In answer to paragraph 10 of Plaintiffs Complaint, these answering Defendants 
deny the allegations contained therein. 
1 1. In answer to paragraph 1 1 of Plaintiff's Complaint, these answering Defendants 
note that the first two sentences do not state any allegations against these answering Defendants 
to which a response is required. To the extent a response is required, these answering 
Defendants deny these allegations. These answering Defendants deny the remaining allegation 
contained therein. 
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12, In w w e r  to pxagaph 1.2 of Plainties Compl&t, these a ~ s w e h g  Defendmk 
admit that A H  SekY.ices Corporztlion was insolvent in 2001 and has conthud to be insolvent 
from said date; deny any implication that such kolvency only first co erzced in 200 1 ; and 
o.tbemise deny the allegations in paragaph 12 of Plaintips Complaint. 
13. In answer to paragaph 13 of Plainties Complaint, these answering Defendants 
acknowledge the existence of the Amended anz& Restated Stock Pledge Agreement, but state that 
the document speaks for itself. These answering Defendants respond that the second and third 
sentences state a legal conclusion to which no response is required and note that paragraph 13 of 
Plaintiffs Complaint does not state any allegations against these answering Defendants to which 
a response is required. Ts  the extent a response is required, these answering Defendants deny 
these allegations. 
14. In answer to paragraph 14 of Plaintiffs Complaint, these answering Defendants 
deny the allegations contained therein. 
15. In answer to paragraph 15 of Plaintiffs Complaint, these answering Defendants 
admit that there is a pending civil action filed in Nez Perce County, Case No. CV-07-00208; 
admit that the Court entered an Opinion and Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Partial S m a r y  
Judgment and Motion for Injunction on February 8,2008, and state that the Opinion and Order 
speaks for itself; but deny the remaining allegations contained therein. 
16. In answer to paragraph 16 of Plaintiffs Complaint, these answering Defendants 
admit that there is a pending civil action filed in Nez Perce County, Case No. CV-07-00208; 
state that Complaint speaks for itself; but deny the remaining allegations contained therein. 
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17. In mswer to paragraph 17 of Ir'lajntips ComplaintLa-, &ese ansufehg Eefendants 
admit that that J o h  Taylor was at all material times the chief exelllive officer and a director of 
ALA Sesvice G o ~ o r a ~ o n  md AIA. hsurance, k c .  and a shareholder of AM S h c e s  
Go~poration. These a n s w e g  Defendmts admit that they appemd in the pendhg civil action 
filed in Nez Perce Comty, Case No. CV-07-00208; state that the appearances by these answering 
Defendmts and the allegations contained in both the Compl&t and Answer speak for 
themselves; but deny the r m a i ~ n g  allegations contained in paragraph 17 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
18. In answer to paragraph 18 of Plaintiffs Complaint, these answering Defendants 
admit receiving commicatjons from Roderick C. Bond but state that the communications 
speak for themselves; admit that they appeared in the pending civil action but state that the 
appearances speak for themselves; and deny the remaining allegations contained therein. 
19. In answer to paragraph 19 of Plaintiffs Complaint, these answering Defendants 
admit that the Defendants and their respective counsel of record entered into a Joint Defense 
Agreement but deny the remaining allegations contained therein. 
20. In answer to paragraph 20 of Plaintiffs Complaint, these answering Defendants 
deny the allegations contained therein. 
21. In answer to paragraph 21 of Plaintiffs Complaint, these answering Defendants 
admit they owe duties as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, but state that the 
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct speak for themselves. These answering Defendants deny 
t-be remaining allegations contained therein. 
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22. 2~ answer to pmgraph 22 of PlahtiEs Complht, &ese mswering Defend=& 
admit they owe duties as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional Condu~t, but state ?&at the 
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct: speak for themselves. These answering Defendmts deny 
the remailling allegations can tah4  therein. 
23. In answer to paragapb 23 of PlahtiPs Complaint, these answering Defendmts 
a h i t  they owe duties as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, but state that the 
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct speak for themselves. These answering Defendants deny 
the remaining allegations contained therein. 
24. In answer to paragraph 24 of Plaintiffs Complaint, these answering Defendants 
admit they owe duties as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, but state that the 
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct speak for themselves. These answering Defendants deny 
the remaining allegations contained therein. 
25. Tn Answer to paragraph 25 of Plaintiffs Complaint, these answering Defendants 
deny the dlegillions contained therein. 
26. In answer to paragraph 26 of Plaintiffs Complaint, these answering Defendants 
admit they have worked with Quarles & Brady LLP and Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A. in 
the joint defense of the civil action filed by Plaintiff in Nez Perce County, Case No. CV-07- 
00208, but deny the remaining allegations contained therein. 
27. In answer to paragraph 27 of Plaintiffs Complaint, these answering Defendants 
deny the allegations contained therein. 
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28. In answer to paasaph  28 oFPlaintiFs Camplaht, these mwering Defendmts 
admit that Hawley Troxell has received and accepted pawent of a~orney  fees and costs for legal 
services pe r fom4  for AIA Services Corporation, AIA Znswmm, Inc, and Crop USA Inswmce 
Agency, Inc, in the civil action filed by P lh t i f f  in Nez Perce Comty, Case No. CV-07-00208, 
but deny the r m a i ~ n g  allegations contained therein. 
29. In answer to paragraph 29 of PlGntiPs Complaint, these answering Defendants 
admit receiving comunications from Roderick C. Bond, but state that the comunications 
speak for themselves, and deny the r m a i i n g  allegations contained therein. 
30. In answer to paragraph 30 of Plaintiffs Complaint, these answering Defendants 
deny the allegations contained therein. 
3 1. In answer to paragraph 3 1 of Plaintiffs Complaint, these answering Defendants 
deny the allegations contained therein. 
32. In answer to paragraph 32 of Plaintiffs Complaint, these answering Defendants 
state that the Court record in the civil action filed in Nez Perce County, Case No. CV-07-00208, 
including (without limitation) the Court record in connection with Plaintiffs attempt to add 
Michael Cashman as a named defendant, speaks for itsele and these answering Defendants deny 
the allegations contained therein. 
33. In answer to paragraph 33 of Plaintiffs Complaint, these answering Defendants 
deny the allegations contained therein. 
34. In answer to paragraph 34 of Plaintiffs Complaint, these answering Defendants 
deny the allegations contained therein. 
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35. In mswer to paragaph 35 of Plahtiflrs Compl~nt,  these m w e k g  Defendants 
deny the allegations contained therein. 
36. In answer to paragaph 36 oEPlaintiFs Complaint, these m w e ~ g  Defendants 
deny the allegations mniaked therein. 
37. h aslswer to pmagraph 37 of Plaintiffs Complaint, these answering Defendants 
d a y  the allegations contained therein. 
38. In answer to paragraph 38 of Plaintiffs Complaint, these answering Defendants 
deny the allegations contailled therein. 
39. In answer to paragraph 39 of Plaintiffs Complaint, these answering Defendants 
admit that the Waskngton Bank Properties note and the deed of trust on the Lewis Cl& Plaza 
building securing that note were transferred by the Liquidator of The Universe Life Insurance 
Company, a wholly-owned subsidiary of AIA Services Corporation, to AIA Services 
Corporation and that AIA Services Corporation subsequently pledged the note and deed of trust 
to Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. as collateral to secure a loan made to AIA Services 
Corporation by Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. These answering Defendants further admit 
that Hawley Troxell assisted in drafting the necessary documents to effectuate the transfer of the 
note and deed of trust by the Liquidator to AIA Services Corporation and the subsequent pledge 
of the note and deed of trust by AIA Services Corporation to Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. 
to secure a loan by Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. to AIA Services Corporation. These 
answering Defendants deny the remaining allegations in paragraph 39 of Plaintiffs Complaint. 
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40. In answer to paagaph 40 ofPl&tifE"s Complaht, these answering Defmdmts 
deny the allegations wntained therein. 
41. In Answer to paragapb 41 of Plaintiffs Compl&t, these answekg Defend- 
deny the dlegations contajnd therein. 
42. In answer to paragaph 42 of Plahtifts Complaint, these answering Defendants 
deny the allegations contained therein. 
43. In answer to paragraph 43 of Plaintiffs Complaint, these answering Defendants 
deny the allegations contained therein. 
44. In answer to paragraph 44 of Plaintiffs Complaint, these answering Defendants 
state that the minutes of the April 30,2007 ~o in t  meeting of the boards of directors of AIA 
Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. speak for themselves and deny the allegations 
contained in paragraph 44 of Plaintiffs Complaint. 
45. In answer to paragraph 45 of Plaintiffs Complaint, these answering Defendants 
deny the allegations contained therein. 
46. In answer to paragraph 46 of Plaintiffs Complaint, these answering Defendants 
deny the allegations contained therein. 
47. In answer to paragraph 47 of Plaintiffs Complaint, these answering Defendants 
deny the allegations contained therein. 
48. In answer to paragraph 48 of Plaintiffs Complaint, these answering Defendants 
deny the allegations contained therein. 
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49. In answer to paragaph 49 of Plaintips Compl&t, these m w e ~ n g  Defendmts 
deny the allegations cont&ed therein. 
50. In mswer to pa ra~aph  50 of PlainhfPs Complaint, these answering Defendants 
deny the allegations contained therein. 
5 1. In answer to paragraph 5 1 of Plaintiffs Complaint, these answering Defendants 
deny the allegations contained therein. 
52. In answer to paragraph 52 of Plaintiffs Complaint, these answering Defendants 
acknowledge the 1995 Stock Pledge Agreement and the 1996 Amended and Restated Stock 
Pledge Agreement but state that the documents speak for themselves; and deny the allegations 
contained in paragraph 52 of Plaintiffs Complaint. 
53. In answer to paragraph 53 of Plaintiffs Complaint, these answering Defendants 
admit that Eberle Berlin Kading Turnbow & McKlveen, Chtd. represented AIA Services 
Corporation in connection with the redemption of AIA Services Corporation common stock fiom 
Reed 5.  Taylor, paxticipated in drafting the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement and 
other applicable agreements, and issued an opinion letter relating to the 1995 Stock Redemption 
Agreement; state that the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement and the Eberle Berlin 
opinion letter speak for themselves; state that the Court record in the civil action filed in Nez 
Perce County, Case No. CV-07-00208 speaks for itself; and deny the remaining allegations 
contained in paragraph 53 of Plaintiffs Complaint. 
54. In answer to paragraph 54 of Plaintiffs Complaint, these answering Defendants 
admit that Hawley Troxell has been paid attorney fees and costs for legal services rendered to or 
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on bebdf of its clienb S d c e s  Corporation, A M  Insurmce, Tnc. anel Crop USA Ins~armce 
Agency, Inc., but deny the r e m a i ~ g  allegations contained in paragraph 54 of Plaintiffs 
Gompl&t. 
55. In mswer to paagraph 55 of PlaktiFs Complaht, these answ 
admit that Hawley Troxell has been paid attorney fees and costs for legal services rendered to or 
on behalf of its clients AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Ine. and Crop USA Insurance 
Agency, Inc., but deny the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 55 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
56. In answer to paragraph 56 of Plaintiffs Complaint, these answering Defendants 
deny the allegations contained therein. 
57. In Answer to paragraph 57 of Plaintiffs Complaint, these answering Defendants 
deny the allegations contained therein. 
58. In answer to paragraph 58 of Plaintiffs Complaint, these answering Defendants 
deny the allegations contained therein. 
59. In answer to paragraph 59 of Plaintiffs Complaint, these answering Defendants 
deny the allegations contained therein. 
60. In answer to paragraph 60 of Plaintiffs Complaint, these answering Defendants 
note that paragraph 60 of Plaintiffs Complaint does not state any allegations against these 
answering Defendants to which a response is required. To the extent a response is required, 
these answering Defendants deny these allegations. 
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6 1. In answer to gaagapb 6 1 of l ) f & ~ F s  @ompl&t, these a n s w e ~ g  Defendmts 
admit that Reed J. Taylor is a non-client oEHaw1ey Troxell and is s e l a d y  not a client of any of 
the individual Defmdant;~, md deny the r e m a ~ g  allegations contained therein. 
62. In answer to paragaph 62 of P l h t i P s  Complaint, these answering Defendants 
admit they owe certain duties to their clients, but deny the r e m a ~ n g  allegations contained 
therein, 
63. In answer to paragraph 63 of Plaintiffs Complaint, these answering Defendants 
deny the allegations contained therein. 
64. In answer to paragraph 64 of Plaintiffs Complaint, these answering Defendants 
deny the allegations contained therein. 
FIRST A F F m T I V E  DEFENSE 
Defendants rue entitled to a litigation privilege which bars Plaintiffs claims in their 
entirety. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIa DEFENSE 
Plaintiff, by his conduct and actions, has waived some or all of the claims andor 
allegations against these answering Defendants. 
THIRD AFFDRMATFJE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff, by his conduct and actions, is estopped fiom asserting some or all of the claims 
andor allegations against these answering Defendants. 
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Plaintiff bas failed to mitigate his damages sought in his Compl&t. 
Plaintiff has failed to state with p&icularity all averments of fiaud andlor conspiracy as 
required by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
TIVE DEFENSE 
Certain of PlaintifT's claims are barred by the statutes of limitation pursuant to Idaho 
Code Sections 5-2 19(4) and 48-6 19. 
SEVENTH AFFlRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs claims against Defendants are based on an unenforceable and illegal agreement 
and as such he has suffered no recoverable damages. 
RESERVATION 
These answering Defendants reserve the right, after discovery, to amend this Answer to 
add additional a h a t i v e  defenses supported by the facts, and a failure to include all such 
defenses in this Answer shall not be deemed a waiver of any right to further amend this Answer. 
REOUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
These answering Defendants hereby request that they be awarded their attorney fees and 
costs incured herein pursuant to Sections 12-120(3), 12-121, 12-123, and 48-608 of the Idaho 
Code, and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
WEREFORE, having fully answered the Complaint on file herein, these answering 
Defendants pray as follows: 
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1. That the Cornplaint herein be dismissed with prejudice, and that P l h ~ f f  take 
nothrlng thereby; 
2. That these answering Defendmts be awarded their attorney fees and costs 
incurred herein; and 
3. For such other and fbfier relief as the C o w  may deem just and equitable. 
DATED this day of September, 2008. 
E L M  & BUBKIE, P.A. 
By: 
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CERTPICATE OF SERVICE 
1 HEEBY CERTIFY that on the day of Sqtember, 2008,I caused a tme and 
coned copy of the above and foregoing h s t m e n t  to be served upon the following in the 
m m e r  indicated below: 
Michael S. Bissell U.S. Mail 
CMBELL BISSELL & Hand Delivery 
'7 South Howard Street, Suite 4 16 i /  Federal Express 
Spokane, Wasbkgon 99201 Facsimile Transmission 
(509) 455-71 11 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual; 
Plaintiff, 
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN 
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V. 
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A. 
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL 
ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X, 
unknown individuals; 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 08-01765 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER 
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Protective Order. Plaintiff is 
represented by attorney Michael S. Bissell of Campbel'l, Bissell & Kirby PLLC and Defendants 
are represented by James D. LaRue of Elam & Burke, P.A. The Court having reviewed the 
motion, memorandum, and affidavits submitted by the parties, having heard oral arguments of 
counsel and being fully advised in the matter, hereby renders its decision. 
ORDER GlUNTING MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER - 1 
Defcndane~Ydotion for Protective Order is G W T E B  md a41 discovery in th is matter ii; 
stayed until a reasonable time following this Court's ruling on Defendmts' Motion to Dismiss. 
DATED this 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Prz: 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the b day o 008, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to ed upon the following in the 
mamer indicated below: 
Michael S. Bissell J" U.S. Mail 
CAMPBELL BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC Hand Delivery 
7 South Howard Street, Ste. 416 - Federal Express 
Spokane, WA 99201 Facsimile Transmission 
James D. LaRue 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
J"u.s. Mail 
Hand Delivery 
- Federal Express 
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual; 
Plaintiff, 
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN 
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V. 
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A. 
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL 
ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X, 
unknown individuals; 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 08-01 765 
PROTECTIVE ORDER 
T!as cause coming on at this time on stipulation of the parties hereto, through their 
respective counsel of record, and good cause appearing therefor; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, AND THIS DOES ORDER, that all discovery in this matter 
is stayed until Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is resolved. Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & 
Hawley, LLP's responses to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production 
PROTECTlVE ORDER - I 
PmpauuiSd to Defendant Hawley Troxell Elvlis & Hawlc;);, JJLP, &all not he due twenty 
(20) days aPrer the Court issues its ruling on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss filed Septeolber 10, 
DATED this day 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Qk t J&A iaL  
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the b day of S a, 2008, I caused a true and 
clrrect copy of the above and foregoing instrument to beFserved upon the following in the 
manner indicated below: 
Michael S. Bissell /" U.S. Mail 
C.WBELI., BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC Hand Delivery 
7 South Howard Street, Ste. 416 
- 
Federal Express 
Spokane, WA 99201 -- Facsimile Transmission 
James D. LaRue 
Ee,m & B m ,  P.A. 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
J u s .  Mail 
Hand Delivery 
- Federal Express 
acsirnile Transmission 
PROTECTIVE ORDER - 2 
.5762 
U PLLC 
Spokme, WA 99201 
Tel: (509) 455-7100 
F a :  (509) 455-71 f 1 
Artomeys for P 1 h W  Reed J. Taylor 
lN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TEE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEE 
STATE OF IRAHCI, IN AN2 FOR Tm COWTY OF F E Z  PERCE 
RXED J. TAYLOR, an individual; 
PlaiIltB, 
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. J O W  
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V. 
COLLINS, an individual; R I C W  A. 
RJLEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXXLL 
ENNIS & ENWLEY, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X, 
unknown individuals; 
Case No.: CTJ08-01765 
PLA.R'?llFF'S RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS 
Defendants. I 
PlaintBReed J. Taylor ("Reed Taylor"}, by and through his attorneys, Campbell, 
Bissell & Kirby, PLLC, hereby responds to Defendants' (collectiveIy "Hawley Troxell") 
Motion to Dismiss. 
Reed Taylor's claims involve factual and legal claims that entitle him to damages 
and that cannot be resolved through an I.R.C.P. 12@)(6) motion. Indeed, dismissal is not 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO 
appropriate because of the skgle factual issue of  vr.he~er Wawley T'roxeIl ever had 
a u ~ o f i v  to represent AIA rzlsucmce or AIA Services. S ida r ly ,  Reed Taylor's 
appropriate and wmmted direct cl against Hawley Troxell defeat tbe Molioa to 
D i s e s  as he is the only person truly entiaed to p m u e  the claim. Moreover, and 
notwi.t%t&mdiag Wawley TroxeU's lack of au&ority to act on b e h ~ o f  Znsurmce and 
AIA Services, it exceeded the scope of my pqor ted legal representation, and as such it 
is liable for the claims and co~esponding damages requested in Reed Taylor's 
Complhf which are more than adequately pled under Idaho notice pleading standard.' 
Tr. PA.Cm& B A a G R O m  
Reed Taylor is the pledgee of all of the shares of AIA Insurance, Inc. ("AIA 
Insurance"), the only shareholder of AIA Insurance holding all of its shares, a secured 
creditor, and the largest creditor of AIA Services Corporation ("MA Services"). See 
Complain< p. 3, 10. AL4 Services is sigmfkantly insolvent and its assets are 
jm-cient to pay the over $8,500,000 owed to Reed Taylor. Id. Consequently, Reed 
Taylor is bringing claims personal to him and c l W  derivatively held by him, all directly 
against Hawley Troxell for certain damages, i.e, he is pursuing all claims directb against 
Hawley Troxell, See Complaint. 
Since 1996, Reed Taylor was granted and possessed a security interest in all of 
the stock of AIA Insurance and all of the commissions and related receivables of AIA 
Insurance. See Complainf p. 4, a 13. 
On February 22,2007, Reed Taylor voted the shares of AlA burance pursuant to 
his contractual rigkts and as authorized under Idaho law. See Complaint, p. 4,7 14. 
- 
' Even if the Cowt finds that Reed Taylor shouId not be permitted to bring certain claims directly against 
Hawley ZioxeI1, the issue is effectively moot as Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor will bring the same claims 
against Hawley Troxell derivatively on behalf of AIA Services and AIA Insurance. 
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h violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, Eiawlcy TLaxeU mdedook the 
representaha of A.IA. Services, AL4 Insmance and CropUSA I n s ~ ~ m c e  Agency, Inc. 
rCropUSA'", each having Irreconcilable conflicts of interest with the other, See 
CompI&G p. 6, f 17. Hawley Troxell's p w o d e d  representa~on of CropUSA resulted 
in the breach of their 6duciary duties owed to AM Sewices and AIL4 Insurance. See 
CompIaia~ p. 7,g 18. 
Wawley Troxell owed duties to Reed Taylor as a creditor pledgee of AIA 
hswmce,  who voted the shares of Ah% Insurance. See Complaint, pp. 8-9, f 22. 
Hawley Troxell failed to notify or obtain appropriate informed consents or approvals 
from appropriate parties in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. See 
Complaiat, p, 9, 9 23. Hawley TroxeU was advised on nmerous occasions that its 
conduct violated the Rules of Professional Conduct and constituted the aiding and 
abetting of others. See Complaint, p. 13, a 29. Hawley Troxell's disregard of warnings 
can only be construed as intentional improper acts, all of which were to the detriment of 
Reed Taylor. Id. 
Defendants have assisted in the iaappropriate acts of R. John Taylor and other 
interested parties in stopping aU payments to Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor. See 
Complaint, p. 16, qf 37. They also assisted R. John Taylor and others in preventing Reed 
Taylor fr-om being a member of the board of directors of ALA Services. 12. Moreover, 
and witb knowledge of Reed Taylor's right to be on the board of AM Services, 
Defendants participated in board meetings, with such meetings and board decisions being 
nuff and void, See Complaint, p. 17,73 8. 
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Defendma msisted in k8ppropriately &msfe&g md r c h ~ g  h d s ,  assets, md 
propem to deeaud B e d  Taylor. See Complaiat, p. 19,143. Dcfendmk owed d u ~ e s  
unrier the law to Reed Taylor to preseme and protect the assets and businesses of AIA. 
S e ~ c e s  since it was insolvent. See Complaiat, p, 8, f 21. 
D e f e n h b  took instrucLioas aadlor directives from unau&o~ed  boards of MA 
Senrices and M A  Tasmance h o ~ g  that the boards are not properly seated in viola~on. 
offhe Rules of Professional Conduct. See Complaint, p. 20,7 45, 
Defendants inappropriately entered into and/or participated in a Joint Defense 
A~eernent  knowing that Ah4 Services, Ah4 Insurance, CropUSA, R. J o h  Taylor, and 
tlrre other jadividudl defendmb had keconcilable conflicts of interest and &at the 
agreement assisted others to perpetrate andlor hide acts of fiau&, fraudulent conveyances, 
ciGl conspiracy, conversion, breaches of fiduciary duties and other claims. See 
Defendants have assisted and/or aided and abetted R. John Taylor and others 
(including CropUSA) in acts of fraud, fraudulent conveyances, conversion, civil 
conspiracy, tortious interference, breaches of fiduciary duties and inappropriate 
transactions thereby proximately causing damages to Reed Taylor as a creditor and stock 
pledgee. See Complaint, p. 1 1-12, f 27. 
III. LEGAL AWEORWY AND ARG- 
A Hawley TroxelI Cannot Meet Idaho3s Stfiagent 121bff6) Standard. 
1.  he   om plaint Properly Alleges valid ~suses Action. 
On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court Iooks only at the 
pleadings, and all inferences are viewed in favor of the non-moving party. Youvrg v. City 
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ofXefchzn~z, 137 Idaho 102, 104, 44 P.3d 1157 (2002). "The issue is ucii urbe&cr tbe 
pI&W will d~mate ly  prevail, but w h e ~ e r  llae party is en~t led  to oEer evidence to 
." I2 at 104, "Every reasonable ktendment will be made to sustain a 
compl&t.ag&t a motion to dismiss for fdure to state a claim," Idaho Cornmfrs on 
Wumarz liliglilrs v. Campbell, 95 Idaho 21 5,217,506 P.2d 1 12 (1973). Idaho has adopted 
a systelrr of notice p leahg .  Cook v. Sbline Colp., 135 Idaho 26, 33, 13 P.3d 857 
(2000). A pleading need only cont& "a short md pl& statement of the claim showing 
that the pleader is entitled to relief. .. ." Id,  quoh'ng Dzrrstler. v. Durstelel; 108 Idaho 230, 
697 P.2d 1244 (Ct. App. 1985). Under a notice pleading, "a party is no longer slavishly 
bomd to stating p ~ c u l a r  theories inl ib pleadings." Cook 135 Idaho at 33. AH 
pleadings s h d  be so constmed as to do subsmtial justice. I.R.C.P. 8(f). 
Motioas to dismiss under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) m viewed with disfavor because of 
the wasle of time in case of reversal, and because the primary objective of the law is to 
obtain a determination of claims on fixthe merits. Fnckerli v. Marfindale, 82 Idaho 400, 
404, 353 P.2d 782 (1960). A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a 
claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 
support of his claims which would entitle him to relief. Id 
Reed Taylor agrees with Hawley Troxell's assertions that a motion to dismiss is 
addressed solely to the s ac i ency  of the complaint and that all inferences from the facts 
alleged in the complaint must be d r a w  in his favor. Hawley Troxell also correctly points 
out that the issues for the Court include whether Reed Taylor has alleged sufficient facts 
to support his claims, which, if true, would entitle him to relief and whether he is entitled 
to offer evidence to support the claims. See Hawley Troxell's Motion, p, 4. Applying 
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these sbdards, Reed Taylor's Compl&t clearly states cl upon which relief can be 
&ranted, i'e., alleges facts -- together with all favorable in5erences &erefiam - &at 
suppart cognimble c l e s  under Idaho law. 
In a nukbeU, Reed Taylor c l h  that HawIey Troxell conspired and aided and 
abeeed ia the breach of fiduciary duties, conspimy, fraud, and tortiow inte~erence, 
Reed Taylor claims that Hawley Troxell conspired with and aided and abetted John 
Taylor andlor CropUSA in protechg John Taylor's bteresls to the d e ~ e n t  of the 
interesb of Hawley Troxell's other clients, thereby damaging Reed Taylor. In addition, 
Hawley Troxell directly interfered with Reed Taylor's contractual rights in assuming to 
represent AlA Insurance without authority as well as conspiring with and aiding and 
abetting John Taylor andlor CropUSA in the interfering with Reed Taylor's contractual 
rights. In addition, lslawley Troxell is directly liable for the conversion of property in 
wbich Reed Taylor possessed a valid interest as well as conspiring with and aiding and 
abetting John Taylor to do the same. 
Here, Reed Taylor's Complaint provides suEcient notice to Wawley TroxeU of 
the claims asserted against it. Hawley Troxell has failed to meet the heavy burden 
required to obtain a dismissal of claims pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), and Hawley 
Troxell's Motion to Dismiss should be denied in firlL2 
2. Regardless Of How Novel One Or More Of Reed Taylor's Causes Of 
Action May Be Under Idaho Law, They Are Valid Causes Of Actions. 
"The court should be especially reluctant to dismiss on the pleading where the 
asserted theow of liability is novel or unusual since it is important that such legal theories 
Althou& Idaho law only requires notice pleading, the Court should permit Reed Taylor to file an 
amended complaint to the extent that the Court may believe that the Complaint fails to sufticiently plead a 
cause of action. 
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be explored and asayed in the light of achlal facts, slot a pleader's supposition." "ewmt 
v. Ar-ringilon Const- C'o., 92 Id&o 526,S 3 1,446 P.2d 895 (1 968), citing Sllzrff v. Pilot LijCe 
fils. Co., 313 F.2d 445,447 (5"h Cir. 1963) (emphasis added), 
Regardless of whether Idaho law has adopted the l e d  au tho~w of my of the 
being pursued by Reed Taylor, he should be p e d g e d  to plead and pursue dl of 
his claims. 
3. The Proper Test Of The Vafi&Q Of Reed Taylor's Complabt Ls 
'1ChroaLt;h A Motion For S-afy Judment M e r  Discovery Bas 
Been Conducted. 
"Tlzc motion to dismiss serves its most useful purpose where from the pleadings 
and docmeated proof available no conboverted fact issue remains and only questions of 
law arc: to be decided." Stewart v. Azringtort Const. Co., 92 Idaho 526,53 1,446 P.2d 895 
(1968) (citing Shull v. Pilot LSfe Ins. Co., 313 F.2d 445# 447 (5' Cir. 1963)). "The 
validity of a complaint is more properly tested by the s m q  judgment procedurs of 
1.RC.P. 56." Stewmt, 92 Idaho at 531; DuBn v. Idaho 1;nprover~zent Ass'iz, 126 Idaho 
1002,1013,895 P.2d 1195,1206 (1995). 
To the exient that my of Reed Taylor's cIaims involve factual issues (wbich they 
all do, to the extent Hawley Troxell wants the claims disnrissed), such claims should be 
resolved at txial or on s m w  judgment. All of Reed Taylor's claims survive an attack 
based upon I.R.C.P. 12@)(6). 
4. If The Court Pinds That Reed Taylor's Complaint Is Deficient In Any 
Respect, Reed Taylor Shodd Be Permitted To File An Amended 
Complaint. 
If a court finds that a complaint fails to state a claim, then the court can permit the 
party to file an amended complaint to cure any defects. Gnrdner v. Hollifield, 96 Idaho 
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609, 611, 533 P.2d 730 (1974) (tbe Court d i s ~ s s e d  p l ~ t i p s  complaint but allowed 
Jim 15 drays leave to file an mended compl&t). Thus, to the exte;at. that the Court may 
find that Reed Taylor's Complht may contajn my defects, Reed Taylor should be 
pedBed  to file an mended compl&t curing such defects. 
B, 
And Such Claims Are Not Subied To b y  Scope Of Representation 
Defeases Or Li&ation PMeere 
The issue of standing foeuses on the party seeking relief and not on the issues the 
party wishes to have adjudicated, which may be based upon threatened harm as well as 
past injury. Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 772, 133 P.3d 1232 (2006). "'An 
attorney can be liable to a nonclient, even an adversaq in litigation, for fraud or deceit, 
Duty is not at issue, because wrong is intentional conduct." 1 Legal Malpractice tj 6:7 
(2008) (iratema1 citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also e.g., Banco Popular North 
Lnterica v. Gautdi, 876 A.2d 253 (N.Y. 2005) (recognizing there could be a valid cause of 
action for a conspiracy to defraud a creditor by helping a client transfer assets). 
'"A] lawyer is subject to liability to a.. .nonclient when a nonlawyer would be in 
similar circumstances." See Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Law. 5 56 (2008). 
This basis concept of lawyer liability is discussed in numerous Comments in 9 56: 
If activities of a nonlawyer in the same circumstances wouId render the 
nonlawyer civilly liable or afford the nonlawyer a defense to liability, the 
same activities by a lawyer in the same circumstances generally render the 
lawyer liable. . . 
See Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Law. 9 56 (2008), Comrnent b. 
When a lawyer advises or assists a client in acts that subject the client to 
civil liability to others, those others may seelc to hold the lawyer liable 
along with or instead of the client. Whether a lawyer is liable depends on 
the elements of liability under the law upon which the claim of liability is 
predicated and may therefore turn on such facts as how the lawyer's acts 
- I-. 
k*, $ 1 ~  
con~buted to the pI&eff s what the Iawcr h e w  or begeved as to 
the relevant facts and law, the I a ~ e r "  intent, and how culpable the 
client" conduct is mder the law. 
See Restatement ( Z d )  of Law Gove&g Law. 5 56 [2008), 6 eat c. ""A Law 
is subject to civil liabfiiq for injury l egdy  caused to a person by any m o n a  act or 
omission of my principal or ernployee of the firm,.." & ~ e e  Restatement ( M d )  of Law 
O o v e h g  Law fj 58 (2008) cC%en firm p ~ c i p d s  are persondy liable vic&ously, 
they are jointly md severdy liable." See Comment g.) 
Were, Reed Taylor's Complht  asserts valid causes of action against Hawley 
TroxeU for conspiracy, fi-aud, breaches of fiduciary duties, tortious interfkrence, and 
unfair and deceptive acts in trade (and aiding and abetting of the foregoing). As 
discussed in M e r  detail below, these claim are all independent of Reed Taylor's rights 
to bring derivative claims directly against Hawley Troxell, i.e., Reed Taylor is not 
required to sue derivatively on behalf of AIA Insurance and AIA Services, but may bring 
dir-ecf claims because of the significant fachral and legal circumstances discussed below. 
These collective claims are all excluded from the any assertion of litigation privilege. 
See Hawley Troxell's Motion, pp. 29-32. 
C. Reed Taylor Has Standing To Direct& Bring Certain Derivative Claims 
A~ainst Hawley TroxeK 
1. Reed Taylor Has Standing As A Stock Pledgee. 
A stock pledgee has standing to bring direct claims against third parties. See e.g., 
Gzrstafson v. Gusf@son, 47 Wn, App. 272, 278, 734 P.2d 949, 953 wn. App. 1987); 
Ernpire Life Ins. Co. oflnzerica v. Yaldak Corp., 468 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1972); Ritchie v. 
MsMzltllen, 79 F. 522 (6th Cir. 1897); see also 19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations 5 2032 (2008) 
("A pledgee of corporate stock has an interest therein that entitles him or her to be heard 
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in court a f  equity c o n c e e g  the presema~on aad protecfifion of the assets md property of 
the corpora~on."). "The pledgee may file suit In equity to preserve the stock and to 
protect bis or her interesb, . . .The pledgee is 
also interested in the presentation of the corporate property and in preventing it from 
passiag out of the hands of the coqorafion ..." &e 12A Fletcher Cyc. Corp. 1$ 5651 
(2008) (emphasis added). 
Here, Reed Taylor has staading to pursue cIaims directly against Hawley Troxell 
because he is .the sole pledgee of all of the shares in AIA Insurance. Hawley Troxell's 
actions are damaging AIA Insurance, impairing the value of A.M. Insurance, diverting 
AIA Jlamance's assets, and inappropriately assisting and aiding and abetting J o h  Taylor 
and othets to loot AIA Insurance. All of the foregoing acts have resulted in money and 
assets being inappropriately diverted out of AIA Insurance and claims not being pursued 
against Hawley Troxell, John Taylor and others for the recovery of AIA hsurmce's 
funds, assets and damages. As the sole pledgee of all of AIA Insurance's shares, Reed 
Taylor has standing to pursue the claims directly against Hawley Troxell. 
2. In Addition To His Rights As A Pledgee, Reed Taylor Has Standing 
Because He Stands In The Shoes Of ALA Insurance's Sole 
Shareholder. 
"The pledgee may file suit ... to protect his or her interests, to the same extent, at 
least, as the oledgor.. ." See 12A Fletcher Cyc. Corp. $5651 (2008) (emphasis added). 
Generally, shareholders must pursue claims derivatively, is., on behalf of tfie 
corporation. However, a well-recognized exception to this general rule is that a 
shareholder in a closely held corporation may file a direct action without bringing the 
claims derivatively in the name of the corporation. See e.g., Steelman v. Mnllo7y, 1 10 
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Idaho 510, 512-13, 716 P.Zd 1282 (1986) (""Since., .directors in this srnzlil closely bcfd 
corporation, had a fiduciary duty to Steehm,  as minority shareholder, we c m o t  agree 
with appeUm&' conten~on that this case should have been disraissed because it is a 
'direct action' rather than a shareholder's derivative suit.') (emphasis added); see also 
Aurom Oedit Services, Ii?c v. Liberf_y Pest Developnzent, hc. ,  970 P.2d 1273, 12610 
mtah 1998) (a direct action may be brougfrt when based upon a "con&ac~ to which 
l p l h ~ w  is a party, or on a right belon&g severally to I p l & a ,  or on a fraud affecting 
kl&t@ &ect;ly ...' ")qtroting 13 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private 
Corporations 5 5911 (1970)); Sclzumaclze~. v. Schunzacher, 469 N.W. 2d 793 (N.D. 1991); 
hhnson v. Gilbert, 127 Ariz. 410, 412, 62 1 P.2d 916, 91 8 (Ariz. App. 1980) overrzrled 
on other gr~zrnds (". . .plaintiff had standing, both derivatively and directly, to sue on the 
alleged contract and for an accom~g." ) ;  Scl?timaket. v. Schunznker, 469 N.W.2d 793, 
798 (N.D. 1991). 
Since a pledgee has the rights of a shareholder, the pledgee has the shareholder's 
standing to pursue direct claims: 
A shareholder may sue directly for h a m  to &elf or herself that is 
separate and distinct from that sufYered by the corporation. 
... Under some authority, the analysis for dete-g whether a 
stockholder's action should be cIassified as direct or derivative turns on 
the determination of who s&ered the alleged harm, the corporation or the 
suing stockholder individually, and who would receive the benefit of 
recovery or other remedy. Most courts hold, however, that a shareholder 
may have standing to bring an action arising from an injury to the 
corporation if the injury is the result of the violation of duty owed directly 
to the shareholder, or if the shareholder sustains an injury that is peculiar 
to him or her alone, and does not fall alike upon other stockholders, even 
ifthe corporation was similarly h m e d .  
... When a shareholder's complaint states a cause of action that is both 
direct and derivative, the shareholder may proceed with the direct action. 
PLAIN'ITFF'S RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANTS7 MOTION TO DISMlSS - 1 I 
3 2.9 
... Some jurisdictions, however, permit a shareholder in a close 
coqcporation to proceed &ecdy rather than derhabvely under some 
circmstances. h such a j~sdict ion,  the decision whether to allow a 
p m  to proceed with a direct suit in lieu of a derivative action is entrusted 
to the court's discretion. 
In dete-g when a sheholder of a close corporation may proceed 
with a direct action, rattier than a deriva6ve action, courts consider 
whether a direct action will: (I) UaEairIy expose the corporation or the 
defendanb to a mdtiplicity of actions; (2) mteriauy prejudice the 
interests of the co~oration's creditors; or (3) interfere with the fair 
dis~bution of recovery among aU derested persons, 
See 18 G.3.S. Corporations 5 485 (2008) (internal citations omitted). 
The distinction between individual and derivative actions has been explained as 
follows: 
@Jt is generally held that a stoclsholder may maintain an action in his own 
right for an injury directly affecting him, although the corporation also 
may have a cause of action growing out of the same wrong, where it 
appears that the injury to the stockholder resulted fiom the violation of ' 
some special duty owed to the stockholder by the wrongdoer and having 
its origin in circumstances independent of the plaintiffs status as a 
shareholder. 
McCann v. McCam, 138 Idaho 228, 233, 61 P.3d 585 (2002) qziotiizg 19 Am. Jur. 2d 
Corporations lj 2249 (1986). In other words: 
An action brought by a shareholder is derivative if the gravamen of the 
complaint is the injury to the corporation or to the whole body of its stock 
or property and not injury to the plaintiff's individual interest as a 
shareholder. 
Mi;.Caml, 138 Idaho at 233 gzrotitzg 19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations tj 2250 (1986); see also 
Steelinan v. Mallory, 110 Idaho 510, 512-13, 716 P.2d 1282 (1986). The definition of 
"gravamen7' is '"tlhe substantial point or essence of a claim, grievance, or complaint." 
Black's (Seventh Edition) Law Dictionary, p., 708 (1999). 
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Mere, Reed Tzylor's cf, are based upon the fact that the money md assets of 
MA hurance are behg tortiouly nrisappropriated, convert;ed md looted to his 
d e ~ e n t .  He is the only shareholder of AIA hsmmce as the pledgee of aU of its 
oubtmdhg shares, be holds a s e c ~ q  hterest in all of the co 
Tzlsmmce, he is a creditor owed over $8,500,000, md be is the only bona-fide party 
entiaed to recover and possess all of the moneys recovered through bjs direct claims. In 
short he is entitled to all of the assets and funds of AIA Services and AM buraace.  
Moreover, AIA Insurance is not b * ~ g  any claims agrdinst the responsible parties, 
iacluding Hawley Troxell. There is no better example of a case w m m h g  direct claims. 
These reasons, along with the others set fortb in this Response, makes Reed Taylor 
essentially the only person entitled to bring the claims. 
3, Reed Taylor Has Standing As A Secured Creditor Of Ah% Services. 
When an unauthorixd disposition of collateral occurs, a secured creditor has 
standing to bring claims against third patics for conversion and other remedies. See c.g., 
First Sec. Bank of Idaho, XA. v, Absco Vat-ehozise, Irtc., 104 Idaho 853, 856-57, 664 
P.2d 281 (Ct App. 1983); US. v. McCleskey Mills; btc., 409 F.2d 1216 (Ga. 1969). The 
rights of a secured creditor are extensive: 
In some circu.m.stances, however, an unauthorized sale or other disposition 
of collateral may constitute conversion as to the secured party. In most 
cases when a debtor makes an unauthorized disposition of collateral, the 
security interest survives disposition of .the collateral. In these cases, the 
secured party may repossess the collateral from the transferee or, in an 
appropeate case, maintain an action for conversion. The secured party 
may claim both aw proceeds and the original collateral but, of course, 
may only have one satisfaction.. . . 
Were  a sale of collateral is, with respect to the secured party, a 
conversion of the collateral, there is a conversion on the part of the one 
who sells, as well as on the part of the one who purchases, or to whom 
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propem is kwfened,  or a third party who ex~rcises d o ~ ~ o ~ k  over fhe 
collaterd or its proceeds.. . 
See 79 C.J.S. Secured Transac~ons $ 157 (2008) (htemd cita~ons omitted) (emphasis 
rtdded). 
Here, Reed Taylor holds a perfected security interests in AIA Services and AL4 
Insurance" c o ~ s s i o n s  and related receivables and all of the stock of AL4 Inmmce. 
In bolciing a security kterest in all of AlA Insurance, Reed Taylor's security interest and 
cornspondkg righ& me pmmomt  to all others, and his security interest in all of the 
c o e s s i o n s  of AIA Services is no less sigdicant as they are the company's sole source 
of revenue. 
4. Reed Taylor Has Standing To P w u e  JBis Ciaims As The Creditor Of 
AIA Services. 
A creditor of an insolvent corporation has standing to bring direct claims. See 
~..g.., Board of 2Fz1stees of Teanlsters v. Foodtown, Inc., 296 F.3d 164, 170 (3rd Cir. 
2002); Asarco LLC v. Americas Mizz. Carp., 3 82 B.K. 49 (S.D. Tex 2007) (making claim 
against directors for breach of fiduciary duty). 
Here, Reed Taylor's position as a creditor owed over $8,500,000 arid who has a 
partial s m a r y  judgment against AL4 Services gives him standing to pursue direct 
c l a i ~ ~ ~ . ~ ,  and even more entitled to standing in light of the fact that he is also a secured 
creditor and pledgee. Nevertheless, Hawley Troxell argues that Reed Taylor has no 
standing, as n creditor, to pursue claims against Hawley Troxell or AIA Services' 
directors for breach of fiduciary d ~ t i e s . ~  See Hawley TroxeU's Motion, pp. 11-13; see 
3 However, even if? accepted as true and found to be fiilly applicable to this case, Hawley TraxeH's 
argument does not apply to the rights Reed Taylor has as a pledgee (shareholder) and secured creditor, the 
issues raised wilI be moot when Reed Taylor also files derivative claims against Hawley Troxell. For this 
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5. Reed Taylor Bas Stan&g As The Only Authorized Director And 
Officer Of AIA I n s m c e .  
A director or officer may bring cl a g h s t  o-tber parties in a quai-derivative 
action. Law of Corp. OEs. & Dirs.: Rts., Duties & Liabs. !.j 9:27 (2008) (citing New 
York law); see also Steel~tznn v. Mallory, I10 Idaho 520, 512-13, 716 P.2d 1282 (1986) 
g a director's rights to bring a dji-ect. action in lieu of a derivative action 
(alfhough the director was also a sbareboIder)). Reed Taylor is the only authorized 
officer and director of AIA Insurance, and, consequently, he has standing to pursue 
claims direcfly as he is the ody  party entitled to the funds. 
6. As Both The Director And Sole Shareholder Of AIA Insurance, Reed 
Taylor Em Standing To Make Direct Claims Against Hawley Troxell. 
Under Idaho law, a shareholder and director of a closely held corporation has 
standing to bring direct claims. Steelman v. Mallory, 110 Idaho 510, 716 P.2d 1282 
(1986); see also 12A Fletcher Cyc. Corp. !.j 5651 (2008) (""The pledgee may file suit in 
equity to preserve the stock and to protect bis or her interests, to the same extent, at least, 
as the pledgor ... The pledgee is also interested in the preservation of the corporate 
property and in preventing it from passing out of the hands of the corporation...") 
(emphasis added). Here, Reed Taylor is the only authorized officer and director of M A  
I n s m c e  and its only shareholder as the pledgee of all its outstanding shares. Reed 
Taylor is entitled to bring direct claims against Hawley Troxell. 
7. Reed Taylor Has Standing As A Third Party Beneficiary. 
A party has standing to bring direct claims when he or she is a third party 
beneficiary: 
Thus, a shareholder may have a persond cause of action against a third 
person to recover damages for breach of contract, even though a corporate 
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:awe oS action and tbe sftaeholder's cause of action result from the s m e  
won@ acts, such as for ~ smmagemea t  of the corporate busisless arid 
&version of assets in breacb of an eqress conkact with the shareholder.. . 
... The shareholder's individual claim based upon a contract between the 
corporation and ano.ther may be brouglit as a ~ d - p w  beneficiary 
action, despite lack of privity beween the pI&W shareholder and the 
defeadanc provided the shmeholder as an intended beneficiary of the 
con&act.. . 
12B Fletcher Cyc. Gorp. $ 5921 (2008) (&tern& citations omitted) citing VogeZ v. Reed 
SuppIy Co., 277 N.C. 119, 126, 177 S.E. 2d 273, 278 (1;I.C. 1970) ( ~ d - p w  
beneficiaries not in privy of contract may bring an action in their own name to "edorce a 
contract made for their benefit..."') (other citations odHed). There are other instances in 
which a third-party has standing to pursue claims against an attorney: 
. . . [A]n attorney may owe a duty to a party who is not his or her client, but 
who is a third-party 'beneficiary to an agreement between the attorney and 
his or her client. Accordingly, third party liability of an attorney arising 
&om representation of a client may be found to exist where the attorney is 
responsible for 'damage caused by his or her negligence to a person 
intended to be benefited by his or her perfommce irrespective of any lack 
of privity. Privity between an attorney and a non-client is not necessary 
for a duty to attach where the attorney had reason to foresee the specific 
harm which occurred.. . 
... Thus, although a legal malpractice claim may accrue only to the 
attorney's client, an attorney may be liable for damages to a tbird party 
because of events arising out of his or her representation of a client if the 
attorney's acts are fraudulent or tortious and result in injury to that third 
person. 
An attorney for a trustee is liable for breach of fiduciary duty to the third- 
party beneficiaries of the trust when the attorney has pIaced his or her self- 
interest about that of the trustee. 
7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at Law ij 234 (2008) (internal citations omitted). 
Here, AIA Services promised Reed Taylor to not impair the value of AIA 
Insuance and to vest the voting rights to its shares in AIA Insurance to Reed Taylor upon 
a default, with the full knowledge of Hawley Troxell and Richard Riley (who was 
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of ATA S e ~ c e s  and KIA Insmmce, he is the only au&oriz;ed representa~~e of 
hsmance, he is r e q ~ e d  to be an &e board of AIA Services, he has priority over all of 
the asseb of MA Services and Ayl hsurance, he has a security interest in all of .the ALA 
Insmmce's shares, and, as Hawley Troxell a d ~ t s ,  AIA Services is iasolvent. 
Of Pmorted Legd Representation Because They Were Never 
"A lawyer employed or retained by an orgda t ion  represents the org&~on 
acting k o u &  its duly au&orized constihrents.'WC 1.13(a). 
When a managing officer has been validly removed, he has no authority to 
institute legal proceedings in the name of the corporation. American Center 
Edircation, Inc. v. Cavnar, 145 Cal.Rptr. 736, (1978) (citing TenlpZeman v. Grant, 75 
Colo. 519, 534-35, 227 P. 555 (Colo. 1924) ('"It is also true that neither the plaintiff 
Ternplem nor the former directors.. .had any right or authority to assume to be officers 
of the.. .corporation, or to institute legal proceedings in the court.. .in the name of the 
corporation.")]; US. v. f ig 352 F.Supp.2d 1195 (W.D. Okla. 2004) (the court is not 
bound to defer to the parties'representations as to their authority to hire counsel); 
S@way Ins. Co. v. Spinak, 641 N.E.2d 834 ('I11.App. 1994) (holding that Vle 
unauthorized filing of a lawsuit constituted a cause of action and subjected the attorneys 
to exemplary damages). No person has the right to appear as another's attorney without 
the other's authority. Asa.Ju1.2d Attorneys at Law 5 159 (1997); Colmex, A7c. v. Hmris, 
%JL 2487991 CJirn. App. 2008). An attorney who enters an unauthorized appearance for 
a party is liable to the party for any damage sustained. 7 Am.Jur.2d Attorneys at Law f j  
269 (1997). Absent authority to retain an attorney, no attorney-client relationship can be 
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es-blished. liz re GansentatomhiJI o m b o n ,  584 N.W.2d 649 (Mh.App. 1999), 
Here, d of Hawley Troxell's acts exceed the scope of my pqor ted  
representation because they were never au&o&ed to repsen t  ALA losmmce, never 
properly auhorized to  represent Senrices, md because of the irreconcilable and 
mwaivable c o a c t s  of interest they intentisndy mmdacmed in simultaneously 
p q o r t e a y  represen&g AIA Insurance, ALP, Sentices, and CropUSA, R. John Taylor, 
and others. 
1. Ehwley Troxell Hag No Anthorfty To Reprwent AIA Insurance, And, 
Therefore, HsiwIey Troxell Has No Seape Of Representation. 
Reed Taylor is the only authorized director and oEcer of AIA Insurance. Under 
the legal authority cited above, Hawley Troxell is not authorized to represent AIA 
Insurance, and is, therefore, liable to Reed for the same reasons and to the same extent as 
my other person or entity for Reed Taylor's claims. 
On December 12, 2006, AIA Services received a notice of default from Reed 
Taylor, a copy of which was provided to Defendant Richard Mey. See Complaint, p. 3,  
'11 3. On February 22, 2007, Reed Taylor voted the stock of AIA Insurance. Ses 
Complaint, p. 4 ,7  14, pp. 8-9,T 22. Reed Taylor should be in control of AIA Insurance, 
and would be but for the tortious acts of Hawley Troxell and others. See Complaint, p. 5, 
7 15. Notwithstanding Hawley TroxeUYs unauthorized representation, it took instructions 
and/or directives from the unauthorized board of AIA Insurance, namely John Taylor. 
See Complaint, p. 20, fi 45. 
John Taylor purports to control AIA Insurance and Hawley Troxell purports to 
represent AL4 Insurance, however, neither is authorized to do so. Reed Taylor is the only 
authorized officer and director of AIA Insurance and the only person entitled and 
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au&oked to control it. S ie icmtIy ,  hsurmce, by way of Reed Taylor being the 
only authorized director or officer of the compmy, may not have J o h  Taylor or others 
retain md direct c ame l .  Therefore, Hawley Troxell's represenation of kZM, h m c e  
is not aufioked md not protected under the law. Coasequenay, the acts of Hawley 
TroxeE on behalf of M A  I n s m c e  we as individds aad not as attorneys ~~ the 
scope of an gttomey-client relaliom~p. They have not protections under the law. 
Hawley Troxell is directly hterfering with Reed Taylor's contractual lights to 
control AIA Insurance, his right to be a member of the board of AIA Services, his rights 
to c o b s s i o n s  and the $1.2 W o n  Mortgage collateral to which he is entitled to 
possess, and his rights to realize upon his collateral by and through its unauthorized 
representation and its representation of CropUSA. 
Hawley TroxeLt is also directly aiding and abetting John Taylor and other 
interested individuals in breaches of fiduciary duties, conversion, conspiracy, fraud and 
tortious interference. Sigmficant damages to Reed Taylor are being caused by these 
actions, inclucling impairing the value of AIA Insurance, the company that he is 
contractually entitled to control. In SWQ the co&ssion revenues of AIA Insurance and 
$1.2 MUion Mortgage in which Reed Taylor has a direct security interest or a security 
interest by way of the property being proceeds of collateral securing his debt are being 
directly converted by John Taylor, Hawley Troxell, and others. 
Because Hawley Troxell has no authority to represent AIA Insurance, its 
. " . . .  . . . . . . . . . . , . .  . . . .  . . - . . . .  
assertions that it are merely rendering advice within the scope of an attorney-client 
relationship relative to A.IA Insurance cannot be used as basis to assert that Reed Taylor's 
Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. At a minimum, the 
See Sections C-1 and C-2 above, which are incorporated by reference into this section. 
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issues of whefier Hawley Troxell has ~ufior3ty to represent A M  Insurance and whe&c,c 
Hawley Troxell bas a Iegd pridege predicated upon an agomey-cliesrl relalioashp 
present factual issues which (it is respecmly subeged) c m o t  be decided by tbe Cowt 
OQ ao I.R.C.P. 12@)(6) motion, which is addressed solely to the s ~ c i e n c y  of ibe Reed 
2. Hawley TroxeU Has No hthiority To Represent AIA. Services Because 
It Was Never Retained By The Duly Antho&ed Representaee Of 
AJA Services. 
Under the legal au"Lhofiq cited above, Hawley Troxell is not authorized to 
represent ALA. Services and is, therefore, liable in the same manner and to the same 
extent as any other person or entity for Reed Taylor's claims. Reed Taylor and Doma 
Taylor are required to be members of the board of AZA. Services. See Complaint., p. 16, f 
37. Moreover, Hawley TroxeU has unlawfully taken instructions andlor directives from 
the unauthorized board of A H  Services and without o b e g  the necessary approvals. 
See Complaint, p. 20, '$45. 
3. Because Of The Irreconcilable And Unwaivable Conflicts Of Interest, 
Hawley TroxeUys Purporked Represenbtion Exceeds The Scope Of 
Representation. 
A consent to dual representation requGed by W C  f .7 mandates that "the consent 
shall be given by an appropriate official of the organization other than the individual who 
is to be represented, or by the shareholders." W C  1.13(g). Any conflict of interest in 
representing a majority shareholder and corporation in litigation brought by a minority 
shareholder was not waived, where only the majority shareholder approved the conflict 
waiver. Wil2ia~?ls v. Stnlford, 977 So.2d 722, 730 (Fla. 2008). "[Slome conflicts are 
nonconsentable, meaning that the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for such an 
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agreement or provide re-pxesentaation on the bars of the client's coesent, M e n  
representkg more than one client, the question of consen"rbi1ily must be resolved as to 
each cZientYWG 1.7, Go 
Reed Taylor would have been required to give any consent to represent AIA 
h m m c e  Reed Taylor and Doma Taylor, andlor djskterested innocenL shareholders 
would have s ~ m l y  been required to provide consent for Services. By u n d e e g  
to represent multiple clients with coaklickg hterests and by receiving and accepting 
directions from John Taylor whose interests conflicted with their clients' conflicting 
mterests, Hawley Troxell inevitably implicated itself in the claims for damages made by 
Reed Taylor. 
The basic allegations m Reed Taylor's Complaint encompass the following facts: 
It is claimed (and the court has found) that MA Services is indebted to Reed Taylor by 
contract. The relationship between Reed Taylor and AIA Services is not merely creditor 
and debtor. ALA Services is insolvent and therefore owes Educiary duties to its creditors 
under Idaho law (which means that AIA Services should be operated exclusively for the 
benefit of creditors). Furthermore, the status of Reed Taylor is not a mere general 
creditor. Reed Taylor is a secured creditor (which is one of the most pertinent facts of 
this case relative to the liabilities for interference with Reed Taylor's contractual 
relationship and for conversion). Reed Taylor has a security interest in all of the stock of 
AL4 Insurance and all of the cornmission revenue and related proceeds of AIA Insurance 
and ATA Services. Reed Taylor has the right to control AIA Insurance and has in fact 
voted the shares of M A  Insurance as he is contractually entitled to do. Furthennore, the 
Court has granted partial surnmary judgment to pIaintiff fmding AIA Services in default. 
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c( .J !I 1 
Reed Taylor bas tse right to control AIA Insurmce and should be cna"lr.olliag MA 
lasurmce, but bas been denied his contracbd rights by the actions of John Taylor and 
Ihe tlzree corporations represented by Hadey Troxell, with tbe assktaoce of Hawley 
Troxell. 
Hawley Troxell cmenfly represents CroplJSA and ALA Services, md pqortedly 
represents ALA Insmmce as well. An interested director, John Taylor, who is a director 
common to A.3A Services and CropUSA andpulparts to be a director of M A  Insumce, 
controls md makes the decisions for all the corpora~ons with respect to litigation 
involving plaintiE and the corporations. John TayIor bimself is a defendant in the 
litigation and is the object of claims of breach of fiduciary duties owed to the three 
corporations and to Reed Taylor, directly. Hawley Troxell receives and accepts litigation 
instructions from. John Taylor. Each of Hawley Troxell's corporate clients has distinct 
and diverging interests based upon claims being litigated, divergiag interests so strong 
&at numerous torts such as fraud, hudulent conveyance, conspiracy and conversion are 
inrplicated. John Taylor's interests are djstinct and diverge from the interests of the 
corporations based upon claims being litigated. These distinct and diverging interests 
essentially result &om: I) the claim that AIA Services is iridebted to Reed Taylor by 
contract; 2) the claim that Reed Taylor is contractually entitled to control AIA Insurance 
and has contractual rights to fkU possession of the revenue commissions; 3) the claim that 
CropUSA is liable to ALA Services and ALA Insurance because of fraudulent 
conveyances, fraud and other torts; and 4) the claims that John Taylor is liable to AIA 
Services, AIA Insurance and CropUSA for breaches of fiduciaty duties, fraud, fraudulent 
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conveymce, excessive compensal-ion and oeber torts. It is &so c l h e d  that J o b  Taylor 
is Liable to Reed Taylor because of breaches of fiduciary d u ~ e s  owed directly to him, 
The degatioa ag&st Hawley TroxeU are for conspiracy andfor aiding and 
a b e a g  in the breach of fiduciw duties, h u d ,  budulent conveyance and conspiracy; 
for ktedereace with Reed Taylor" sontsac*d relationships; and for conversion, and are 
underscored by the f o l l o h g  facts:. 
ALA Services, an insolvent corporsltion, should be operated exclusively for the 
benefit of creditors, specifically Reed Taylor. The interests of AIA Services are to 
maximize the recovery of assets for its creditors and pursue claims against others who 
may be Lidble the corporation. AIA Services should have separate counsel receiving and 
accepting instructions from independent directors. An attorney representing AIA 
Services should not be taking directions from an interested director like John Taylor 
against whom claims are being made. It is in the best interests of AIA Services and AIA 
Insurance to pursue claims against John Taylor. It is in the best interests of ATA Services 
and AIA Insurance to pursue claim against others, including CropUSA, which it is 
alleged is liable to A.IA Services. Indeed, it is in the best interests of AIA Services and 
A.IA Insurance to pursue claims against Hawley TroxeU. In addition, the interests of John 
Taylor and CropUSA are naturally adverse. to the interests of AIA Services. It is 
inconceivable to expect J o b  Taylor to manage his personal assets for the benefit of AIA 
Services and its creditors, Reed Taylor. It is inconceivable to expect CropUSA to be 
operated for the benefit of the creditors of ATA Services. It is impossible for attorneys, in 
this case Hawley Troxell, to purportedly represent the interests of AIA Services 
exclusively for the benefit the corporation and its creditors while at the same time 
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represen&g the interests of CropUSA and t k g  direcfcions for both clien& from m 
interested dkector like John Taylor, The hteresls are ilreconcilable aIld zlrrwnivable and 
c o d b t e  Hawley Troxell's breaches of fiduciary duties owed to the cosporatiom. 
In a situation such as descfibed above, Hawley Troxell c m o t  avoid representing 
one client to the disadvantage of moLber client, i.e., tbe iaterests of one lnmt ~zeeessarify 
predut~zinate over the other. Wawley Troxell then must impermissibly divide its loyalty 
to a client and act outside the scope of an aeomey-client relationship, and then shift its 
duty of loyalty back to itself to prevent claims Gono being asserted agairrst it while 
&hhing a steady stream of ill-gotten income from the impossible and unlawful 
purported representations. 
4. Even If Hawley Troxell Was Authorized To Represent AIL4 Services 
And ALQ hnrance, Its Acts Are Outside Of The Scope Of 
Representation Because They Were Not Ln The Best Interests Of The 
O ~ ~ t i o n s .  
"[Aln attorney may not hide behind a client's instructions in order lo perpetrate a 
h u d  against a third party." The Flat-r'da Bat. v. Feige, 596 So.2d 433, 435 pla.  1992). 
RPC I. l3@) expressly states that a lawyer is required to proceed in the bests interests of 
the corporation: 
If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other 
person associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act 
or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that is a violation 
of a fegal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law that 
reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and this is likely to result 
in substantial injury to the organization, then the Iawer shall proceed as is 
reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization.. . 
RPC 1.130s) (emphasis added); see also Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Law. 5 
96 (2008) (virtually identical language to RPC 1.13@)). 
Here, the only interests Hawley Troxell has served are those of itse2f, John Taylor 
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md other Enlerested parb:es. With the assismce of Hawley TroxeII, John Taylor aod Ihe 
other pdies  who should be on the receiving end of claims by M A  Services and Ah% 
lasmmce, are eas*g that Reed Taylor and Doma Taylor are no longer being paid my 
m o m b  due them. MemwMe, the funds continue to flow out of fhe corporations to 
CropUSA, J o b  Taylor, Hawley Troxell aad other irtterested and responsible parties. 
5. Any Purported meenneni For HawIey TroxeIl To Provide Legal 
Sedces Is Void And Une&orceable. 
Contracts &at violate ethical rules violate public policy and are menfbrceable. 
Once representa~on has commenced, a lawyer shall withdraw from the representation of 
a client if "the representalion will result in violation af the rules of professional conduct 
or the law."WC 1.16(a)(a). A lawyer may not engage in a representation that serves his 
or her self interests and limits the representation of one or more clients. RPC 1.7(a)(2), 
see nlso Hendry v. Pelland, 73 F.3d 397, 403 (C.A.D.C. 1996) (simultaneously 
represenkg multiple parties in violation of the rules of ethics constitutes a breach of 
fiduciary duty). 
As a result of any one or more of the ethical violations set forth above, Hawley 
Troxell is not truly authorized to represent any of the entities, let alone the person Hawley 
Troxell truly represents, John Taylor. Thus, Hawley Troxell cannot utilize the im~~uni ty  
defense for any of their acts andlor omissions and resulting torts. 
E. Assuming Hawlev Troxell ls lluthorized To Represent AIA Services And 
AIA Insnranee, l[t Is Liable For AU[ Claims Arising Out Of Actions 
Exceeding The Seope Of Its Purported Representation. 
Attorneys are liable for acts and torts committed outside the scope of tbeir 
representation because the law does not provide absolute immnity. See AIpert v. Crain, 
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Carrzrz & Jarzzes P. C., 178 S.W. 3d 398 (Tex, 2005) (amrney liable for fraud c o M t t e d  
ourside the scope of represenlation); Emmel v. Goland, 793 P.2d 524, 530 (Cal. 1990) 
(a'clomeys may be liable for aiding and a b e ~ g  violation of privacy act or other illegal or 
tortious conduct). 
Hadey TroxeU correcGy notes that a~orneys n o d l y  have the luxury of 
a s s e h g  Liligatioa privilege. See Hawley Troxell's Motion, pp. 29-32. The only 
problem with Hawley Troxell's argument is that this is not the normal case. Hawley 
Troxell's primary = w e n t  is flawed and the same or similar flaws repeatedly appear 
&oughcrut its Motion to Dismiss. Implicit in its anaIysis is the erroneous contention that 
the facts alleged by Reed Taylor are: 1) linzifed to the advice rendered by Hawley Troxell 
to a client; m d  2) conceded to be performed within rhe scope of the attorney-client 
relationship. For example, in its Motion to Dismiss, Hawley Troxell refers to uon- 
liability for aa attorney's ''giving advice" (p. 7); to nn liability where the attorney "did no 
more &an provide legd advice" (pp. 8-9); to no liability for "merely by giving advice" 
@. 15); and to non-liability for an attorney acting for the client within the scope of the 
attorney-climt relationship @p. 9,. 15 & 17). On pages 10-1 1 of Hawley Troxell's 
Motion, it advances the following sumrnary conclusion: 
The plaintiff's claims against HTEH for purportedly aiding and abetting 
its clients' action relate only to advice revrdered and positions taken in the 
course of zealous representation and, as such, must be dismissed for 
failure to state a cause of action. 
This bare conclusion of Hawley Troxell ignores the facts alleged in Reed Taylor's 
Complaint including all of the required inferences contained in the CompIaiat. Reed 
Taylor's Complaint is plainly not limited to factual allegations pertaining to Hawley 
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s h p l i s ~ c  mafysis oftbe caues of a c ~ o n  asserled in Reed Taylor" Compl&t should be 
evduated by the Court in light of the penwive canBcls of interest presented by the facts 
of this case which facts appear in Reed Taylor's Complht. Reed Taylor is entitled to 
have all Serences firom the facts considered in his f~vor. 
There are issues of fact pert-g to whether Hawley Troxell had any aulfiorized 
al-torney-client relationsEp wi& AIA Lnsmanee or MA Services. At a *llm, there 
are issues of fact p e m g  to the scope of Hawley Troxell's purported =presentation 
md the extent to which they exceeded any purported scope of representation. Moreover, 
Hawley Troxell has not, and c m o t ,  provide any authority holding that a law W s  
scope of representation of one client or more clients (AL4 Lnsurmce and/or AL4 
Services) includes defending another client (CropUSA) from claim that should be 
asserted by the other clients to recover millions of dollars that were fraudulently 
transferred with the law f m ' s  assistance. In short, Kawley Troxell's acts and 
subsequent torts exceed any permissible scope of representation. 
IF. Hawley TraxelI Owes Reed Taylor S~eciaf, Duties As A Secured Creditor, 
Stock PIedgee, And Creditor Of The Insolvent AIA Services. 
Under Idaho law, when a corporation becomes insolvent, its assets are held in 
trust for the benefit of the corporation's creditors. See e.g,  Srnith v. Great Basin Grcrin 
Co., 98 Idaho 266, 651 P.2d 1299 (1977). Attorneys may not engage in legal 
representations that affect the attorney's responsibilities to third parties. RPC 1.7(af(2). 
When a corporation is insolvent, attorneys also have special obligations to creditors: 
me hold that if an attorney represents both a dissolved or insolvent 
corporation and a director or officer of that f m ,  and if the attorney 
controls corporate assets, then the attorney must protect the financial 
rights of creditors to these assets, where he or she knows or should know 
that the director or officer intends to interfere with creditor's claims 
PEkmmF'S RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS - 30 
'* ;r 8 
'2 
tf_lrou&h ao hproper distribution of these zsek.  
FilIrzer's Fuel Dislributum, Ikc. v. Noreen, 882 P.Zd 399, 405 (Alaska 1994) (like the 
attorney in. this action, Hawley TroxeU was at one h e  in possession of the $1.2 Million 
Mortgage aad h d s  derived fiorn kL$ Services and/or AV\. Inwance). The lack of an 
attorney-client rela~onsEp does not preclude a fEn&g of a bduciaty duty, which is an 
issue of fact for tbe jury. fr? re D. C. Equiptnent, Inc. v. Peshtigo National Bat~k, 1 12 B.R. 
855, 857 CI;V.D, R.lich. 1990) (holding that an issue of fact as to wbetber corporate 
debtor's counsel owed fiduciary duty to debtor's sole shareholder precluded s m a r y  
judpent). 
Here, Reed Taylor holds a valid and perfected security interest in a l l  of AIA 
hurance  and A.IA Services' commissions and related receivables. Reed Taylor has a 
valid security interest in the shares of AZ4 hsurance. Reed Taylor is a creditor owed 
over $8,500,000 by the insolvent AIA Services, thereby rn&g him the beneficiary of 
the h d s  and assets held in trust by AIA Sentices and its subsidiary A.IA hsurance. 
Moreover, he is the pledgee of all of the shares in AL4 Inswanw and the only authorized 
director and officer. Meanwhile, Hawley Troxell is simultaneously representing the 
interests of John Taylor and others, with full knowledge of the insolvency of AL4 
Services and its trust fund obligations to Reed Taylor. There can be no better example of 
a situation in which corporate assets should be protected or better set of facts to support a 
lawyer's duties owed to a non-client. Thus, Reed Taylor's cl- are all valid and 
warranted under the special factual circumstances of this case as he is the beneficiary and 
secured creditor of the remaining assets and funds of the insolvent AL4 Services. 
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Without providing my specific exmples aad by cithg cases that are either 
ia~ppficable (or that actually support Reed Taylor), Hawley Troxell asserts that Reed 
T~ylor's Complaint is factudy deficient and fails to plead facts sufEcient to jvstrfy 
es. See Hawley Troxell's Motion, p. 5. However, like Hawley TroxeU9s other 
a rments ,  the assefeions are baseless and lack merit 
For exaple,  Reed Taylor's Complaint specifically swes "all applicable facts 
alleged below are incorporated by reference into each cause of action as necessary to 
support each cause of action." See Complaint, p. I .  Thus, every fact alleged in Reed 
Taylor's CompIht applies as necessary to support each cause of action. As discussed in 
detail below, .the facts and causes of action are all more than smcientIy pled. 
H, Reed Tavlor Has Sufficiently Pled That Hawlev TroxeIl Has Aided And 
Abetted In Various Torts. 
1 Contrary To HawIey TroxeU's Argument, Idaho Has Numerous 
Aiding Aad Abe&g Cases And Reed Taylor SacientIy Pled 
The Cause Of Action And They Are Not Barred By Any Privilege. 
Idaho has a plethora of cases on aiding and abetting. The following listed Idaho 
eases (in reverse chronological order) have clearly established the principles of law 
governing conspiracy and aiding and abetting claims. In Todd v. Szlllivan Const. LLC, 
191 P.3d 196, 203 (2008) (Idaho Report Cite Unavailable) (emphasis added), the Idaho 
Supreme Court addressed aiding and abetting: 
As we stated in Helgeson v. Powell, 54 Idaho 667, 682,34 P.2d 957,963 (1934): 
The law seems to be well settled that, where several people 
actively participate in any m m e r  in the commission of a tort, not 
only the actual actor or assailant is liable but all others who aid, 
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abet, e~mse l  or encornage the wongdoer by words, geshues, 
looks or s i p s  are equally liable with him to the injured person. 
In WigI~ltruld E~rerprises, bzc, v. Bmkel., 133 Idaho 330, 342, 986 P.2d 996 (1 999). llhe 
Idaho Supreme Court reiterated: 
k person is subject to liability if he or she does a tortious act in concert 
with the other or pursuant to a common design with him. See Restatement 
(Second) of Torts $876(a) (1977). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has even addressed the mhhal jury instructions necessary to 
f i d  that a defendant aided and abetted: 
the jury was instructed that: 
If you find that a defendant who did not personaUy pe&om a 
wrongful act nonetheless did pursue a c o m o n  plan or design to 
commit that act with the actor by cornmanding, instigating, 
advising, aiding, abetting or encouraging the actor by words, 
gestures, looks or otherwise; then the conduct of the actor 
physically committing the wrongdoing was alsa the conduct of that 
defendant. If either is liable then both are equally liable. 
Highland Enterprises, 133 Idaho at 348. In Price v. Aztec Ltd, Inc., 108 Ida110 674, 677- 
78, 701 P.2d 294 (Idaho App. 1985), the Idaho Court of Appeal addressed &ding and 
Secondly, it is well established in Idaho that a person may be liable as a 
contributing tort-feasor, joint tort-feasor or cotrespasser for harm resulting 
to a third person from the tortious conduct of another. Smith v. Thompson, 
103 Idaho 909,655 P.2d 116 (Ct.App.1982). See, e.g., Lorang v. Hays, 69 
Idaho 440, 209 P.2d 733 (1949); Bailey v. Idaho Imgation Co. Ltd., 39 
Idaho 354, 227 P. 1055 (1924). Further, it has been held "all persons who 
command, instigate, encourage, advise, countenance, co-operate in, aid or 
abet the commission of a trespass by another, are cotrespassers with the 
person c o d t t i n g  the trespass ...." Bailey v. Idaho Irrigation Co. Ltd., 39 
Idaho at 358,227 P. at 1056. 
When the tortious conduct is the cause of a single and indivisible h m ,  
each contributing tort-feasor is liable to the same extent and in the same 
manner as f they had pesfonned the wrongfbl act themselves; is., they are 
jointly and severally liable. Smith v. Thompson, supra See generally 
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WSTAmmK (Second) OF TORTS 5 875, 876 (1977); and ewes 
collected at 74 AA/I. .2d Torts t.j 66 (1974). Each tod-fernor is liable for 
tbe whole dmage at the option of the injured p@. Spencer v. Spencer, 
91 Idaho 880, 434 P.2d 98 (1967). l'be rule of joint and several liab%Q 
also previls where tort-feasors act in concerl in tbe execu~tioa of the 
c o w o n  p q o s e .  The tort liabilily of persons a c k g  in concert is 
eqressed in E S T A E m N T  (Second) OF TORTS 8 876 (1979): 
For harm resulhg to a third person from the todous conduct of 
another, one is subject to liability Sbe  ... 
(b) knows that the other's coaduct cons~btes a breach of duty and 
gives m b s m ~ d  assistance or encomageement to the other so to 
conduct b e l f , .  . . , 
In the Restatement's c o m e n b  on clause b it is said that if the 
encoutagement or assistance referred to is a substm~al factor in causing 
the resulting tort, then the one giving it is himself a tort-feasor and is 
responsible for the comequeaces of the other's act. 
In S~nith v. Tfionlpsorz, 103 Idaho 909, 9 11, 655 P.2d 116 (Idaho App.1982)., the Idaho 
Court of Appeals noted: 
It is well established in Idaho that a person may be liable as a contributing 
tortfieasor, joint todeasor, or "coh:espasser," for harm resulting to a third 
person from the tortious conduct of another. See, e.g., Lorang v, Hays, 69 
Idaho 440, 209 P.2d 733 (1949); Bailey v. Idaho h. Co., Ltd., 39 Idaho 
354, 227 P. 1055 (1924). "All persons who command, instigate, 
encourage, advise, comtenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the comss ion  
of a trespass by another are cotrespassers with the person committing the 
trespass." Bailey v, Idaho Irr. Co., Ltd., 39 Idaho at 358,227 P. at 1056. 
Furthermore, when the tortious conduct is the cause of a single and 
indivisible harm, each contributing tortfeasor is liable to the same extent 
and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongfir1 act 
themselves; i.e., they are jointly and severally liable. See Lormg v. Hays, 
supra; Bailey v. Idaho Irr. Co., Ltd., supra; see generally Restatement 
(Second) of Torts $9 875, 876 (1977); and cases collected at 74 Am.Jur.2d 
Torts 5 66 (1 974). 
As noted in all of the Idaho cases cited above, Reed Taylor has sufGciently pled 
aiding and abetting causes of action against Hawley Troxell. For example, Reed Taylor 
specifically alleges the following in his Complaint: 
, 
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Defendan@ are liable to Reed J. Taylor for m m o w t  to be proven at trial 
See Compl&< p. 11, ff 27 (emphasis added). In Reed Taylor's C o r n p l h ~  he dso 
exllaustively pleads various form of the: cause of action of aiding and abetting, along 
with nmerous facts. See Complaint, pp. 20-21, $7 46-50; see also e.g., Complaint, p. 4, 
AU of the above facts are incorporated by reference into Reed Taylor's causes of 
action for aiding scnd abetting. See Complaint, pp. 1 and 20-21. Not only does Reed 
Taylor succinctly and specifically plead aiding and abetting, but he pleads the various 
causes of action with numerous fact patterns and claims, 
2. Rawley Troxell Is Liable Por Aiding And Abetting In The Coxmuision 
Of Nmerons Torts And Such CIahs Are Not Barred By The 
Litigation Privilege. 
T,&e normal tortfeasors, attorneys may be liable to others under various legal 
theories, including aiding and abetting, conspiracy and other torts. Hearst v. Henrst, 50 
A.D. 3d 959 (N.Y. 2008) (factual issues precluded s m a r y  judgment on conversion and 
aiding and abetting of b u d  claim against lawyer); In re MS55, Inc., 2007 WL 2669150 
(D. Colo. 2007); Trnub v. WasI7izzgton, 591 S.E. 2d 382 (Ga App. 2003); Adenn, h e .  v. 
Cohn, 162 F. Supp.2d 35 1 @.D.Pa 2001); Cacciola v. Nellhaus, 733 N.E.2d 133 (Mass. 
A p .  Ct. 2000); bz re Atla~ziic Finm~cial Management, Inc. Seczvifies Liiigaiiorz v. Paine 
Webber, Jacksatl & Curtis, et nl., 658 F. Supp. 380 @. Mass. 1986) (valid cause of 
action for aiding and abetting securities fraud based upon conflicts of interest). 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO 
DEFWRNTS" MOTION TO DISlLllSS - 3 5 
$53 
A ZliEfbly i l l u s ~ a ~ v e  and demomka~ve case is l i z  re MS55, .kc., 2007 WL, 
2669150 @. Colo. 2007). In &at case, the federal district court reversed the b 
court" order - k g  a motion to dismiss. A b d m p t c y  trustee for Ihe estate of a 
coqomte debt-or sued a law ,firm for tortiow conduct involving c e h n  kmciaf 
Lransachoas bettween the debtor and coqorate ksiders, including one Roward Leach and 
"enti~es under his contro1,'W referred to in the facts of the case as "Leacb.'"e facts 
reveal a series of various trmactions which are quite complex but u l k t e l y  involve 
Leach obtaining p h a r y  Liens on debtor's assets when debtor was insolvent. The court 
notes that "of ~ritical importzace''t0 the trustee's claim is the fact that the law h 
(referred to in the case as "GDC") acted as counsel for both debtor and Leach during the 
transactions which the court characterizes as "dual representation'battendant with 
codlicts of interest and divided loyalties between the debtor and Leach. The district 
court stated: 
The b&ptcy court summarized the basis for Trustee's claims against GDC as 
follow: 
[GDC], while owing professional duties to pebtor] acted to 
protect the interests o f  another client, Leach, contrary to the 
interests of [Debtor]. According to vmstee], [GDC] undertook to 
structure the Bridge Loans so that Leach, Blue Chip, and Akamai 
would receive security interests andlor paymeats from [Debtor] 
that were either fraudulent or preferential. 
bz re MS5.5, Inc., 2007 WL 2669150 * 3. The district court reviewed the allegations of 
the trustee's complaint relative to claims for conspiracy and aiding and abetting in the 
breach of fiduciary duties7 and held that the complaint stated claims. The court stated: 
' The district court noted that "Colorado state law dictates that when a corporation becomes insolvent, the 
corporation's creditors are owed a common law duty by the directors and officers of the corporation." 2007 
W 2669150 at * 14. 
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143 GDC1s f iduc iq  duties to Pebtor] encompmsed duties 
which pebtor] and its mmagement owed to general creditors at ii41 
times after December 1, 2800 to avoid sex-dealing and insider 
preferences. 
fi 155 Zlze civil c o q k a c y  in which [GDC] participated was 
attended by c i t c m m c e s  of fraud of willful and recMess 
disregad of the rights af webtor], wecured creditors md smaller 
shareholders. 
ij 157 The ofEicers and directors of Pebtor] breached their o m  
fiduciary duties to unsecured creditors andlor smaller shareholders 
in Pebtor] by parljcipating in or approving [GDC's breach of 
fiduciary duties]. 
fi 160 GDC's conduct in aiding and abetting those breaches were 
attended by circumsbces of fraud or wiBul and reckless 
disregard of the rights of the debtor, unsecured creditors, the 
Trustee and smaller shareholders. 
3Ca: this cask, for the same reasons as in In re MS5.5, IRC., Reed Taylor's factual 
:allegations against Hawley TroxeU state claims upon which relief can be granted. 
Defenbts,  by mde*g to represent multiple clients wifh conflicting interests, and by 
receiving and accepting directions from John Taylor whose interests conflicted with their 
other clients\onflicbg interests, inevitably implicated themselves in the claims for 
damages made by Reed Taylor. Reed Taylor properly states claims against Hawley 
Troxell for conspiracy and aiding and abetting John Taylor and/or CropUSA in breaching 
fiduciary duties by acting to protect John Taylor's andlor CropUSRs interests to the 
detriment of the interests of Hawley Troxell's other clients, AIA Services and ALP, 
Insurance, and to the detriment of Reed Taylor directly. Reed Taylor's claims against 
defendants with respect to interference with his contractual relationships and conversion 
have the same foundation. 
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Aao&er inshctjve case is Adet?a, hc. v. Colzlz, 162 F. Supp.2d 351 (l3.D. Pa. 
2001). In that case, a closely-held corpora-t.ion aad two shaeholders sued a former 
majority shaeholder (""Mdecki') and his law finxi ("'Cow" )alleging m o n g  other cl ' 
breach of fiduciary duty and aidiag m d  a b e ~ g  in the breach of fiduciary duty. The law 
firm moved to disnsiss which mo-t.ion was denied by the court. The facts indicate that 
Malecki, as; corporate director and officer, diverted corporate funds to aaoeber business 
"'vvbich be a w e d  and apemted for his own personal p e c d w  gain.'" addition, 
Mdecki used coqorate "facitildes and persomel to M e r "  his other business. Tbe law 
h had undertaken to provide representa~on to both Malecki, personally, and the 
corporation and the facts of the case detail a number of personal and corporate 
transactions for which the law firm provided representation. The c o w  stated the law 
f m s '  position on the applicable law as follows: ''[qhe Cobn Defendants contend that . . 
. an attorney is not liable for aidiag and abetting a corporate officer's breach of fiduciary 
duty merely by the provision of advice to the corporation absent direct and knowing 
pdcipation in the breach itsex . . ." Adena, Inc., 162 F. Supp.2d at 356. The court 
addressed the issue, stated the law, and held as follows: 
To establish a claim of aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, a 
plaintiff: must show: (1) a breach of fiduciary duty owed to another; (2) 
knowledge of the breach by the aider or abettor; and (3) substantial 
assistance or encouragement by the aider or abettor in effecting that 
breach. (Citations omitted). The court in Sehuylkill Skyport LM [v. Rich, 
1996 'inlZ 502280 (E.D.Pa.19961 did not require the direct and knowing 
participation that the Defendants contend is required. Rather, the court 
allowed the claim to proceed based upon a showing of "substantial 
assistance or encouragement."M~oreover, even if such a heightened 
involvement were required, the Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that the Cohn 
Defendants were indeed knowing and active participants in Malecki's I 
breach. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a claim of aiding 
and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty against the Cohn Defend-ants. 
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It would ce appear from the preceding that Pemsylvania law is consistent 
with the law of Idaho as set forth in the cases cited above and follows the Second 
Resbtement of Torts # 876 (which is fotlowed by Idaho md is cited several times). It is 
to be emphasized that at &e crux of the cause of actjoa agaiast the Gohn Defendmb in 
Aden4 Inc. v. Cohtz was the dual representatjon of clients and the divided loyalties that 
inevilably occur. The G o b  D e f e n h b  subjected themselves to claims of liability for 
conspiracy aad aiding and abetting of various torts by undertaking to represent more than 
one client and .then substantially assisting the client in breaching fiduciary duties owed to 
tbe other client. 
Likewise, in this case Reed Taylor properly and s&ciently states claims against 
Hawley Troxell for conspiracy and aiding and abetting John Taylor andor CropUSA in 
breaching fiduciary duties by protecting John Taylor's and/or CropUSA's interests to the 
detriment of the interests of Hawley TroxeU's other purported clients, AIA Services and 
ALA. Insurance, thereby damaging Reed Taylor. 
Another illustrative case of divided loyalties, conflicts of interest and claims of 
aiding and abetting the breach of a fiduciary duty is Cncciola v. Nelll~aus, 733 N.E.2d 
133 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000). That case arose out of a partnership of four brothers. The 
estate of one of the fraternal partners (Salvatore) filed suit against the partnership 
attorney. The partnership attorney had also undertaken to represent one of the three other 
brothers (Edward), individually, when Edward purchased the partnership share of another 
brother (Anthony). This transaction was alleged to have disadvantaged the partnership 
(which could have acquired Anthony's share for the partnership as a whole) to the 
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advmage o f  Edward, mdjvidudly. The appellate court reversed the &id court's 
d j ~ s s d  of the p la ia tzs  complaint Citiog the Second liestatement of Torts 8 876, the 
court specEcaUy addressed a cause of action ag&& an attorney far a i h g  and abelring 
the breach of a fiduciary duty in a codic t  of hterest conte*: 
Xndeed the defendmt may also be liable for aiding aad abertjng Edward's 
breach of bis fiduciary duty to Salvatore. As his partrier, Edward owed 
Salvatore a duty of % h o d  goad f&ith aad loyalty," (citations o ~ t t e d ) ,  
tbr: more so because of the familial relationshig. (Cita~ons on?in;ed). 
'F]iabGiQ arises when a person [actively] partjcipates in a fiduciary's 
breach of duty ... such that he ... could not reasonably be held to have 
acted in good f&&.' (Citation o ~ a e d ) .  Compare klirrker v. Hill, 44 
Mms.App.Ct. 184, 189-190, 689 N.E.2d 833 (1998) (discussing 
Restatement [Second] of Torts 5 876Pf [I9771 and claim of civil 
conspiracy in context of d r :  12p][6] motion). Here, the plaintiff alleges 
that the defendant not only wrongly advised Edward he had no duty to 
Salvatore with regard to the purchase of h&onyls  interest in the 
parinership, but acted as Edward's lawyer in a transaction that conflicted 
with his duty to the parhership, and then refixsed to give Salvatore the 
Somation he requested after the sale had occurred. Pmphasis added). 
Cacciolu, 733 N.E. 2d at 139 (emphasis added). 
To reiterate, in this case Reed Taylor's Complaint states claims against Hawley 
Troxell for conspiracy and aiding and abetting John Taylor andor CropUSA in breaching 
fiduciary duties by acting to protect John Taylor's anandlor CropUSA's interests to the 
detriment of the interests of Wawley Troxell's other purported clients, AIA Services and 
AIA Insurance, thereby damaging Reed Taylor. Likewise, Reed Taylor's claim against 
Nawley Troxell with respect to interference with his contractual relationships and 
conversion have the same factual basis. 
3. The Cases Cited By Hawley TroxeU Are Tnapplieable Or 
DistinguishabIe. 
Hawley Troxell attempts to portray the facts in this case as though nothing 
abnormal has transpired. See Hawley Troxell's Motion, pp. 8-10. However, the cases 
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cited by Hawley Traxell either have little to nno s d m f i e s  with this case or are not 
properly cited at aU. See e.g., Manrz v. GTCR Golder Ra~mel; L.L. C,, 351 B.R. 685 
@.Ark. 200q ((the law fm was not liable by way of its act of hiring a crisis manager for 
a corporation jn good faith, who later misappropriated the corporation's assets kvvitbout 
the assismce of Ibe law h); Durl~a~~z v. &rest, 142 N.M. 8 17, 171 P.3d 756 (2007) 
(law firm foEo*g &l&te Iasmmce's internal protocol was not liable for aiding and 
abefhg, since there were no allegatjons of wrongfiil acts by the law fm); Morin v. 
Trlpin, 71 1 F.Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (law fixxu was not liable for stafing its client's 
position); Cmtlp v. Dema, 948 F.2d 455 (8th Cir. 1991) (attorney not liable for not 
disclosing facts to a miaority shareholder because he did not knowingly assist in 
securities violations); Kalzala Royal Corpol-atioiz v. Goosill Anderso>~ Quinn &. Stifel, 113 
Hawaii 251, 151 P.3d 732 (2007) (attorneys not liable for imposing unreasonable 
resi.rictions for reviewing documents). 
I. Reed Taylor Bas Sufficiently Pled Breach Of fi'iduciary Duties And 
Aidimp h d  Abettio~ Breach Of Fiduciary Duties. 
The pleading requirements necessary to state a cause of action against a lawyer 
for aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duties is the same as against any other 
person or entity. See e.g., In re Senior CoZtages ofAmerica, LLC, 482 F.3d 997, 1007 
(8th Cir. 2007); Adenn, h e .  v. Cohn, 162 F. Supp.2d 351 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Caccioln v. 
Nellhazrs, 733 N.E.2d 133 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000). In addition, evidence that an attorney 
has violated rules of ethics pertaining to dual representation is sufGcient to support a 
claim that an attorney violated common-law fiduciary duty of loyalty. Hendry v. Pelland, 
73 F.3d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1996). A shareholder's allegations that a law M s  conflict of 
interest representing two corporations is sufGcient to state a claim for breach of fiduciary 
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dt&y against the law h. Rers v. Bwley, Srzydel; Sergt & Colzerz LLC, 484 F. Supp.Zd 
Reed Taylor's c f h s  ag&st HawIey Troxell include aidlog and nlire&g in John 
Taylor md other hdividuals3reacbes of fiducisuy duties owed to Reed Taylor, along 
with iadependent breaches of fiduciasy duties personal to the corpora~oas. See e.g., 
Complhg pp. 7-8, ll,20-21, and 24-25. The claims in this maeer me those personal to 
Reed Taylor and those iaf%icted upon AlA  Services and MA lasurmce, for which Reed 
Taylor is entitled to bring directly against Hawley TroxeU in lieu of a derivative action. 
2. Reed Taylor Elas SufGdently Pled Conversion And Aidinp And Abetting 
Conversion. 
1, Reed Taylor Has Pled Conversion As A Cause Of Action. 
When an unau&o&ed disposition of collateral occurs, a secured creditor has 
standing to bring claims against third parties for conversion and other remedies. See e.g., 
First Sec. Bank of IdalzoJ NA. v. Absco Warehozrse, he., 104 Idaho 853, 856-57, 664 
P.2d 281 (Ct. App. 1983); US. v. McCZeskey Mills, Inc., 409 F.2d 1216 (Ga. 1969). ?'he 
rights of a secured creditor are exiensive: 
In some c i r c w c e s ,  however, an unauthorized sale or other disposition 
of collateral may ~onstitute conversion as to the secured party. Ln most 
cases when a debtor makes an unauthorized disaosition of collateral. the 
security interest survives disposition of the collateral. In these cases, the 
secured party may repossess the collateral fiom the transferee or, in an 
appropriate case, maintain an action for conversion. The secured party 
may claim both any proceeds and the oriejnal collateral but, of course, 
may only have one satisfaction. . . . 
Where a sale of collateral is, with respect to the secured party, a 
conversion of the collateral, there is a conversion on the part of the one 
who sells, as well as on the part of the one who purchases, or to whom 
pro'clerty is transferred, or a thkd party who exercises dominion over the 
collateral or its proceeds. . . 
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See 79 C.J.S. Secwed Trmsactiom g 157 (20083 (ktemal cita~ons o ~ e e d )  (emphasis 
added]; see also Lzmr v Westen2 Szff: CO., 107 Idaho 693, 692 P.2d 337 (1984); Ltrssier 
v. Matr Yixn Developmenf, Inc., 667 P.2d 804, 8 14 (EIawaii &p. 1983); Nelsol? v. Jones, 
3 8 Id&o 664, 224 P. 435, 43 8 (1924); Westenz Farm Selvice, fnc. v. Olseiz, 15 1 Wn.2d 
645, 90 P.3d 1053 (2004) (when a debtor trmsfers collateral subject to a perfected 
s e c ~ w  interest, the secured party may comence  aa action against the putchaser for 
conversion). 
Were, Reed Taylor has security interest in the cornIn.issions of AL4 Services and 
AIA Lnsurmce, Reed Taylor also has all of the shares of AIA burance pledged to him 
and holds a security interest in those shares. Moreover, Reed Taylor also has a security 
interest in the proceeds of all commissions and the distributions fiom AL4 Services' other 
subsidiaries, namely, the $1.2 W o n  Mortgage improperly pledged to CropUSA. 
2. As A Seewed Creditor, Reed Taylor Is Not Required To Own The 
Co-sions And $ld Million Mortgage As They Are Pledged To 
Him As Collateral. 
One who wrongfidly withbofds personal property from another who is entitled to 
it under a security agreement may be liable for conversion, l i z  re Bailey, 197 F.3d 997, 
1000 (9th Cix. 1999); Case Coip. v. Gelzrke, 91 P.3d 362, 365 (Ark. App. 2004) ("A 
secured party has the right to take possession of the collateral upon default, and so has 
sufEcient possessory interest to bring a conversion action.. .money can be the subject of 
Reed Taylor has, since 1996, held a security interest in all of the cornmissions of 
AIA Services and AlA Insurance and the stock of AIA Insurance. See Complaint, p. 4, 7 
13; pp. 21-23, fiqT 51-57. The $1.2 Million mortgage was also obtained as proceeds from 
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o~med by the corporations, dl of whit& are clearly i d e n a h l e  by aad &ou@ b& 
sktemcnQ, money .Crmsfers, and Ioan proceeds (i.e., money Iamderislg &ough the 
unl loan from CropUSA whereby Rawley TroxU assisted in the kmsaction and 
provided the p q o d e d  leg& services for aU. of the c o ~ c h g  and diver@g kteresk). 
G O I I J P ~ ~ W .  
1, mwley TruxeU Has Engaged In Civil Conspiracy. 
Idaho law is well sellled on claim for civil conspiracy and the minimal pleading 
r eq~emenb .  Arg~naut &1szzrrance Cott.tpa?~y v. mite, 86 Idaho 374, 379, 386 P.2d 964 
(1963) ("In the instant case it is alleged that injury resulted fiom acts done in pursuance 
of the coqiracy" and the 'bder dismissing the complaint is reversed"'); Lorang v. Hays, 
69 Idabo 440, 449, 209 P.2d 733 (1949) ('"a concerted series of action on the part of 
wrongdoers, which c W ~ t e s  in produ'cing the injury complained of.. .pursuant to a 
conspiracy."); moppenburg v. M q s ,  60 Idaho 19, 88 P.2d 513 (1939) (an agreement 
becomes a cornpiracy when its purpose is to do something that is udzwfd or some 
lawful thiog in an d a a  manner). 
Aeomeys are also subject to IiabiZity for claims of civil conspiracy. See e.g., 
Trazlb v. tyasl~irzgfon, 591 S.E. 2d 3 82, 387 (Ga. App, 2003); Banco Papltlar firth 
America v. Gandi, 876 A.2d 253 (N.Y. 2005) (recognizing a cause of action for a 
conspiracy). In one treatise, civil conspiracy and aiding and abetting are distinguished: 
Civil conspiracy and aiding and abetting are varieties of concerted-action 
liability. The prime distinction between civil conspiracy and aiding and 
abetting is that a cons~iracv involves an agreement to participate in a 
won@ activity or to commit a tortious act, while aiding and abetting 
focuses on whether a defendant knowingly gives 'substantial assistance' to 
someone who performs wrongfid conduct, not on whether the defendant 
agrees to join the wrongful conduct. 
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,See 15A C.J.S. Cornpiracy 8 3 C2008) (emphasis added). 
Like aiding and abe&g, Hawley TroxerU aM:empts to c o h s e  Reed Taylor's 
conspiracy claim by citing numerous cases h m  other jurisdietioos. However, as 
discussed above, Iddbo law is well settled on consp2acy claims. Reed Taylor's 
Comptaiot alleges causes of action against Kawley Troxefl for conspitacy, which are both 
personal to Reed Taylor and which be is p u r ~ g  in place of the corporations for his 
benefit. The ageemeat Hawley Traxell entered into involves the alleged "Joint Defense 
A@eemen$'"'Joint Retainer Agreemenfbd their pqorted direct and indirect improper 
represenktion of John Taylor and other individuals for tbe purpose of interfering with 
Reed Taylor" contractual rights and unlawfully protecting the interests of Jobn Taylor, 
thereby preventing claims &om being asserted against Hawley Troxell and covering up 
years .of inappropriate representation and opinion letters. Morebver, the conspiracy 
involves coqering up and perpetuating fiaud, conversion, and other claims, as set forth in 
Reed Taylor's C~amplaint. See e.g., Complaint, pp. 7-8 $q 19-20; p. 21 nv 47-49. 
Similarly, while practicing law is generally a l a m  activity, practicing law 
becomes illegal when done so in an illegd manner, as set forth in Reed Taylor's 
Complaint. Thus, although entering into a joint defense agreement is generally 
permissible, the same joint defense agreement can also be improperfy used to illegally or 
unlawfully practice law. 
2. Contrary To Hawley TroxeUyg Assertions, Reed Taylor Has 
Sufficiently Pled Conspiracy. 
Hawley Troxell challenges Reed Taylor's conspiracy claim on various theories , 
relating to an attorney being pratected'by merely giving advice to a client. See Hawley 
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TroxeU? Motiaa pp. 14-1 5. As wit% Hawley TroxeU" sotbr a rmen&,  the au&oSw it 
relies upon deals with Iradi~onal cases with facts and legal issues si&1cmt1y 
djshgujshable. However, as discussed above, mwley TroxeU? acts do not merely 
involve provibg legal advice. hdeed, Hawley TroxeU was not, md is not, au&orized to 
represent AIk Services or ALA Insumce, and all of its acts are actionable. 
N o ~ h h h g  this fa& Wawley Troxell has exceeded my purported scope of 
representaljon and engaged in conspirjag with John Taylor, CropUSA and others to 
c o d t  various torts and retain property in which Reed Taylor holds a valid and 
pedected security interest. 
L. Reed Taylor &s Sacientliv Pled Tortious Intederence And aid in^ And 
Abetting Tortieus Interference. 
1. Reed Taylor Has Pied Tortious hterfereace With A Conhet. 
A prima facie case of tbe tort [of interfering with a contract] is established where 
the pl&Madduces proof of the following elements: 
(a) Existence o f  a contract, @) hawledge: of the contract on the part of the 
de f enhk  (c) h t e a ~ o n d  interference causing a breach of the contract, and 
(d) injury to the p I&mresdkg  from the breach, 
Jei?sen v. Testberg, 115 Idaho 1021, 1028,772 P.2d 228 (1988). Reed Taylor concedes 
that the above elements are required to make aprima facie case for tortious interference 
with a contract. They are not required to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
12@)(6). Nevertheless, Reed Taylor has one again sufEciently pled the cause of action, 
contrary to Rawley Troxell's assertions. See Hawley TroxeUys Motion, pp. 15-17. As 
with all of Reed Taylor's causes of action, he incorporates by reference each fact in the 
Surprisingly, Hawley Troxell even admits that it assisted in the improper titling and pledging of the $1.5 
Million Mortgage to CropUSA-the same mortgage that was acquired with firnds in which Reed Taylor 
had a security interest and the estate of The Universe, another subsidiary of ALA Services whose shares and 
all distribuhons thereto were pledged to Reed Taylor. See Hawley Troxell's Answer, p. 8, f l39. 
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With respect to &e first aad second elements, Reed Taylor pleads rbe exjstence of 
conbacts. See e.g, Camp1&& p. 3, 11-12; p. 4, 99 13-14; p. 17, 7 38; p. 21, $1 48. 
Sqr ishgly , .  Hawley Troxetl even a h i t s  to h a k g  lutowledge of h e n d e d  Stock 
Pledge ~ ~ e e m e n t "  See Hawley Troxell's Answer, p. 4,7  13. T'hus, the fist and second 
elements are not ody pled, but satisfied for puposes of the Amended Stock Pledge 
Agreement With respect to the tkird element, Reed Taylor bas also s p e c s c d y  pled 
in tenkndy  inlerferences. See e.g., Complaint, p. 4 ,3  14; p. 5, 'If 15; p. 9, 7 23; p. 16,3 
37; p. 17; 3 38; p. 21, 48. Finally, Reed Taylor has pled the find element of damages. 
See e.g., Complaint, p. 17,T 38; p.ll ,T 27(1); p. 12, I/ 28; pp. 25-26. Thus, Reed Taylor 
has pled all four elements of tortiow interference with a contract (as to him and the 
corporations). 
2. Hawley Troxell Has TortiousIy Interfered With Reed Taylor's 
Contntctnal &@ts By And Through Its Purported Representation 
And Improper Assistance Of J o h  Taylor Auld CropUSA, 
Employees and agents are third-parties when acting outside of their scope of 
authority. See e.g., Hotfser v. City ufRed11zor7d, 91 Wn.2d 36, 586 P.2d 482, 484 m a .  
1978). As the purported (and unauthorized) agent for CropUSA, AIA Services and AIA 
Insurance, Hawley TroxeU. has tortiously interfered with ,Reed Taylor's contraclual rights 
with ALA Services and AZA Insurance by exceeding all scope of representation and 
without proper authorization. By representing CropUSA (and John Taylor), Hawley 
Troxell has intentionally interfered with Reed Taylor's contractual rights. Moreover, 
Hawley Troxell has also intentionally interfered with Reed Taylor's contractual rights 
lo Hawley Troxell does not admit to having knowledge of the $6M Note, Restructure Agreement, Amended 
Security Agreement or any other agreements. 
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~ o ~ x @ l  its unau&orized representaGon o f U  Scmices aod MA hsmmce, Fbdly, and 
mr exham~vely, Hawiey TroxeIl has hte&ered witb Reed Taylor's r i b t s  to be a board 
member of MA S e ~ c e s ,  htesered with bis fights to possession of co 
collateral, and k t e ~ e r e d  with lris ri&& h v a l ~ g  the $1.2 Million Mortgee, mong 
various otihers. In sum, Hawley Troxell is essenljally d a a y  and happropriately only 
represeahg John Taylor and his constihen&. 
M; Reed Tador Has S ~ c i e n t k  Pled Prand And A~&F And A b e ~ g  
Brand. 
GenerdUy, a p l ~ m  must plead the fooUorjving nine elements in order to state a 
claim far fiaud: 
(1) a sBtement or representation of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its mteriality; 
(4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5)  the speaker's intent that 
there be reliance; (6) the hearer's ignorance of the falsity of the statement; 
(7) reliance by the hearer; (8) juslifiable reliance; and (9) resultant injury. 
Mafmos v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 155 P.3d 1166, 1170 (2007) (holding that 
misrepresenbtions and discrepancies in corporate financial statements precluded 
s m a r y  judment ia buyer's action for fraud).'' 
However, Idaho Courts have long recognized "constructive fraud" as an 
alternative cause of action to common law "fiaud" and that "constructive fraud'' does not 
require a plaintiff to plead the nine elements of common law "fiaud." See e.g., Smitlz v. 
Great Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266, 561 P.2d 1299 (1977); McGhee v. McGhee, 82 
Idaho 367, 371, 353 P.2d 760 (1960) (recognizing constructive fraud as an alternative 
cause of action to fiaud and that the requirement of pleading and proving all nine 
elements of fiaud "is not the case"); Betl~lnl?nzy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 61,415 P.2d 698 
" The causes of action in Reed Taylor's Complaint are based upon constructive fraud. However, Reed 
Taylor wi'fl also plead traditional frauds claims in his Amended Complaht for other specific act, including 
those that have occuned since Reed Taylor filed bis initial Complaint. 
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(1966)[a p r o ~ s e  to build a house to ce %-duds cons~btes "consmc~ve 6 a u P  
when the bu2df.r failed to do so). 
Moreover, a cause of a ~ ~ o o  under ""cons(ructive firtud'' is discused in si&cant 
detail in nmerous treatises (which me &equen@y followed aad cited by the Idaho 
Supreme Corn): 
Constcuc.tive h u d  is a breach of duty which, irrespective of moral gdt ,  
the law declares fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive, to violate 
cod~dence, or to irijure public interests. 
CansLnrctive fraud is Eraud that arises by operation of law from conduct, 
which if sanctioned by law, would secure an unconscionable advantage. It 
is a breach of legal or equitable duty which, irrespective of the moral gudt 
of the fraud feasor, the law declares fraudulent because of its tendency to 
deceive others, to violate public or private confidence, or to injure public 
interests. The legal duty may arise Cora a statute, a contract, or a trust. 
To establish constructive fraud, it is necessary only to prove acts of &aud. 
Neither actual dishonesty of purpose nor intent to deceive is an essential 
element Thus, a party whose actions constitute constructive fraud might 
still have acted in good faith.. . 
37 C.J.S. Fraud 5 5 (2007) (internal foot notes omitted) (emphasis added). 
Constructive fraud is defined as an act done or omitted that amounts to 
positive fraud, or is construed as a fraud by the court because of its 
detrimental effect upon public interests and public or private con6dence, 
even though the act is not done or omitted with an actual design to 
perpetrate positive fraud or injury upon other persons. Otherwise stated, 
"constructive fraud" arises by operation of law from a course of conduct 
yhich, if sanctioned by law. would secure an unconscionable advantape, 
irrespective of the existence or evidence, of actual intent to defraud. 
Constructive fraud, sometimes called l e ~ a l  fraud, is nevertheless fraud, 
although it rests uuon presumption and rests less upon furtive intent than 
does moral or actual fraud. It is presumed £corn the relation of the parties 
to a transaction or ftorn the circumstances under which it takes place. 
Constructive fraud arises on a breach of duty by one in a confidential or 
fiduciary relationship to another that induces justifiable reliance by the 
other to his or her prejudice. 
The conscience is not necessarily affected by it. Indeed, it has been said 
that constructive fraud generallv involves a mere mistake of fact. It 
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fa its generic sense, c o m c l i v e  6aud comprises all acts, ontissions, and 
concehen& involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or 
confidence that resu1t.s in dmage to mober. I-fence, the terns 
"com~ct ive  fraud" and "legal fkaud'' both connote that in certain 
circmsmces one may be cbatged wftZr the consequences of his words 
md acts as &ou& he has spoken or acted frauddenfly, although, properly 
s p e h g ,  his conduct does not merit 124s opprobrim. 
If there is my dis'cinction to be fomd beween the terms ' ~ o n ~ c t j v e "  
and "legal" as applied to fraud, it probably momts  to this: Breach o& 
fiduciw relafions~p or of a contract u b e h a e  fidei is usually called 
"cooasbruc.tive hud:"hereas the term "legal fraud" is generally used to 
characterize a olisrepresentatioa made wiUlout knowledge of its falsity. 
Consmctive 5aud may result £corn recWess and heedes~-representa~o&~ 
although they are not made with a deliberate intent to deceive. 
37 Am. Jr. 2d Fraud and Deceit 5 9 (2007) (internal foot notes omitted) (emphasis 
added). Similarly, altomeys are liable for the aiding and abetting of constructive fraud. 
See Hearst v. Heatat, 50 A.D. 3d 959,857 N.Y.S. 596 (N,Y, 2008). 
Hawley Troxell has assisted John Taylor and others in the commission of fraud, 
including constructive fraud, which simply requkes a duty and h d s  being 
inappropriately diverted or utilized. Reed Taylor has smciently pled these claims. 
N. Reed Taylor Has Sdciently Pled C f h s  For Malpractice, 
For a13 of the reasons identified in this Response, Reed Taylor has standing to 
pursue any beneficiary claims and direct claims against Hawley Troxell for malpractice 
claims owned by AIA Insurance and AIA ~ervices . ]~  Nevertheless, Hawley Troxell cites 
Reed Taylor concedes that his independent malpractice claims asserted against Hawley Troxell are thinly 
supporred by the third-party beneficiary and related authority cited above. However, the undersigned was 
also unable to find a single case in which a creditor was owed millions of dollars by a highly insolvent 
corporation, a creditor had a security interest in ftlnds being converted and improperly utilized by the 
defendant law h, and the other significant Eacts in this case. That being said, Reed Taylor is still entitled 
to bring direct daims against Hawley Troxell in lieu of derivative claims as he is the only person entitled to 
receive any damages from the numerous harms. 
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sificmt au&ffril)E on dpracGce c l ~ b  and the requirement for p~v iQ .  See Hawley 
TroxeB" Mo&on, p. 23-27. Reed Taylor concedes that any claims against Hawley 
TroxeU for mdprac~ce &iag &om its pqosled representation of AIA Services would 
ed by way of the emerne facts in tbis case (facts not seen in other cases). 
However, this is not true with AL4 l a s m c e  became of Reed Taylor's special smdiag 
as a pledgee, director, o%cer and secured creditor of AIA Losurance's shares and assets. 
0. Reed Taylor Has Alleged VaLid Claims Under The Unfair Trade 
Practices Act. 
Hawley Troxell moves to dismiss Reed Taylor's claim as if the incredible facts 
supporting fhe ciaims alleged by Reed Taylor did not exk t  See Hawley Troxell's 
Motion lo Dismiss, pp. 21-23. However, like Hawley Troxell's other arguments, Reed 
Taylor has alleged vatid claims and the facts to support'such c l h . I 3  
1, Reed Taylor Has Alleged A Valid C l h  Against HawIey Troxell Bor 
Unfair Trade Practices. 
Courts do not afford attorneys blanket inxnunity from claims brought by opposing 
parties under the unfair trade practices acts. See e.g., Chapman Lumber, h c .  v. Tager, 
288 Corn 69, 95-96, 95 A.2d 1, 20-21 (Conn. 2008); Bzirrrs ex re1 Osee of Pziblic 
Guurdia~? v. f i l e  and Dorr LLP, 445 F. Supp. 2d 94 @.Ct. Mass. 2006) (allegations by a 
guardian for disabled minor against law firm and trust manager demonstrated 
recklessness necessary to establish claim under unfair trade act); St. Paul Fire and 
Marine h. Co. v. Ellis & Hlis, 262 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2001); Canlpos v. Brooksbank, 120 
F. Supp. 2d 1271 @.Ct. N.M. 2000) (attorney's misleading conduct violated unfair 
practices act); see also Burnnp v. Linnortz, 38 s.w.3d 612, 619-20. In Cl~aprnm? 
'' NawIey Troxell's arguments only pertain to the issue gf contractual privity. Legal representation does 
not necessarily involve a contract 
. 
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Lzfmber, Inc. v. Tager, 95 A.2d 1, 20-21 (Corn. 20089 cciti~g Mozzoclzi v. Beck, 204 
Corn. 490, 529 A,2d 171 (Corn. 1987) (other ktemd citatioas oraiBed) (em&asis 
added).the Comec~cut Supreme Court upheld a judpent  against a debtor's attorney 
ua&r the Udair Trade Prac~ces Act: 
cowsel under the Comeclicut Udak  Trade Practices Act cannot be 
consmed, as the defendant suggests, :as ~ o r b p  blanket d d W  to 
attorneys for tortious acts they commit against third parties while 
representing clients. Rather, the evidence shows that the defendant 
negotiated, and directed his client to execute, a note and mo%age relating 
to property &at the defendant h e w  the client did not own.. . 
Here, Reed Taylor's cause of action sunrives as an exception to the general rule 
that a contract is necessary. The facts in tbis case are far more extreme than any of the 
cases cited above and are easily distingujshed from any cases cited by Hawley Troxell. 
2. Reed Taylor Has Alleged A 'Valid Direct C I a h  For Unfair Trade 
Practices Against Hawley TroxeH. 
Under the same legal authority and argument above and Idaho's Unfair Trade 
Practices Act, Reed Taylor is entitled to bring claims direcfly against Hawley TroxeU for 
its violations of the Unfair Trade Practices Act involving its purported representation of 
AIA hsurance and AZA Services, i.e., Reed Taylor should be permitted to bring AIA 
Services and AIA Insurance's claims direcily against Hawley Troxell by way of being a 
stock pledgee, secured creditor, creditor of an insolvent corporation, the only authorized 
officer and director of A324 hsurance, and the only persodcreditor entitled to any 
recovered damages. All of the actions taken by Wawley Troxell have directly damaged 
Reed Taylor in a distinct and special manner. None of I-Iawley Troxell's actions were 
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au&~rked,  Moreover, Reed Taylor" s e c t  claims will prevent duplica~ve Iifig;riioa and 
there are ua other bona-fide parties en~fied to the as- or claims of the companies.14 
P. 
Cause Of Actiarri, 
p q o s e s  behind the court rule gove&g mendmen& to pleadings are 
o be d e t e d e d  on the merits rather than on technicalities, and ta make 
pleahgs  serve the limited role of providing notice of the nature of the claim and the 
facts at issue. CIzristenseiz Farnily Trzist v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 993 P.2d 1 197 
(1999). If a complaint i s  capable of being amended to state facts sufficient to constitute a 
cause of action, a r e h a l  to grant permission to mend would deprive a p l ~ ~  of a 
substmtial right, Marhtalfer v. Mm-htalfer, 80 Idaho 129, 135, 326 P.2d 994 (1 958). 
As long as the proposed amendment states a valid claim, a court may not consider the 
s ~ ~ c i e o c v  of the evidence s u ~ a o ~ g  the proposed claim. Christensen Family li-tlst v. 
Clzl-istensen, 133 Idaho 866, 872, 993 P.2d 1197 (1999) citing DrIffin v. ldnho 
Improvement Ass??, 126 Idaho 1002, 1013, 895 P.2d 1195, 1206 (1995) (emphasis 
added). "Great liberty should be shown in. allowing amendments to pleadings in 
fixtherance of justice between parties." Stnith v. Shirtiz, 82 Idaho 141,149, 350 P.2d 348 
(1 960). 
Here, Reed Taylor's Complaint alleges suEicient facts to support all of his causes 
of action against Hawley Troxell. Nevertheless, Reed Taylor requests leave to file an 
amended complaint to clarrfy facts and causes of action against HawIey Troxell, cure any 
l4 In the unlikely event that Reed Taylor is able to recover sufiicient funds and assets to satisfy his 
$9,000,000 debt, he will ensure that any other h d s  are first paid to Donna Taylor, the priority shareholder, 
and deposit the remaining funds in the Court's registry for other innocent shareholders. 
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alleged deficiencies, and add addigondl cames of  action and .fact.s.15 
For the remoos set forth above, Hawley Troxell's Motion to Disrajss should be 
denied in M. 
day of October, 200&. 
BELL, BIS SELL & XPLLC 
By: 
- 
Attorneys for PlzhtB? 
A motion to amend and supplement complaint will be filed before the hearing and a draft version of the 
proposed amended complaint will be filed at &at time. The amended complaint will clarify facts, clan.@ 
and add causes of action, and include additional facts ascertained since the Complaint was filed. 
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I mmBY CERmV that on the 9' day of October, 2008, I caused to be 
served a true md COR-ect. copy of the faloregokg docmeat to the fo l l ohg .  
Jmes D. L&ue 
E l m  & Burke, PA 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, LD 83704 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS - 57 
275 
Loren C. Ipsen ISB # 1 767 
E L m I  & B U m E ,  P.A. 
251 E. Front Street, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844 
E & B File No. 7082-0013 
Aeorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUP.JTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual; I 
PlaintifF, I Case No. CV 08-01765 
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN 
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V. 
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A. 
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL 
ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X, 
unknown individuals; 
DEFENDANTS' REPLY BRIEF IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
Defendants. I 
Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, Elam & Burke, P.A., hereby submit the 
following reply brief in support of their motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The law firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP and its individual 
attorneys who are named as parties to this suit will be collectively referred to as "HTEH" 
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I, INTRODUCTION 
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. For this 
puvose, "the court need not accept as true inferences unsupport-ed by facts set out in the complaint 
or legal conclusions cast as factual allegations." Potts v. Ifowavd Universi~, 240 F.R.D. 14, 17 
(D.D.C. 2007). "The well-pleaded facts must be reviewed in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff A plaintiff, however, must allege specific facts, not conclusory allegations. Conclusory 
allegafions and unwmanted deduc.tions are not admitted as true." Scott v. Steinhagen Oil Co., Inc., 
224 F.Supp.2d 1084, 1085 (E.D.Tcxas 2002) (citations omitted). "[Tlhe complaint must contain 
either direct allegations on every material point necessary to sustain a recovery or contain allcgations 
from which an inference fairly may be drawn that evidence on these material points will be 
introduced at trial. Conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions 
will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss." Myers v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 5 
F.Supp.2d 423, 427 (1998) (citations and internal punctuation omitted). It is required that the 
plaintiff must "set forth facts to support the legal theory forming the basis of the complaint." Tirey 
v. Stecker, 2008 171 102, at * 1 (D.Mont. 2008). The pleadings are not suficient where the 
plaintiff relies on "subjective characterizations or unsubstantiated conclusions" or on "bald 
assertions, unsupportable conclusions and opprobious epithets." Fleming v. Lind-Valdock & Co., 
922 F.2d 20,23 (1" Cir. 1990) (citations and internal punctuation omitted). 
The basic difference between a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and a summary 
judgment motion is that the former is a test of law rather than a test of facts. "The moving party has 
the option to test the law and to reserve a right to test the facts; i.e., by making a 12(b)(6) motion, 
reserving a Rule 56 motion." Stewart v. Arrington Constr. Co., 92 Idaho 526,53 1,446 P.2d 895, 
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900 (1 968)- ""The pupose oFRule 12@)(6) is to allow a defendant to test whether, as a matter of 
law, the plaintiff is entitled to legal relief even if everything alleged in the complaint is true." KIwp 
v. Taco Bell Corp,, 909 F.Supp. 5 16, 51 9 (S.D.Ohio 1005). 
A motion to dismiss is the usual and proper method of testing the legal suaciency 
of the complaint. For purposes of the motion, the well-plead& material allegations 
of the complaint are taken as admitted; but conclusions of law or mwmmted 
deductions of fact are not admitted. A complaint may be dismissed on motion if 
clearly without any merit; and this want of merit may consist in an absence of law 
to suppod a claim of the sort made, or of facts sufficient to make a good claim. 
C & HConstr. & PavingInc.. v. Foundation ReseweIns. Co., 85 N.M. 374,376,512 P.2d 947,949 
(1 973) (citations and internal punctuation omitted). 
11. THE MOTION TO DISMISS IS BASED UPON LEGAL, NOT FACTUAL, ISSUES 
HTEH contends that the complaint in this action is legally insufficient and, therefore, should 
be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The issues which mandate dismissal are not questions of 
disputed facts, but legal issues which it is the function of the Court to determine at the outset of the 
litigation. These include whether HTEH owes any duty to plaintiff Reed Taylor, whether the statutes 
upon which plaintiff relies are applicable, whether plaintiff has standing to sue, whether HTEH is 
entitled to the litigation privilege, and whether the plaintiff may sue attorneys with whom he is not 
in privity for legal malpractice. Issues which require the application of law to fact are also 
appropriate for resolution based upon the assumption, for the sake of argument, that the facts alleged 
in the complaint are true. For example, giving the plaintiff every benefit of the inferences 
legitimately to be drawn from his complaint, he has nonetheless failed to state a claim for 
conversion, civil conspiracy, aiding and abetting the commission of a tortious act, or intentional 
interference with contract. 
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A. The Exlstenee of a Duty Is a Legal Question. 
"No liabiliq arises &om the law of torts unless the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff.'" 
Udy v. Cufter County, 136 Idaho 386, 389, 34 P.3d 1069, 1072 (2001). See also Hofiann v. 
Simplot Aviah'on, 97 Idaho 32,539 P.2d 584 (1975). 
"The existen~e of a duty is a question of law over which [an appellate] Court exercises free 
review." Turpen v. h n i e r i ,  133 Idaho 244, 247, 985 P.2d 669, 672 (1999); "Generally, the 
question of whether a duty exists is a question of law." Heath v. Honkers ' Mini-Mart, Inc., 8 P.3d 
1254,1257,134 Idaho 71 1,714 (2000); Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi  Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388,400, 
987 P.2d 300,3 12 (1999); Freeman v. Juker, 119 Idaho 555,808 P.2d 1300 (1991). "The existence 
of a duty is a question of law for t h s  Court." O'Guin v. Bingham County, 142 Idaho 49,5 1, 122 
P.3d 308,3 10 (2005). See also FJitrrideldv. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134,139,90 P.3d 884,889 (2004) 
(holding that "A direct attorney-client relationship is required to exist between the plaintiff and the 
attorney-defendant in a legal malpractice action except in this very narrow circumstance.") 
(emphasis added) The very narrow circumstancc referred to in Harrigfeld is that "an attorney 
preparing testamentary instmments owes a duty to the beneficiaries named or identified therein to 
prepare such instruments, and if requested by the testator to have them properly executed, so as to 
effectuate the testator's intent as expressed in the testamentary instruments." Id. at 13 8,90 P.2d 888. 
"The question of whether a legal duty in fact exists is a question of law for the court to 
decide." Freeman v. Juker, 119 Idaho 555,556-557, 808 P.2d 1300, 1301-1302 (1991). See also 
Chavez v. Barrus, 2008 WZ, 3905436, at *5 (Idaho 2008); Estate ofBecker v. CaZlhan, 140 Idaho 
522,525,96 P.2d 3d 623,627 (2004); Daleiden v. Jeflerson County Joint School Dist. No. 251,139 
Idaho 466,468, 80 P.3d 1067, 1069 (2003); Udy v. Custer County, 136 Idaho 386, 389,34 P.3d 
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G.  Standing 1s a Ques.t-ion of Law. 
The issue ofwhether the plaintiff has standing to sue is a question of law. The Idaho courts 
have in several cases upheld dismissal pursumt to Rule 12@)(6) of lawsuits where the complaint on 
its face failed to allege facts that would show that the plainfiff bad standing. See Thompson v. City 
oflewiston, 137 Idaho 473,50 P.3d 488 (2002) (affiming dismissal pursuant to Rule 12@)(6) of 
taxpayer's complaint to invalidate adoption of urban renewal area plan); Young v. City ofletchum, 
137 Idaho 102,44 P.3d 1157 (2002) (upholding Rule 12@)(6) dismissal of complaint of citizens 
challenging validity of contract entered into by city); Osmumon v. State, 135 Idaho 292,17 P.3d 236 
(2000) (holding as a matter of law that school districts have no standing to sue the state under the 
Constitutionally Based Education Claims Act, Idaho Code $6-2201 et seg.); Student Loan f i n d  of 
Idaho, Inc. v. Payette County, 125 Idaho 824,875 P.2d 236 (Ct.App. 1994) (holding that landowner 
lacked standing to challenge validity of agreement betureen city and county and certain 
implementing ordinances). !Whether plaintiff Reed Taylor has standing to sue his litigation 
adversaries' counsel for legal malpractice or other alleged causes of action is a question of law which 
is appropriately determinable pursuant to Rule 12@)(6). 
D. The Existence of a Privilege or Immunity Is a Question of Law. 
HTEH is entitled to litigation privilege; i.e, Reed Taylor c m o t  sue HTEH for positions 
advanced, statements made, or strategy adopted during the course of litigation. The existence of a 
privilege or imuni ty  is a question of law. Nation v. State, Dept. of Corvectiop 144 Idaho 177,158 
P.3d 953 (2007) (appellate court exercises free review over questions of law and, therefore, holding 
of trial court that Department of Correction is entitled as a matter of law to qualified inxnunity under 
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42 U. S.C. $j 1 983 was affirmed); Rincover v. State, Dept. of Fintmce, Secur-i2"ies Bureau, 128 Idaho 
653, 91 7 P.2d 1293 (1 996) (Rule 12@)(6) dismissal a f imed on g o m d  of i m m i t y ) ;  Smith v. 
Reddy, 882 F.Supp. 497 (D,Md. 1995) (qualiged i m m i q  protects govement  officials &om civil 
suits asising from their discretionav hnctions as a matla of law); Sanchez v. Coxan, 175 Ariz. 93, 
854 P.2d 126 (1993); (absolute legislative imuni ty  in defamation action is a question of law); 
Duvragh v. Superior Court, 183 Ariz. 79, 900 P,2d 121 5 (Ariz.App. 1995) (appraiser's expert 
testhony in judicial promeding was absolutely privileged). "One of the most widely recopized 
absolute privileges is that afforded participants in judicial proceedings. In various circumstances, 
this privilege protects judges, parties, lawyers, witnesses and jurors. Whether the privilege exists 
is a question of law for the court." Darragh, 183 biz. at 8 1,900 P.2d at 121 7. (Citations omitted) 
E. HTEH Is as a Matter of Law Entitled to the Defense of Lack of Privity. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that "As a general rule, an attorney will be held liable for 
negligence only to his or her client and not to someone with whom the attorney does not have an 
attorney-client relationship." Harrigfeld v. Nkzncock, 140 Idaho 134,137,90 P.3d 884,887 (2004). 
Harrigfeld extended the attorney's duty to intended beneficiaries of testamentary instruments 
prepared by the attorney. That is the only circumstance recognized by Idaho law where an attorney 
owes a duty of care to parties with whom the attorney is not in privity. The issue of whether or not 
to extend that duty to the circumstances of the present case is an issue of law to be decided by the 
court, not an issue of fact for the jwy. Plaintiff Reed Taylor argues a lawyer's duty of care should 
be extended to the facts alleged in his complaint. Extended, expensive and contentious pre-trial 
discovery will not shed more light on this issue. Whether the plaintiff can sue attorneys with whom 
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he is not in privity for legal malpractice is an issue which is appropriate to deternine under Rule 
12(b)(6)- 
111. PLAmTXFF'S ST ZNG ARGUMENTS WITHOUT MERIT 
This case presents the unique and musual issue of whether an individud may sue counsel 
who have appeared in behalf of adverse pwies in pending litigation. In support; of his argument that 
he has standing to bring a direct (not a derivative) actionZ against other parties' atlomys, plaintiff 
Reed Taylor advances eight diRerent theories. Each theory can be shown to be without merit as a 
matter of law, 
A. Reed Taylor Is Not the Client of NTEH. 
As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that many of Reed Taylor's arguments have the 
cart before the horse; that is, they depend upon the assuption, although the complaint does not so 
allege, that he has already prevailed in the lawsuit against AIA Services and AIA Insurance 
(hereinafter the "Underlying Litigation") and has been awarded the relief requested in that litigation. 
However, the Underlying Litigation involves vigorously contested issues of law and fact. It remains 
to be seen whether, and to what extent, any of the parties will prevail in the Underlying Litigation. 
Reed Taylor's basic assumption seems to be that anyone who opposes his litigation position in the 
Underlying Litigation is acting wrongfirlly. Contrary to this basic misconception, the defendants 
in the Underlying Litigation are entitled to due process. They are entitled to oppose Reed Taylor's 
claims and to assert any defenses they have. 
2~laintifl's counsel attempts to finesse this point by asserting tbat "Reed Taylor has standing to directly 
bring certain derivative claims against Hawley Troxell." (Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, p. 
9) A direct derivative claim, of course, is an oxymoron. 
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It should farther be pointed out as a preliminary matter that Reed 'Taylor is not a credllar who 
loaned money to a corporation and took a secu~ly interest in corporate assets as collateral. He 
occupies the unique position of a redeeming sharebolder who seeks payment &om an insolvent 
corporation in preference to the rights of tbird-party creditors and other shareholders. His attempt 
to place himself in the shoes of HTEH's clients is without merit and would be inimical to the 
inte@Q ofthe judicial process because it would deprive HTEH's clients of the right to independent 
legal representation. 
B. Reed Taylor Lacks Standing to Sue Counsel for Opposing Parties. 
"An attorney owes no duty to a third party in an adversarial relationship." Bowman v. Two, 
104 Wash.2d 181,188,704 P.2d 140 (1085). "Existence of a duty to an adversary party beyond the 
courtesy and respect owed all participants in the legal process. . . would interfere with the undivided 
loyalty an attorney owes a client and would diminish an attorney's ability to achieve the most 
advantageous position for a client." Id. at 189. As litigation counsel for the AIA Services, AIA 
Insurance and CropUSA, HTEH owes no duty to represent the interests of Reed Taylor, and he has 
no standing to object to the manner in which HTEH discharges its duties to its clients. 
1. Reed Taylor Has No Standing to Sue HTEH Directly as a Stock Pledgee. 
Reed Taylor's first theory is that he has standing to sue HTEH directly because stock in a 
subsidiary corporation (AIA Insurance) is pledged as security for the payment of the redemption 
price by the insolvent parent corporation (AIA Services). He asserts he may bring direct claims 
against third parties to preserve his interest in the stock of AIA Insurance. However, this theory 
disregards the obvious point that HTEH does not have possession of, or claim any interest in, such 
stock. Nor does the complaint allege that such is the case. The complaint alleges only that HTEH, 
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acting as defense counsel, bas asserted positions contrary to those espoused by Reed Taylor. 3 
HTEH is entitled to represent its clients' legal positions in court md camot be held liable to Reed 
Taylor for doing so. 
The cases cited by Reed Taylor are inapposite. For example, in m i r e  Life Ins. Co. of 
Anzerica v. I/aldak Corp., 468 F.2d 330,335 (5th Cir. 1972), the court was careful to point out that, 
"It is, however, an established rule that if a plaintiff sues in a stockholder capacity for corporate 
mismanagement, he must bring the suit derivatively in the name of the corporation." Visbile some 
courts have recodzed an exception to the rule where the act complained of creates a cause of action 
in favor of the shareholder, us an individzrat, '"tlhat exception to the general rule does not arise, 
however, merely because the acts complained of resulted in damages both to the corporation and to 
the stockholder, but is confined to cases where the wrong itself amounts to a breach of duty owed 
to the stockholder personally," Id at 335. As will be discussed in greater detail infra, HTEH owes 
no duty to Reed Taylor. To the contrary, HTEH's duty is solely to advocate the legal position of its 
clients, who dispute Reed Taylor's claims that he possesses an enforceable right to receive 
preferential payment for his stock in AIA Services or is entitled to enforce his security interest in 
assets of that corporation while it is insolvent or if doing so would render it insolvent. 
In Gustafson v. Gustafon, 47 Wash.App. 272, 734 P.2d 949 (1987), relied upon by Reed 
Taylor, the ex-spouse of a shareholder and the pledgee of the shareholder's stock as security for 
amounts owing pursuant to a divorce decree was held to possess both a derivative and a direct cause 
3 For example, par. 14 of Reed Taylor's complaint alleges that HTEH "engaged in inappropriate conduct in 
assisting parties (including R. John Taylor) in obtaining andlor maintaining a restraining order and preliminary 
injunction against Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor, when Defendants knew there was no legitimate legal basis to do so, that 
doing so was an intentional violation and tortious interference with Reed 3. Taylor's contractual rights, and that the 
assets and funds of M A  Insurance, Inc., were being misappropriated and/or not safeguarded." 
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of action against the shareholder for fraudulent dissipation of corporate assets. Gzlsfafson did no.t. 
hold that the ex-spouse possessed a direct cause of action against either her former husband's 
lawyers or the corporation" lawyers. In the present case, Reed Taylor does not allege that he has 
any direct contrach;lal or other relationship with HTEH, as was the case between Mr. and Mrs. 
Gustasfson. Reed Taylor has no standing to bring suit against counsel for opposing parties in 
pending litigation. 
2. Reed Taylor Has No Standing to Sue HTEH Directly because He Allegedly Is 
Entitled to Become the Sole Shareholder of AIA Insurance. 
Reed Taylor's second theory is that he has standing to sue HTEH directly because he "stands 
in the shoes of the sole shareholder of AIA Insurance." (Plaintiffs Response to Defendants' Motion 
to Dismiss, p. 10) This argument is evidently predicated on the assumption that Reed Taylor is 
entitled to repossess the stock of AIA Insurance and to become its sole shareholder. Reed Taylor 
has the cart before the horse. The Court in the Underlying Litigation has not ruled that he is entitled 
to exercise that remedy, and certainly has not ruled that he is entitled to regain ownership and resume 
operation of AIA Insurance. If, in fact, Reed Taylor is a secured creditor, his obligation upon 
repossession of any collateral is to dispose of such collateral in a commercially reasonable manner. 
Idaho Code $ 28-9-620 provides that a secured creditor may accept collateral in full or partial 
satisfaction of a debt if the debtor consents. The complaint does not allege that the debtor has 
given such consent. In the absence thereof, the secured creditor is under a compulsory obligation 
to sell the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner. Idaho Code 5 28-9-620. 
Reed Taylor fails to explain how, as an insider who is attempting to redeem his stock in an 
insolvent corporation, he purportedly has standing to sue litigation counsel for the corporation. True, 
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HTEH has advocated in open court positions which are contrary to Rced Taylor" proposed course 
of action, but they are iirlly entitled, and indeed ethically obligated, to do so. 
Rced Taylor also rdies on the case of Steelman v. ArlaEkb~y, 1 10 Idaho 5 10, 7 16 P.2d 1282 
(1 986), but that case holds only that a minoriq shaeholder and director can sue other directors who 
wurped a corporate o p p o w t y .  The Steelman holding was clarified by the subsequent case of 
McCann v. McCann, 138 Idaho 228, 61 P.3d 585 (2002), where the plaintiff contended that a 
shareholder in a closcly-held corporation can bring a direct action against corporate directors for 
wrongs allegedly committed against the corporation. The trial court dismissed the complaint, 
stating: 
Plaintiff can bring an individual action where he has suffered a special injury distinct 
from that of the other shareholders. [The alleged claims] do not affect Ron McCann 
specifically. Individual actions generally include claims to enforce shareholder's 
rights to inspect books or vote or redeem stock; to compel dividends; to have the 
corporation dissolved; and to enforce a shareholder's agreement. They generally do 
not include suits alleging violations of duties by corporate officers, such as 
negligence, mismanagement, self-dealing, excessive compensation or squeeze outs. 
Id. at 233, 61 P.3d at 590. 
The trial court in McCann concluded that the shareholder's claims were derivative in nature 
and dismissed the complaint for failure to comply with the 90-day notice requirement for bringing 
a derivative action. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed, holding that "An action brought by a 
shareholder is derivative if the gravamen of the complaint is the injury to the corporation or to the 
whole body of its stock or property and not injury to the plaintiff's individual lnterest as a 
stockholder." Id. at 233, 61 P.3d at 590. 
McCann applies with double force to parties who are not corporate officers or directors, but 
litigation counsel for the corporations. The acts and omissions alleged by Reed Taylor in his 
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complaint against HTEH do not aver the violation of any individwalizd duty owing by WTEM to 
Reed Taylor. Indeed, &at would be impossible since MTEH does not owe any duties to him. Rather, 
the complaint seeks. to allege violations of duties ostensibly owed by HTEH to the corporations as 
a whole. Reed Taylor may bfing such claims against HTEH, if at all, only as a derivative action 
subject to the 90-day notice requirement of Idaho Code 5 30-1-742 and the independent panel 
inquiq requirements of Idaho Code 9 30- 1-74.  
3. Reed Taylor Bas No Standing to Sue HTEH Directly as a Secured Creditor of 
AIA Services. 
Part of the intellectual murkiness of Reed Taylor's complaint in this action is the tendency 
to conflate AIA Services and AIA Insurance with their litigation counsel. It does not follow that 
Reed Taylor has standing to sue HTEH simply because of the existence of a justiciable dispute 
between himself and the corporations. 
Reed Taylor argues he is entitled to bring a direct suit against HTEH because he claims to 
be a secured creditor of AIA Services and alleges that the corporation made an unauthorized 
disposition of its collateral. His complaint does not allege that HTEH made an unauthorized 
disposition of such collateral or is in possession of the collateral, other than with respect to payment 
of attorney's fees (which will be addressed inJ;a). Whether or not Reed Taylor as an alleged 
secured creditor possesses a direct cause of action against the corporation is meaningless insofar as 
he now seeks to sue HTEH directly. 
\\ 
\\ 
\\ 
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4. Reed Taylor Does Not Have Standing to Sue HTEH Direcfly as a Creditor of 
AfA. Sewices. 
Reed Taylor's z p m e n t  on fais point is merely a repeat of his previously apmen t .  me the r  
he claims to be a secured or unsecured creditor makes no difference. He still lacks stmding to sue 
the attorneys of his litigation adversaries. 
5. Reed Taylor Does Not Have S t a n h g  to Sue EZTEH Directly because He Is 
Allegedly the Only Authorized Director and Officer of AIA Insurance. 
The Court in the Underlying Litigation has not so ruled. It is entirely proper for the AIA 
entities to retain counsel to represent their position in regard to this issue. 
6. Reed Taylor Does Not Have Standing to Sue HTEH Directly because He Is 
Allegedly the Only Director and Shareholder of AIA Insurance. 
The Court in the Underlying Litigation has not so ruled. It is entirely proper for the AIA 
entities to retain counsel to represent their position in regard to this issue. 
7. Reed Taylor Does Not Have Standing to Sue HTEH Directly as a Third-party 
Beneficiary. 
The complaint does not allege that Reed Taylor is the third-party beneficiary of any contract, 
and his brief is unclear regarding what contract, if any, he claims was entered into for his intended 
benefit. Where the plaintiff has totally failed to allege any facts to support his theory, it is not the 
task of the defendants or the court to speculate on whether such facts may exist. 
8. Reed Taylor Does Not Have Standing to Sue HTEH Directly as a Cumulative 
Result of the Foregoing Seven Theories. 
Seven erroneous and deficient theories, whether taken individually or cumulatively, still do 
not amount to a showing that Reed Taylor occupies a position that would give rise to any duty on 
the part of HTEH to protect or represent his interest. 
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IV ALA SERVICES, A M  rrVSfJ CE AND CROPUSA ARE 
ENTITLED TO mPmSENTATION RV THE IUNDEUYLNG 
LITIGATION BY COUNSEL OF THEIR OWN CHOICE 
The basic and fatal assumption which undergirds the complaint in this action is that the 
litigation skategy of HTEI-I as counsel for AIA Sewices, AIA Insurance, and CropUSA is wrongful 
simply because it fails to meet the approbation of Reed Taylor. In his view, any position espoused 
by opposing parties or their attorneys in the Underlying Litigation which is contrary to his claims 
somehow constitutes a tortious action. For example, 7 14 of the complaint alleges that defendants 
"engaged in inappropriate conduct in assisting intmested parties (including R. John Taylor) in 
obtaining andlor maintaining a restraining order and preliminary injunction." Paragraph 15 of the 
complaint alleges in effect that defendants declined to abandon their litigation position after Reed 
Taylor obtained partial sumrnary judgment in the Underlying Litigation. Paragraph 16 alleges that 
defendants have knowledge that Reed Taylor's allegations in the Underlying Litigation include 
claims of breaches of fiduciary duty, conspiracy, fraudulent conveyance and fraud against R. John 
Taylor and others. Paragraph 17 alleges that defendants appeared as counsel for the AIA Services 
and AIA Insurance in the Underlying Litigation. Paragraph 18 alleges that defendants represent 
AIA Services and AIA Insurance in the Underlying Litigation despite the demands of Reed Taylor's 
Washington counsel, Roderick Bond. Paragraph 19 alleges defendants entered into a joint defense 
agreement. Paragraphs 20'21 and 22 allege defendants violated an ostensible duty not to represent 
more than one party in the Underlying Litigation. Paragraph 22 alleges that it was improper for 
defendants to enter into ajoint defense agreement in the Underlying Litigation. Paragraph 23 alleges 
defendants violated the Rules of Professional Conduct by failing to obtain the consent of unnamed 
"interested parties" before undertaking the representation of parties in the Underlying Litigation. 
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Paragraph 24 alleges defendants improperly represented CropUSA in the Underlying Litigation. 
And so the complaint goes on for another 20 pasagraphs objecting to f3TEH's actions as litigation 
counsel in the Underlying Litigation. 
It perhaps states the obvious that Reed Taylor is not the proper party to select counsel for his 
adversaries in the Underlying Lilrigation or to dictate the litigation skategy of opposing parties. The 
AIA entities as presently constituted are entitled to select counsel of their own choosing. Idaho Rule 
of Professional Conduct 1.13(a) provides that a lawyer employed or retained by an organization 
"represents the organization acting through its authorized constituents." Comment 1 states that 
officers, directors arid shareholders are the "constituents" of the corporate dient. Comment 5 makes 
clear that "the organization's highest authority to whom a matter may be referred ordinarily will be 
the board of directors." Idaho Code 5 30-1-801(2) provides that "All corporate powers shall be 
exercised by or under the authority of the of, and the business and affairs of the corporation managed 
by or under the direction of, its board of directors." 
It is within the purview of the boards of directors of AIA Services, AIA Insurance and Crop 
USA to instruct their counsel of positions to be taken in the Underlying Litigation, and it is part of 
the duty of loyalty and care of HTEH to their corporate clients to advise them regarding litigation 
strategy. The theories advanced, positions taken, comments made and defenses raised by HTEH 
in the Underlying Litigation are protected by the litigation privilege. See Alpert v. Crain, Caton &. 
James, P.C., 178 S.W. 2d 398 (Tex.App. 2005); CSX Transportation, Inc. v Gilkinson, 2007 WL 
858423 fN.D.W.Va. 2007); Weaver v. Superior Court, 95 Cal.App. 3d 166, 156 Cal. Rptr. 745 
(1 979); Clarkv. Druckman, 28 1 W.Va. 41 7,624 S.E. 2d 864 (2005); Friedman v. Dozorc, 41 2 Mich. 
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1, 3 12 N.W.2d 585 (1981). All allegations of Reed Taylor's complaint which Enit fault with 
litigation stance of EITEM and its clients in the Underlying Litigation must be dismissed. 
V. THE COMPLAINT PAILS TO STATE A CLAIM FOR 
AIDmG AND ABETTmG OR CIVIL CONSPmC'Y 
A. Representation of a Client in a Lawsuit Does Not Constitute Aiding and Abetting. 
Closely related to the issue of whether HTEH is protected from liability to Reed Taylor under 
the litigation privilege is the question of whether that law firm can be held liable for "aiding and 
abetting" the acts and omissions of its corporate clients simply by representing its clients. It is clear 
firom the allegations of Reed Taylor's complaint that his principal, if not ody, lament is the refusal 
of the AIA entities, and by extension their counsel, to succumb to his demands. His pleading in the 
present case is premised on the assumption that all his claims in the Underlying Litigation are 
meritorious and the AIA entities have no right to raise any defenses or objections to those claims. 
He is eager to dispense with the expedient of a trial of his case against the AIA entities and to transit 
directly to a lawsuit against their litigation counsel. 
Chief among Reed Taylor's claims is that, as aredeemed shareholder, he is entitled to be paid 
preferentially for the redemption of bis stock, even though AIA Services is, and according to his 
complaint has been since at least 2001, insolvent. By definition, if he were to prevail on this claim, 
all other shareholders and all other creditors of AIA Services will receive nothing from the 
liquidation and distribution of the corporation's assets. In defense to this proposition, the AIA 
entities have asserted that under Idaho law a corporation may not distribute its assets to a redeemed 
shareholder when it is insolvent or would thereby be rendered insolvent. This defense is of more 
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than academic interest to the directors oEAIA Insurance because under Idaho Code 6 30- 1-48, as in 
effect in 1996, they are personally liable for unlawful dish-ibutions to redeemed sh~eholders .~ 
Idaho Code 5 30- 1-6, in effect in 1996 when Reed Taylor entered into the reswctured stock 
redemption agecment with AIA Services, authorized a corporation to redeem or otherwise acquire 
its own shares only to the extent of "unreserved and mesh-icted e m e d  surplus available therefor, 
and, ". . . with the aEmative vote of the holders of a majority of all shares entitled to vote thereon, 
to the extent of unreserved and unrestricted capital surplus available therefor." The statute fi-ther 
provided: "No purchase or payment for its own shares shall be made at a time when the corporation 
is insolvent or when such purchase or payment would make it insolvent." Idaho Code 5 30-1 -46, 
as in effect in 1996, more generally authorized a corporation to distribute a portion of its assets to 
its shareholders out of capital surplus, subject however to the condition that "[nlo such distribution 
shall be made at a time when the corporation is insolvent or when such distribution would render the 
corporation insolvent." Pursuant to the savings provision of Idaho Code 5 3 0- 1 - 1 703, effective July 
1, 1997, the provisions of the Idaho Business Corporations Act in effect when the restructured 
redemption agreement was entered into in 1996 continue to govern the validity of the transaction. 
In re Lake Country Investments, LLC, 255 B.R. 588,600 (2000). 
Although Reed Taylor evidently demurs, the AIA entities and HTEH have raised the defense 
in the Underlying Litigation that AIA Services was insolvent or renderedinsolvent by the agreement 
4~daho Code $ 30-1-48(b), as in effect in 1996 and thus applicable to the redemption of Reed Taylor's stock, 
provided: "A director who votes for or assents to the purchase of corporation's own shares contrary to the provisions 
of this act shall be liable to the corporation, jointly and severally with all other directors so voting or assenting, for 
the amount of consideration paid for such shares which is in excess of the maximum amount which could have been 
paid therefor without a violation of the provisions of this act." See Idaho Code 5 30-1-833 for the corresponding 
provision of the Revised Model Corporation Act, adopted in Idaho in 1997. 
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to redem his stock. The insolvency of AIA Services can hudly have come as a surprise to him. 
Who better than the chief executive officer and largest shareholder of AIA Sesvices to ~mderstmd 
that he was rendering the corporation insolvent by redeeming his stock? Who better to realize that 
this would leave the remaining shareholders and creditors of the corporation in the lurch? The 
unique smcbre  ofthe promissory note payable to Reed Taylor (interest only for ten years) suggests 
strongly be was aware the corporation was insolvent and, fierefore, lacked funds to pay him. 
While the Court in the Underlgng Litigation has ruled that Reed Taylor's promissory note 
is in default, his entitlement to payment has not yet been established. The AIA entities, through 
their counsel HTEH, are entitled to raise the defense in the Underlying Litigation that payment of 
the note is prohibited because the corporation was insolvent. This issue has not been resolved in the 
Underlying Litigation. Indeed, the assertion of defenses, even if novel or innovative, are protected 
by the litigation privilege. Reed Taylor possesses no cause of action against HTEH for its fulfillment 
of its duty to represent its clients zealously in the Underlying Litigation. 
B. The Complaint Fails to State a Clairn for Civil Conspiracy. 
1. A Complaint for Civil Conspiracy Must Allege an Underlying Wrongful Act or 
the Commission of a Lavvful Act to Achieve an Unlawful Objective. 
"A civil conspiracy that gives rise to legal remedies exists only if there is an agreement 
between two or more to accomplish an unlawful objective or to accomplish a lawful objective in an 
unlawful manner." McPheters v. Maize, 138 Idaho 391, 395, 64 P.3d 3 17, 321 (2003). "An 
agreement between two or more persons, to do or accomplish something which is in itself lawful and 
does not contemplate or employ any unlawful means for its consummation, and which does not 
injure or damage the prospective victim (so called), is not actionable. Such an agreement is not a 
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conspiracy for the reason that an ageetnent cat. become a cozlspiracy only when it has for its puFose 
the doing or accomplishing somet.bing that is criminal or unlawful, or some lawful thing in an 
unlawkl m m e r : r , ' T l ~ p p e ~ b u r g  v. Mays, 60 Idaho 19 (1 939). 
Thus, '"clivil conspiracy is not, by itself, a claim for relief." McPheters, 138 Idaho at 395, 
64 P.3d at 321 (mphasis added). Rather, 'kivil conspiracy is a derivative tort that relies on an 
underlying actionable mong." Cunninghum v. Jensen, 2005 WL 2220022, at "8 (Idaho 2005). If 
a civil conspiracy is established, it has the effect of making all of the defendants liable for each 
individual act of each of the other defendants. Dahlguist v. Mizttson, 40 Idaho 378,390,233 P. 883, 
887 (Idaho 1925). 
The complaint in the present case is legally insuficient because it fails to allege either that 
HTEH committed an unlawful act or it engaged in lawhl conduct in order to achieve an unlawful 
objective. Not only is in not unlawful for attorneys to represent their clients zealously in litigation, 
they are under a duty to do so. And the mere fact that the clients may not prevail in litigation does 
not convert their defense counsel into co-conspirators. 
2. Agents Cannot Conspire with their Principal. 
"[Ilt is fundamental that an agent cannot conspire with his principal." Harvey v. Fearless 
f i r r i s  W;klolesale, Inc., 589 F.2d 451, 457 (9th Cir. 1978). The explanation for this rule is that, 
"[slince a corporate entity cannot conspire with itself[,] a civil conspiracy is not le~allv possible 
where a corporation and its alleged coconspirators are not separate entities, but, rather, stand in either 
a principal-agent or employer-employee relationship with the corporation." 16 Am.Jur.2d 
Conspiracy 9 56 (1 998) (emphasis added). 
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Iddbo follows this "hndamcntal" principle of conspirikcy law. See AJ"lolz Energy, Inc. v. 
Idaho Power Go., 1.22 IiZaho 333, 340, 834 P.2d 850,857 (1992) ("A corporation cannot conspire 
with its officers or agents to violate the mtitrust laws.") Indeed, it follows logically from the 
requirement that a civil conspiracy consist of ""an agemcnt  between two or more to accomplish an 
d a w f u l  objective or to accomplish a lawful objective in an. unlawful manner." McPheters v. Maile, 
138 Idaho 391,395,64 P.3d 3 17,321 (2003) (emphasis added). '"Allthough a corporation's agents 
may render the corporation liable for torts committed in the scope of their mployment, an agent or 
multiple agents may not render the corporation liable for a civil conspiracy involving only corporate 
agents." McGlain v. Pactiv Corp., 602 S.E.2d 87,90 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004) (citations omitted). "A 
conspiracy cannot exist where the two or more persons involved in the alleged conspiracy were 
merely interchangeable entities or were essentially conducting a single act as a single entity.. .. 
Similarly, a conspiracy cannot exist between a principal and an agent or servant." Israeli Aircraft 
hdus. ,  Ltd. v. Sanwa Bus. Credit Corp., 850 F. Supp. 686,693-94 (N.D. Ill. 1993). 
In other words, Defendant and the agents through which it conducts business are legally 
incapable of "conspiring" to harm Plaintiff. Plaintiff's attempt to avoid this reality by alternative 
pleading is ineffectual. W l e  he attempts, in the alternative, to pleading the existence of an agency 
relationship, to deny the existence of such a relationship or to claim that the individual defendants 
acted outside the scope of their agency relationship, these alternative allegations are wholly 
conclusory. 
3. The Complaint Fails to Plead Conspiracy with Particularity. 
Even if plaintiffs civil conspiracy claim were legally tenable, it is inadequately pleaded. 
Where the "object of the alleged conspiracy is fraudulent," civil conspiracy must be pleaded with 
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prprticularity. Waseo Prods., Inc. v. Southwall Teehs., Inc., 435 F.3d 989,990-92 (9th Cir. 2006). 
Rule 9(b j's pleading standsds apply. Vess, 3 17 F.3d at 1 103-04; M.A. Deately Cons&. v. City of 
Lewiston, 2006 WL 980730, at "2 (D. Idabo 2006). In addition to pleading the circumstances of 
fraud with particulariQ, the plaintin" is required to "plead at least the basic elements of the 
conspiracy, especially the existence of an agrement." Wasco, 435 F.3d at 990. h other words, '"t]o 
successhlly plead [a civil conspiracy] cause of action, plaintiff must more clearly allege specific 
action on the part of each defendant that corresponds to the elements of a conspiracy cause of 
action." Acczlimage Diagvlostics Corp v. irerarecon, Inc., 260 F. Supp.2d 94 1,948 (N.D. Cal. 2003). 
Here, however, plaintiffs civil conspiracy claim is devoid of any specific allegations 
supporting even the basic elements of a conspiracy. To establish a civil conspiracy, a plaintiff must 
prove "an ageeement between two or more to accomplish an unlawful objective or to accomplish a 
lawful objective in an unlawful manner" and the commission of a civil wrong that injures or 
damages the victim. McHzeters, 138 Idaho at 395, 64 P.3d at 321. Rather than plead any facts 
detailing the supposed conspiracy, including any conspiratorial agreement and the role each 
individual played in the conspiracy, plaintiff merely makes conclusory assertions that a conspiracy 
existed. 
V7. THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM FOR 
INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT 
Notwithstanding plaintiff's arguments, the fact remains that a principal and agent are treated 
as one for purposes of analyzing whether tortious interference with contract has occurred. It is a 
legal absurdityto allege that an agent interfered with its principal's contract. See BECO Const. Co., 
Inc. v. J - U B  Engineers, Inc., 145 Idaho 719,184 P.3d 844 (2008); Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp. 
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141 Idaho 233, 108 P.3d 380 (2005); jrhomas v. Medical Center Pftysicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200, 
61 P.3d 557 (2002); Leon v. Boise State University, 125 Idaho 365, 870 P.2d 1324 (1994); 
Ostrander v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. ofIdaho, Inc., 123 Idaho 650, 654, 851 P.2d 946, 950 
(1 993). 
VII. THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM FOR CONVEBION 
The complaint fails to allege that WTEW exerted control over or possession of any 
identifiable personal property belonging to Reed Taylor or in which he possessed a pedected 
security interest. It is alleged only that HTEW accepted payment of attorney's fees and costs.5 
There is notbing improper about AIA Services and AIA Insurance retaining counsel to 
defend them in the Underlying Litigation or paying the fees of their defense counsel. The existence 
of a claim by alleged secured creditor does not preclude a debtor from paying its legal bills or other 
obligations as they fall due. If Reed Taylor's conversion theory were correct, then neither of the 
AIA entities could pay the wages of its employees, rent, taxes, operating expenses or amounts owing 
to trade creditors. All payments to anyone other than the alleged secured creditor, Reed Taylor, 
would be improper. Idaho Code § 28-9-332 protects payees: 
(a) A transferee of money takes the money free of a security interest 
unless the transferee acts in collusion with the debtor in violating the rights of the 
secured party. 
5 Paragraph 55 of the complaint alleges that defendants "assisted in the inappropriate titling and pledging of 
a $1.2 Million Mortgage owned by AIA Services Corporation. . . ." However, the complaint does not allege that 
HTEH became the owner of the mortgage or that HTEH at any time possessed or controlled the note and mortgage. 
Even if it could be inferred that Reed Taylor claims a perfected security interest in the mortgage, which is far from 
clear, his security interest would continue despite any transfer or assignment of the mortgage. Idaho Code 5 28-9- 
20 1(a). 
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(b) A xrmsfcsee of hnds from a deposit account takes .the h d s  free of 
a securlv interest in the deposit account unless the ~ansfesee acts m collusion with 
the debtor in vivlati~lg the rights of the secured party. 
Representation by an law firm of a party in a lawsuit cannot be said to constitute collusive 
action to violate the rights of a secured party. The AIA entities are en~t led to retain at-tomeys to 
defend &emselves and to compensate their aEorneys for services rendered. 
VIII. THE COMPLALNT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM FOR 
VIOLATION OF THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 
Evidently, Reed Taylor bas abandoned this claim, since his brief does not cite any authority 
in support of this contention that HTEH violated the Consuer  Protection Act. Instead, he switches 
his theory to violation of the "Unfair Trade Practices Act." (Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss, pp. 53-55) There is no such act in effect in this State, and the laws of other 
states are not entitled to extraterritorial application where none of the events alleged in the complaint 
occurred in such states. 
IX. THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CLAM FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE 
Tbe elements of a cause of action for legal malpractice are well-established in this State: 
To establish a claim for attorney malpractice/professional negligence, the plaintiff 
must show: (1) the creation of an attorney-client relationship; (2) the existence of a 
duty on the part of the lawyer; (3) the breach of the duty of the standard of care by 
the lawyer; and (4) that the failure to perform the duty was a proximate cause of the 
damages suffered by the client. 
Estate ofBecker v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522,526,96 P.3d 623,627 (2004) 
Plaintiff Reed Taylor's complaint is deficient because it fails to allege facts to establish an 
attorney-client relationship between HTEH and himself, the existence of any duty on the part of 
HTEH to him, or the breach of any duty owing by HTEH to him, and fails entirely to allege how any 
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act or omission of HTEH was the proximate cause of my dmages allegedly suffered by him, Reed 
'Taylor's novel theory that he is entitled to direct the actions of his liljgation opponents' a(-lomeys 
h d s  no support in law and should be rejected. To the c o n k q ,  the actions of HTEH in the course 
of the Underlgng Litigation and related adversztrial matlers is protect& by the litigation privilege. 
See, e.g., Robinson v. Volb.tvagenwrrl: AG, 940 F.2d 1369 (loih Cir. 1991); C;arcia v. Rody, 
Dickason, Sloan, Akin di: Robb, 106 N.M. 757,761,750 P.2d 1 18,122 (1 988). 
X. LEAVE: SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT 
Because plaintiff has only stated h s  intent to move for leave to amend if the motion to 
dismiss is granted and has not provided the Court or counsel with a copy of the proposed 
amendment, it is diEcult to respond to plaintifts argument that he should be allowed to amend his 
complaint. Defendants, however, entertain serious doubts that any conceivable set of facts can be 
pleaded under the circumstances of this case which state a valid claim for relief. Whether to permit 
an amended pleading is committed to the sound discretion of the Court, which is not obligated to 
grant leave to amend when the amendment would be a futile act. "A court may consider whether 
the allegations sought to be added to the complaint state a valid claim in determining whether to 
grant leave to amend the complaint." Estate of Becker v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522, 527, 96 P .3d 
623, 628 (2004). See also U S. v. Union Corp., 194 F.R.D. 223, 23'7 (E.D.Pa. 2000) (An 
"amendment is futile if the [pleadings], as amended would not survive a motion to dismiss for failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."); Gragossian v. Cardinalhrealth Inc., 2008 WL 
2157004, at *1 (S.D.Ca1. 2008) (It would be futile to allow leave to amend "where the proposed 
complaint contained only conclusory allegations without supporting facts."); K Mane Fils, S.A. v. 
International Flavors andFmgrances Inc., 2008 WL 2559345, at *2 (D.N.J. 2008) ("A proposed 
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mendment is Futile when it cannot withstand a rnotion to dismiss. To survive a rnotion to dismiss, 
the complaint's factual alIegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative 
level, on the assumption that all the allegations are Ime.") (citations and internat punctuation 
omitit.ed); ., 238 B.R. 558, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (""Elven liberal 
consmction bas its limits. '[Flor the pleading must at least set forth sufficient information for the 
court to de tmine  whether some recopized legal theory exists on which relief could be afforded 
the pleader.") 
XI. CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff Reed Taylor's complaint attempts to plead a set of unique propositions but is 
deficient as a matter of law. Reed Taylor has no standing to sue HTEH for malpractice or any of the 
related claims he attempts to allege. HTEH has a duty to represent its clients, not Reed Taylor. He 
is not entitled to direct HTEHYs actions or to require that HTEH represent his interest in pending 
litigation in derogation of the interests of its clients. 
Whether or not the complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted is not a question 
of fact to be decided by a jury, but a question of law to be determined by the Court. There are no 
issues pled by the complaint which are entitled to proceed to trial, because even if all the factual 
allegations of the complaint (as opposed to unwarranted legal conclusions and "opprobious 
epithets") were assumed to be true, he simply has not stated a claim upon which relief can be 
granted. Dismissal pursuant to 1.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is appropriate. 
\\ 
\\ 
\\ 
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DATED this /o day of Oclober, 2008. 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
n 
By: 
Atto ys for ~ e f e n d g s  9 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the i L>  day of October, 2008,I caused a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner indicated 
below: 
Michael S. Bissell U.S. Mail 
CAMPBELL BISSELL & KIIU~Y, PLLC Hand Delivery 
7 South Howard Street, Ste. 416 I/ Federal Express 
Spokane, WA 99201 Facsimile Transmission (509) 455-7 1 1 1 
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.5762 
V PLLC 
7 Sou& Elotvard Street, Suite 4 1 6 
Spokme, P1;4 99201 
Tel: (509) 455-71 00 
F a :  (509) 455-71 11 
Aaorneys for PlaintiE Reed J. Taylor 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IIh%HO, IN FOR c o r n y  OF m~ PERCB 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual; 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
Case No.: CV08-01765 
and Supplement his Complaint in the form attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN 
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V. 
COLLINS, an individual; N C W  A. 
U E Y ,  a0 iadividual; HAWLEY TROXELL 
E M S  CI.. 14AWLEY, LLP, aa Idaho limited 
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X, 
unknown individuals; 
I. EVIDENCE RXLIED WON 
PL-F REED J. TAYLOR'S 
MOTION AND m M 0 - m  OF 
LAW TO AMEND COMPLAINT 
This  Motion and Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion, the attached Exhibit 
A, and the COUI-~'S Be. 
PLAINTIFF REED J. TAYLOR'S 
MOTION AND MEMORANDUM OF 
LAW TO AMEND COMPLAINT - 1 
b 'kJ3 
nr . 
"[A] party may mend  a plea&g only by leave of the court.. .and leave shall be 
&eely given when jusZice so requires.. ."I.RC.P. 15(a). S ~ w l y ,  a pasty may move to 
supplemeat a "pleahg setting forth &msactidns or occmences ar events which have 
happened skce the date of the pleadhg sough to be supplemented.. ." 1.R.C.t). 15[d), 
"Great liberty shoclld be s h o w  in allowing amendments to pleadjngs in Mhermce of 
justice between parties." St77ifJI V. Sliilm, 82 Idaho 142, 149,350 P.2d 348 (1960). 
Here, Reed Taylor is moving the Court to mend his Gompla.int in the form 
attzxhed hereto as Efibit A The purpose of the m e n h e a t  is to: (1) clarify and 
expand tire claims and causes of action; and (2) add derivative claims. 
Justice requires that Reed Taylor be p e e t t e d  to file his Amended Complaint. 
DATED this ~ % a ~  of October, 2008. 
C M B E L L ,  BISSE & KIRBY PLLC P
PLAINTIFF =ED J. TAYLOR'S 
MOTION AND mMORANDUM OF 
LAW TO AMEND COMPLAINT - 2 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the / p /,day of October, 2008, I caused to be 
served a W e  aad conect copy of the faregokg docment with aaacbent to the 
f o l l o ~ g :  
James D. L&ue 
E l m  & Bmke, PA 
P.O. Box IS39 
Boise, ZD 83704 
PLAINTIFF REED J. TAYLOR'S 
MOTION AND MEMORANDM OF 
LAW TO M N D  COMPLAINT - 3 
L S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762 
LL, BISSELL & Y PLLC 
7 South Howard Sheet, Suite 416 
S p o h e ,  WA 99201 
Tel: (509) 455-71 00 
FEE: (509) 455-71 11 
Attorneys for Reed Taylor 
IN TEE DISTRICT COURT OF TEB2 SECOPJD K J D T G N  DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, LN AND FOR THE COWTY OF Nl?,Z PERCE 
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN 
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V. 
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A. 
FULEY, an in&vidual; HAWLEY TROXELL 
ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X, 
unlcnown individuals; 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual, who is 
bringing this action on behalf of himself and 
on behalf of the creditors andor shareholders 
of AIA Services Corporation and AIA 
Insurance, Inc,; 
Hawley Troxeli. 
I. FACTS 
Case No.: CV08-01765 
FlXST W m E I 3  C O m L m  FOR 
D W G E 8  
1. Reed Taylor, by and through his attorneys of record, CAMPBELL, 
BISSELL & KlRE3Y, PLLC, alleges as follows (all allegations and claims asserted below 
are incorporated by reference into each cause of action, remedy andor requested relief to 
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f i t h e  exteat necessruy to supporl: each such cause sf action, remedy m&or requested 
relief): 
2. Reed Taylor ("Reed Taylor") is a resident of Leuviston, Nez Perce Corn@, 
Idaho. Reed Taylor is b ~ g i a g  this action on behalf of I r k e l f  hdividually and on 
behalf of all shareholders and creditors of MA Services Corporation ("'MA Semites") 
and AIA busslace, Inc. ("AIA Inswmce'". Reed Taylor is an elderly person as defined 
h I.C. 6 48-608. 
7. Hawley TroxeU Ennis & Hawley, LLP ('"Hawley Troxell") is an Idaho 
limited liability parlnersfip in the business of practicing law. Hawley Troxell is 
vicariour;ly liable for the acts of the individual Hawley Troxell. Hawley TroxelI has 
purportedly acted as counsel for AL4 Services, AIA Insurance and CropUSA Insurance 
Agency, Inc. ('"CropUSA"). 
4. Defendant Gary D. Babbitt ('"abbitt") is an individual residing in the 
state of Idaho and is an attorney practicing law in the state of Idaho with and for Hawley 
Troxell. 
5. Defendant D. John Ashby ("Ashby") is an individual residing in the state 
of Idaho and is an attorney practichg law in the state of Idaho with and for Hawley 
Troxell. 
6.  Defendant Patrick V. C o l h  ("CoUiasy') is an individual residing in the 
state of Idaho and is an attorney practicing law in the state of Idaho with and for Hawley 
Troxell. 
7. Defendant Richard A. Riley ("Riley") is an individual residing in the state 
of Idaha and is an attorney in the state of Idaho with and for Hawley Troxell, 
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8. Jane Does I-X me o m  individuals who are and/or were altorneys &at 
p ~ c i p a t e d  in tbe tortious acts aad conduct alleged agaiast the above h o r n  Hawley 
Troxell ~& and for Hawley Troxell who me also responsible for the claims and 
dmages. (All of the Defendmts are collectively referred to as cXawley Troxell"" or "its" 
or "'Defendm&'". 
9. Rawley TroxeU. bansacted business ~ o u g b  the practice of law in Nez 
Perce County, Idaho, and have an expecta~on of being named as defendants in Nez Perce 
ComQ, Idaho. Wawley Troxell committed tortious acts, exceeded the scope of any 
p q o a e d  representation, and/or assisted in the commission of tortious acts in Nez Perce 
County, Idaho. Hawley TroxeII's tortious acts and/or assistance have inflicted damages 
upon a resident of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
10. Damages in this action exceed $10,000. Jurisdiction md  venue are, 
therefore, appropriate in Nez Perce County District Court. To the exteat that there are any 
conflicts or discrepancies alleged in this Complaint, they are to be construed as 
alternative relief, claims, remedies and damages being sought against HawIey TroxeU 
(is., if Hawley TroxeLl had authority to represent AIA Services or AIA Insurance, then it 
still committed certain torts and breached duties). However, no allegations in this 
CompIa.int should be construed as any admission by Reed Taylor or any of the 
corporations that Hawley Troxell ever had authority to represent AIA Services or AIA 
Insurance, 
1 I. AIA Services is a closely held Idaho corporation. AIA Insurance is a 
closely held Idaho corporation. The present purported officers and directors of AIA 
Insurance and AIA Services (R. S o h  Taylor "John Taylor", Connie Taylor, James Beck, 
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ti $J 
JoLee Duclos md Bryan Freemm) ware hterested p d e s  by way of their ta&ous acts and 
omersEp of sbwes in CropUSA, Thus, a direct action for certain claims is appr-opiate 
because, mong  other reasons set f0rl.h in this CompIh\ my h d s  recovered sbould not 
be placed in the hands of the foregoing p3sties. 
12. MA Services bas pledged aU of tbe outstandkg shares of AIA Insmmce 
that it o m  to Reed Taylor pursuant to a $6 MKon Proraissory Note dated August I ,  
1995, the h e a d e d  and Reshted Stock Pledw Apeemen& the Ameaded and Restated 
Securiq Agreement, the Restruebe Redemp~on Ageement, and Series A Preferred 
Shrrreholder Ageemeat (all of the foregoing, anciUary docments and related documents 
are coUectively referred to ar: tbe "Redemption Agreements'?. 
13. At all relevant times of the & m a d o n s  and causes of action set forth in 
this Compfht, Reed Taylor was the sole pledgee of aU of AIA Insurance's outstanding 
shares and the only secured creditors of AIA Services and AIA Insurance entitled to the 
c o d s s i o n s  and related receivables received by the corporations and al3 proceeds related 
thereto. As a stock pledgee and the sale stock pledgee of AIA Insurance's sbares, Reed 
Taylor is entitled to bring derivative and/or direct cl&s as a shareholder since a pledgee 
is entitled to all of the rights and protections of a shareholder, in addition to the individual 
rights to protect collateral. As the sole pledgee of all shares of AIA Insurance, Reed 
Taylor is entitled to recover and possess all funds, damages andfor property recovered 
fiom all direct and derivative causes of action. 
14. As a creditor of the insolvent AIA Services owed over $8,500,000 and a 
secured creditor of the insolvent AfA Services, Reed Taylor is entitled to bring derivative 
and/or direct claims against responsible parties in the place of, or on behalf of, U 
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mchael C u b a n ,  J m e s  Beck end dl responsible parties for various tortious acts and 
the recovery of misappropriated asseb, funds, services andlor compensation. Reed 
Taylor has also made other wrritt.en demmds upon the pqo r t ed  boards of AlA Services 
md A&% hswmce to take action, and no actions have been taken. Reed Taylor bas also 
made mbstantial non-&volous claim ag&st the responsible parties in Taylor v. .A2 
Services, el" nl., but no actions have been taken as a result of the claims or allegations. 
However, the pqo r t ed  boards of AIA Services and AM Insurance have failed to act and 
have failed to conduct the corporaliions in a respoosible manner consistent with the law. 
19. The pqo r t ed  relevant past and present board members and officers of 
AIA hmance  and AL4 Services have failed to conduct shareholder meetings, failed to 
properly disclose facts and transactions to the shareholders, a d  have continued to do so 
even after Complaints were filed and with the full knowledge of Hawley TroxelI. The 
past and present responsible board members and officers have never advised the 
shareholders or creditors of the misappropriation of corporate assets, funds, opportunities, 
services and claims which should be pursued. 
20. Because of the fact that the relevant past and present purported board 
members of AIA. Services and AIA Insurance have a vested interest in not pursing claims 
against themselves or the attorneys that have unlawfully assisted them and have utterly 
and completely failed to do so, Reed Taylor believes that he and Donna Taylor will be 
the only parties to pursue the valid claims because the claims will never be pursued by 
the parties cunently purported to manage AIA Services and AIA Insurance. This action 
is not a collusive one to confer jurisdiction on a court of the state of Idaho which it would 
otherwise not have. 
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21. A&ou& Reed Taylor is "rbe only auhorized director ancl oEcer of 
Insusmce and that the actions of AM Services' board of &ectors is not autho~zed, Reed 
claims under this Compl&t as tbou& the directors were not 
au&o&ed to a d  an&, to the extent that the boards were au&orized, then the actions were 
d a m ,  happrapriate and exceeded the scope of my agency act on b e h a  of AL4 
Services and AfA lasurance, 
22. Hawley Troxell's acts, o ~ s s i o a s ,  md torts alleged in this Complht  
exceed any purpoded aQomey-ctient relafionsbip and are not protected by any I.iti@tion 
p ~ v d e ~  or b d t i e s .  Hawley Troxell" p~uported legal representation was never 
authorized by the proper boards of AZA. Sewices or AZtl. Insuance. Any purported 
waivers Hawley 'Troxell has obtained were not received by authorized andor 
disinterested representatives of AIA Services and AIA Insurance, and were not 
authorized 
23. To the extent that Hawley Troxell obtained any waivers or consents, its 
purported legal representation exceeded the scope of my representation that was in the 
best interests of AM Services or MA Insurance. By taking direction from John Taylor, 
Connie Taylor andor James Beck, Hawley Troxell knew that any purported 
representation was not, and could not, be in the best interests of AIA Services or AIA 
Insurance thereby exceeding any scope of purported represenhtion. 
24. AIA Services and AIA Insurance's purpoded agents, boards andlor 
officers, in which Hawley Troxell allegedly relied upon, exceeded the scope of all proper 
acts as agents, board members and officers of AIA Services and AIA Insurance, which 
M e r  resulted in Hawley Troxell's acts exceeding the scope of any authorized legal 
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m a o r  a~orney-client represen"catioa. All of the ac~ous  of HaSwley Troxell, John Taylor, 
C o ~ e  Taylor and J m e s  Beck were outside of the scope of their au&orized a ~ t s  and 
duties. 
25. Reed Taylor's Complaint is comprised of three types of claims: (a) those 
c l h s  and dmages persond and individud to Reed Taylor; (b) those claims and 
damages &at are personal to Reed Taylor and A.IA Sewices and/or ALCc Insurance, but 
which are being brought by Reed Taylor direcay against Hawley Troxell; and (c) those 
c l e s  that are o w e d  ody  by AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance, but which are being 
prosecuted by Reed Taylor deGva~vely on behalf of AIA Services and/or A.IA Insurance. 
26. In addirion, Reed Taylor will also pursue claims that are derivatively 
being prosecuted on bebaIf of A N  Insurance directly on behalf of AIA Insurance should 
he gain control of the company in the near fkture. To the extent that funds and/or 
property is recovered that exceed the amounts owed to Reed Taylor, he will deposit such 
funds and/or property with the Court for the dis-lribution to innocent shareholders of AIA 
S e ~ c e s .  
27. Hawley Troxell is not, and has never been, authorized to represent AIA. 
Insurance or A M  Services in Taylor I). RC4 Services, et al. Hawley Troxell is not, and 
has not, represented the interests of AIA Insurance or AIA Services, but instead has 
represented the interests of John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashmaa, 
JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, CropUSA and other interested parties. 
28. As the only authorized of;ticer and board member of AlA Insurance, Reed 
Taylor, has not and will not authorize or consent to Hawley Troxell as being attorneys for 
AM Insurance or representing the company in any fashion. As a person who is required 
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Scmices suadlor MA Zowmce, were not -length traasactioas, and/or were done so 
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42. As the purpo~ed a%orneys for Services, an entity, Mawley Troxell 
owed duties as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professiond Conduct, its duty of care, and 
under the law to &the corporation and its shareholders to preserve and protect tbe assets 
and businesses of fhe corporatioa, and since AIA Services was insolvent, to its creditors 
includjag Reed Taylor. As aftorney for A H  Services, and in light of the cl&s made 
against John Taylor and others by Reed Taylor, Hawley Troxell owed a duty to its entity 
client not to a s m e  representalion of the interests of John Taylor, individually and/or 
fhrou& a Joint Decnse Agreement, or with any other interested parties, 
43. As the purported aMorneys for AIA Insurance, aa entity, Hawley TroxeU 
owed duties as provided by the I d d o  Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty of care and 
the law to the corporation and its shareholders including a creditor pledgee of the 
corporalion? stock, Reed Taylor, with contractual rights to vote the shares and assume 
control and who had exercised his contractual rights and had voted the shares but whose 
rights were breached and rejected by interested directors and otbers who were in control 
of the corporation including John Taylor. As attorneys for AIA Insurance and in light of 
the claims made against John Taylor and others by the Reed Taylor, Hawley Troxell 
owed a duty to its entity client not to assme  representation of the interests of John 
Taylor, individually and/or through any Joint Defense Agreement, and/or of other 
interested parties (including CropUSA, Connie Taylor, James Beck and Michzel 
Cashan).  
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44, As aaorneys representkg the ioterests of John Taylor ~ o u g b  a Joint 
Defense Ageemenl; Hawley Troxell owed its duties first and foremost to its pqor ted  
S e ~ c e s  md  AL4 Iosurance as provided by the Tdabo Rules of Professionat 
Conduct, duty of care mdor  the law. As aBorneys for J o b  Taylor by and tbrougb takiog 
directions and/or accepkg decisions made by him b o ~ g  that he was interested and 
should have c l k s  asserled ag&t him, and ia li&t of the claims ag- John Taylor by 
the Reed Tayllor, Hawley Troxell owed a duty to its purported corporate clients not to 
assume represenkeon of the interests of John Taylor, CropUSA or other interested 
parties. Hawley Troxell failed to notify or obtak appropriate informed consents or 
approvals from appropriate partics or disinterested shareholders in violation of the Rules 
of Professional Conduct, Hawley Troxell's duty of care, and the Bylaws and Articles of 
Formation of the corporations, all to the detriment of Reed Taylor. 
45. As the purported attorneys for AIA Services andlor AIA Insurance 
(individually or through any Joint Defense Agreement) Hawley Troxell owed duties of 
loyalty to the corporations and could not represent John Taylor or CropUSA in Taylor v. 
AL4 Services, et aL, or represent or assist Jobn Taylor in Donna J. Taylor v. R John 
Taylor because Hawley Troxell's loyalty belongs exclusively to ALA Services and/or 
AIA Insurance. F ~ e m o r e ,  Hawley Troxell could in no way represent CropUSA or 
participate in any joint defense of CropUSA or other interested parties (such as John 
Taylor, Connie Taylor, J m e s  Beck, and/or Michael Gashman) as AIA Services and/or 
AIA Insurance should have been asserting claims against CropUSA, each other, and other 
interested and uninterested parties. 
46. Hawley TroxeU represented, and continue to represent, the interests of 
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of Gduciasy d u ~ e s  include, but ape not limited to: 1) W l e  p q o h g  to represent AM 
lmuraace md AL9 Services, Rawley TroxeU assisted and/or aided and abetled J o h  
Taylor in fhe tol-t:ious hte&erence with .the assertion of Reed Taylor's conkacm rights 
to toon&ol md operate AIA burance,  wbicb bas p r o ~ a t e l y  caused dmages to Reed 
Taylor; 2) Wbile p q o d g  to represeat AIA Services and AIA m m c e ,  Hawley 
TroxeU inappropriately assisted and/or gded and abetted Jobn Taylor and ofher Interested 
parties to engage ia. tortious traasactions iavolvkg John Taylor, AIA Services, ArPl 
hsurance, and/or CropUSA, which such transactions have been to the detriment of AliZ 
S e ~ c e s ,  AIA las-ce, and Reed Taylor, and p r o h a t e l y  caused damages to Reed 
Taylor as creditor and stock pledgee; and 3) W e  representing John Taylor, individually 
or through a Joint Defense Agreement, Hawley Troxell has had full knowledge that 
client is an btercsted party and director of AIA Services, AJA Insurance, and CropUSA, 
and is personally conducting and controlling the course of litigation involving Hawley 
Troxell's former clients, ALA Services and AIA Insurance, and Hawley Troxell has 
assisted and/or aided and abetted John Taylor and others (including, CropUSA) and has 
coordinated and participated with Hawley Troxell and Quarles & Brady in John Taylor's 
engaging in tortious transactions involving himself, AIA Services, AIA Insurance, and 
CropUSA, which transactions have been to the detriment of AIA Services and AIA 
Insurance and proximately caused damages to Reed Taylor as a creditor and stock 
pledgee. 
49. In connection with Hawley Troxell's inappropriate representation and/or 
joint defense of John Taylor, AL4 Services, AIA. Insurance, CropUSA, and other 
interested parties fineluding Connie Taylor, James Beck, and Michael Cashman) Hawley 
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Troxell accepted papents  of aEomeys fees md costs believed to exceed $500,000 ia 
violation ofthe Idho  Rdes of Professiod Conducg its duty of care, and as p d c i p a k g  
and/or assisting in iaappropriate corporate acts aad the ~ & g  aad a b e ~ g  of others. 
50. Over tbe cowse of the Iftjgation. in Reed i'83/1or v. Services, et al., 
Reed Taylor's a&omey In that ac~on ,  Roderick C. Bond of Smith, C w o n  & Bond 
PLLC, a d ~ s e d  Hawley TroxeQ on nmerous occasions &at its conduct violated Idaho 
Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty of care, was inappropriate, and constiwted the 
aiding and a b e ~ h g  of other hterested md Wterested p h e s  (including John Taylor 
and CropUSA), among other potenm legal claims against them. In early 2007, Reed 
Taylor's counsel advised Hawley TroxeU that its inappropriate actions would result in 
claims being filed against them by Reed Taylor. Reed Taylor's counsel reiterated these 
wamiags orally and in writing on nmeraus occasions. Despite the warnings from Reed 
Taylor's counsel, Rawley Troxell conduct persisted thereby M e r  damaging Reed 
Taylor. Rawley TroxeU's disregard of h/fr. Bond's warnings can only be construed as 
intentional improper acts to assist John Taylor and other interested parties to the 
detriment of Reed Taylor. 
51. Hawley Troxell wrongfi,illy assisted John Taylor and other interested 
parties in operating CropUSA with the h d s ,  assets, employees, trade secrets and other 
things of value inappropriately obtained from A M  Services and/or AIA Insurance, and 
by assisting John Taylor and other interested parties (including CropUSA) in preventing 
claims from being asserted and prosecuted against them. Hawley Troxell wrongfully 
assisted and/or failed to prevent interested parties (including John Taylor) in transferring 
the long-term employees of PlrXA insurance to CropUSA, while at the same time 
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represeakg LO tbe Court in T ~ l o r  v. A D  Seivices, et al., that the corporaitions were 
being operated properly m a o r  faifiog to advise the Court of tbe happropriate acts and 
kmsacEons. All the wbile Hawley STroxeU. was awafe of atlcllor assisted in the 
inappropriate payment of salaries, benefits, compensation, and dkector fees of $20,000 
per year when AIIA Services was iasolvent. 
52. Despite Reed Taylor's demands that Hawley TroxeUf take action to protect 
the assets and fkn& of ALA. SeMces and AL4 Insurmce and recover b d s  aad assets 
6om John Taylor, CropUSA and other inte~ested and Wterested parties for the benefit 
of tbe cofporatjons and Reed Taylor, Hawley TroxeU refused to act in accordance with 
the Rules of Profession Conduct, its duty of care, md  the law. Despite Reed Taylor's 
demands that interests of the minority disinterested shareholders be considered andlor 
protected because of the wrongfiil acts of John Taylor and other interested parties, 
Hawley TroxeU refbsed to act and failed to fully and properly disclose all pertinent facts 
to the disinterested shareholders and request their votes. 
53. In various motions, responses and affidavits submitted to the court in 
Taylor v. AU Se~vices, e f  al., Hawley Troxell made arguments that did not benefit AIA 
Services, AIA Insurance, or Reed Taylor, inappropriately made other arguments 
preventing valid claims fiom being asserted against John Taylor, James Beck, Connie 
Taylor, Michael Cashman, and other interested and uninterested parties, and failed to take 
action against responsible parties (including John Taylor, CropUSA, Connie Taylor, 
James Beck, Michael Cashman, LanceIot Investors Fund, and others). In the instance of 
Michael Cashman, Hawley Troxell successfirlly argued to the Court in Taylor v. AL4 
Services, el al., that Ivfr. Cashman should not be named as an individual when Hawley 
P 
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Troxell should have beea t h g  a c ~ o n  ag&st Mr. C a b a n  and ofiers. 
54. Despite Reed Taylor's demmds that disinterested &ectors and/or parties 
. must direct the li~ga"don on behaE of tbe corpora~oas, Wawley Troxell rehsed and 
p e ~ a e d  andlor assisted John Taylor and other h t e r e ~ e d  p d e s  to direct the E"dgartioa 
to the d e ~ e n t  of the coqoratioos and Reed Taylor. Despite Reed Taylor's demands 
&at action be taken to ce's hproper parantee of a $15,000,000 
he-of-credit for CropUSA EawIey Troxell refhed to act, failed to inform or fully 
disclose to d iskte~sted p h e s  or shareholders the existence of such inappropriate loan 
guarantees, and heatened to take legal action against Reed Taylor if he tried to rescind 
or terminate the &proper guaantee (since Defendant Gary D. Babbitt's threat, the 
balance of the loan increased by over $5,500,000 to over $10,500,000). 
55. Hawley Troxell's conduct has violated Idaho Rules of Professional 
Conduct and its duty of care, which require Hawley Troxell to disgorge all attorneys' fees 
and costs paid to them ia TnyEor Y. AL4 Services, ef uL, and for other related and/or 
unrelated legal services. Despite Reed Taylor's demands to comply with the Rules of 
Professional Conduct and its duty of care, Hawley Troxell refused to do so. 
56. Through the acts of Hawley Troxell, the value of AIA Insurance and the 
assets of AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance have plummeted in value, the corporations' 
value and assets have been impaired, and/or the assets and h d s  have been transferred to 
CropUSA. Through the acts of Hawley Troxell, ownership of CropUSA was vested and 
has remained vested in interested parties (including John Taylor), while the major 
creditor Reed Taylor and minority shareholders were Ieft with nothing. Despite Reed 
Taylor's demands that action should also be taken for the interests of the innocent 
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m i m o ~ v  sb~ebolders m d  creditors, E ~ w l e y  Troxell has refixed to take action md . 
inappropriately msisted the interested parties (inclu&g J o h  Taylor, Counie Taylor, 
Jmes  Beck and Michael Gasban). 
57. Despite Wawley Troxell having made several legal a r m e n t s  that lacked 
merig lacked good faith mdlor were not pounded in facts, Hawley Troxefl provided a 
settlement offer to Reed Taylor in Taylor v. AM Setvice4 ek nl., which included a 
provision that be release all. claims agaiast HawIey TroxeU as a condition of the 
seaement. The inclusion of such a provision was a violation of the Rdes of Professional 
Conduct md Hawley Troxell" duty of care. Hawley Troxell also refused to make any 
provisions for disinterested minority shareholders of AIA Services as requested by Reed 
Taylor. 
58. Hawley Troxell has assisted in the inappropriate acts of John Taylor and 
other interested parties in stopping all payments to Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor, Reed 
Taylor's former wife and the holder of all outstanding Prefened A Shares of AIA 
Services. Like Reed Taylor, Donna Taylor is required to be a member of the board of 
directors of AIA Services. Like Reed Taylor, Hawley Roxell has assisted John Taylor 
and other interested parties in preventing Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor from being 
members of the board of directors of AIA Services, which has further far reaching 
rmifications and results in additional damages against Hawley Troxell. 
59. With -full knowledge of AIA Services' obligations to ensure that Reed 
Taylor and Do- Taylor are members of AIA Services' board until they were paid in 
full, Hawley Troxell proceeded to attend and participate in inappropriate board meetings 
andlor take inappropriate action based upon board meetings held by interested directors 
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*&out Reed Taylor or Donna Taylor being present md  out provihg them with 
their kigl~? to be present, which hrther results ia a l l  such meekgs and decisions being 
null aiad void, md Hawley Troxell behg liable for the associated dmages for 
s u b s ~ ~ d l l y  p d c i p a k g  in such actioos. 
60. Hawley Troxell represented AZA Services and MA h u r m c e  in Mgation 
with the state of Idabo. The litiga~on was h d e d  by AZA Insurance by and through 
c o e s s i o n s  in which Reed Taylor held a security interest of which Hawley Troxell had 
Ml howledge. The litigation was resoIved, however, and instead of titling the 
$1,200,000 Mortgage that was received as settfement in the name of AJA Insurance, 
Hawley gkoxell titled the mortgage only in the name of AIA. Services in an inappropriate 
scheme to keep the mortgage fiom AIA Insurance and Reed Taylor (Reed Taylor is also 
entifled to possession of the Mortgage because it is a distribution from the The Universe, 
which is another subsidiary pledged to Reed Taylor). 
61. Wawley Troxell inappropriately purportedly represented AIA Services, 
AJA Insurance and CropUSA by drafting documents to assist in the inappropriate pledge 
of the $1,200,000 Mortgage to CropUSA to facilitate the payment of Hawley Troxell's 
services in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty of care, and ftte law. 
Hawley Troxell assisted and/or failed to prevent and/or not* disinterested parties or the 
Court that AIA Services had inappropriately pledged its sole remaining other significant 
asset, the $1,200,000 mortgage, to CropUSA to facilitate the payment of $500,000 for 
Hawley Troxell's services in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty of 
care, and the law. 
62. Hawley Troxell omitted and/or misrepresented material facts to the Court 
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Taylor. 
65. Hawley Troxell aasisted in happropriately Irmsfemng and ret 
funds, assets and propet-ty to CropUSA to d e h a d  A3Ld, Semices\cr&tor Reed Taylor 
(incluhg, without l f i % ~ o n ,  aver $95,000 owed by PaciEc Empire Radio Co~poration 
to ALA mce, assistmce in k m s f e f i g  shaves of the Pacific Empire R&&o 
Corpom~on to John Taylor, and f*g to collect the over $300,000 owed by John 
Taylor) by not reporting sucb acts to disiaterested p&es or other appropriate parties as 
required by the Rules of Professional Conduct md its duty of care. 
66. In April 2007, Hawley Troxell p e ~ a e d  andor assisted interested parties 
in holding a joint board meeting of AJA Services and AIA Lnsurance with fSl howledge 
that Reed Taylor and Doma Taylor were being intentionally denied their right to be on 
the board of AIA Services and p h c i p a k g  in sucb meetings (Donna Taylor has 
subordinated her right to payrnent in favor of Reed Taylor). At the meeting held in April 
2007, Hawley Troxell permitted and/or assisted John Taylor to appoint Connie Taylor 
and James Beck to the boards of AIA Services and AIA Insurance knowing that they 
were interested parties who AIA Services andor AIA Insurance should be pursuing 
claims against, that they inappropriately held shares in CropUSA., that they were 
inappropriately being paid $20,000 per year to attend the board meering of an insolvent 
corporation, and that they did not meet the required standards necessary to be members of 
such boards as set forth under the corporations' bylaws. 
67. Hawley Troxell inappropriatefy permitted andlor assisted two interested 
parties, Connie Taylor and J m e s  Beck, to approve andor consent to a Joint Retainer and 
Joint Defense Agreement with Hawley Troxell and ,others, which also facilitated the 
irtappropriate joint Legal representations of btereged p a i e s  with c o d i c h g  
heconcilabie interesls and the p a y e n t  of aMomeysY fees and costs to various attomeys 
ia violaeon of the Rdes of P~rofessional Conduct and its duty of case. 
68. - Hawley Traxell has been fdy  aware of Reed Taylor's rights to property 
ia which he held a s e c ~ w  interest and wrrs pledged to him as collateral. In fact, 
Defendmt Richard A. Riley represented A U  Services in the redemption of Reed 
Taylor's shares and the drafting of the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement 
md other applicable agreements. Wawley Troxell was responsible for issuing opinion 
letters relating to the transaction, which include various applicable representations and 
wmmties. Hawley TroxeU is now asserting arguments counter to the representations 
made in the opinion letter drafted by Hawley Troxell by and through Defendant Richard 
A. Riley. Hawley Troxell also assisted in the c o ~ s s i o n  of torts by John Taylor, 
CropUSA, and other interested parties by representing the corporations in various 
inappropriate transactions. 
69. Hawley Troxell also knew that the disinterested minority shareholders of 
ALA Services (innocent shareholders) were never advised of the significant claims 
against the interested parties (including John Taylor and CropUSA) and the sigaZicant 
misappropriation of the corporations' assets, but provided legal services on behalf of the 
interested parties and accepted payment from AIA Services and AIA Insurance. Ln 
connection with the payment of attorneys' fees and costs to other named parties in Taylor 
V. AM Services, el at., Hawley Troxell failed to obtain the necessary approvals &om Reed 
Taylor or other disinterested parties to the detriment of AIA Services, AIA Insurance 
andlor Reed Taylor. 
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70. Despite demands to the c , H M e y  Troxell conkued to take 
insWtJonr; and/or directives from the un~u&orized boards (or John Taylor) of 
Services andlor AZA Lnsmce  knavvirzg that the boards are not properly seated a d  are 
compked of bterested parties (incluhg John Taylor) with s i m c m t  claims that 
should be asserted against them ia violation ofthe Rdes oEProfessioasil Coaducg its duty 
of care, and/or the law. 
71. Hawley TroxeU is c o d ~ g  and has committed tortious acts in concert 
with other parties (including J o h  Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, 
JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, CropUSA, Clements Brown, Quarles Brady, and others) 
and/or pursuant to a common design or civil conspiracy with such other parties. 
72. Hawley Troxell h e w  that the conduct of other parties (including John 
Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashan,  JoLee Duclos, CropUSA, Bryan 
Freeman, Clements Brown, Quarles Brady and others) constituted breaches of duties 
and/or gave mbstantial assistance and/or encouragement to such other parties in 
breaching said duties. Hawley Troxell knew that it was purportedly using the normally 
lawful act of practicing law to com.mit and/or substantially assist others in conxnitting 
unlawfid acts. 
73. Hawley Troxell gave substantial assistance to other parties (including S o h  
Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Casban,  JoLee Duclos, CropUSA, Bryan 
Freeman, CIements Brown, Quarles Brady, and others) in committing and/or 
accomplishing tortious conduct and/or acts (including, without limitation, breaches of 
fiduciary duties, b u d ,  constructive fiaud, fraudulent conveyances, conversion, tortious 
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inee~erence, md ofher c l b s ) ,  and Hawley Troxell" conduct, sepmtely considered, 
condmtes the breaches of &Jes owed to Senices, Ah3 I-asurance, andlor Reed 
Taylor. 
74, Hawley Troxell conduct cons~btes  aiding and a b e h g  of other parties in 
ssion of .the torts mdor caused of a c ~ o n  dleged in this Camplh t  (iocludiag 
John Taylor, Connie Taylor, Jmes  Beck, Mchael Casban,  JoLee Duclos, CropUSsZ, 
Bryaa Freemm, Clemena Brom, Q w l e s  Brady, md others) and/or constitutes the 
conduct of a c a n ~ b u k g  to~easor ,  and such conduct has damaged AlA Services, AL4, 
hsurmce, and Reed Taylor. 
75. Hawley Troxell's conduct constitutes the c o d s s i o n  of civil conspiracy 
in the commission of the torts andlor causes of action alleged in this Complaint, 
including,  out l ~ t a t i o n ,  the conspkacy to jointly represent parties to commit torts as 
further evidenced by Joint Defense Agreements. 
76. The paragraphs in this Section are incorporated by ~eference into each 
cause of action below as necessary to support aiding and abetting and/or civil conspiracy 
of the torts and/or causes of action set forth below and/or contemplated in this Complaint. 
III. FYRST CAUSES OF A C ~ O I V S - - C O ~ H I O I V  
(Reed Taylor, A M  Services andlor ALA fnsurance's Causes of Actions) 
77. Reed Taylor has, and bas had during certain relevant time, a valid and 
perfected security interest in the cornmissions and related receivables of AIA Services 
and AIA Insurance and all proceeds relating to such security interests. Reed Taylor also 
has a security interest in all of the stock of AIA Insurance and the stock of al l  of AFA 
Services' other subsidiaries, including The Universe and all distributions and proceeds 
relating to such security interests (i.e., the $1.2 Million Lewis-Clark Mortgage). Hawley 
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Troxell bad full knowledge of Reed Taylor's security bterests in lfre foregoing property 
and such other propem reasonably co~itemplaied by the Redemption Agreements. 
78. By way of Reed Taylor's secusity interest in Alll hswmce's 
ssions, his security interest in ALA. Insurance's stock, md his asserted eon&ac.tual 
right to the possession and control of A.lA ance on Febmary 22, 2007, all of AfA 
h s u m c e "  revenues, assets, and iricome should be under i%e possession and control of 
Reed Taylor, inclu&g, without I~ ta t io rz ,  the $1.2 MilZion Mortgage, settlement 
proceeds in fbe a p p r o ~ a t e  arnounl: of $800,000, all b d s  and assets transferred or 
utilized in any way by CropUSA, and every doilar of revenue generated by ALA 
Insurance from all sources since February 22,2007. 
79. Reed is entitled to possession and contxol of all of the property to which he 
has a c o n k a c a  right, including, without limitation, the property indicated above and all 
other property contemplated in tbis Complaint through his security interest in the 
co&ssions and related receivables and the proceeds related thereto, security interests in 
the stock of all of AIA Services' subsidiaries and the distributions and proceeds related 
thereto, and through the security and related rights set forth in the Redemption 
Agreements. 
80. AU of Reed Taylor's security interests and possession rights can be traced 
through various sources lo ident-lfy d h d s  and assets that Hawley TroxeU has 
u n l a W l y  taken or assisted others in taking. Hawley Troxell has taken control of 
property, which Reed Taylor is entitled to possession and control, including without 
ljxnitation, all funds received for the payment of attomeysYees and costs in Taylor V. RL4 
Se~vices, ef al. and attorneys' fees and costs paid for other purported services. Hawley 
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TroxeXl exercised do n and control over assets (bcludkg the $3.2 Millrion 
Mortgage) mdlor funds (my b& received from MA Services or MA Insurance) in 
which Reed Taylor is entided to possession with full knodedge of Reed Taylor's 
possessav i&ts and s e c ~ v  interests, 
81. Wawley Troxell bas received substmtial paments believed .to exceed 
$500,000 for the p a p e n t  of aMomeysYees and costs, which such firads Hawley Troxell 
had no lawful right to possess or retain, W s  that Reed Taylor bad the legal right to 
possess, md  such h d s  were received in viola~on of the law, Rules of Professional 
Conduct Hawley Troxell's duty of care. Hawley Troxell also assisted in the inappropriate 
titling and pledging of a $1.2 man Mortgage owned by AIA Services to facilitate the 
payment of fuods to it, which such funds and the $1.2 Million Mortgage Reed Taylor was 
legally entitled to possess. Hawley TroxeII has also accepted the payment of services for 
attorneys' fees and costs rendered for CropUSA, which were paid by the money and/or 
assets mlawfUlly derived &om AIA Services and/or AL4 Insurance, which such money 
andor assets Reed Taylor held valid security interests. 
82. Hawley TroxeU's conduct constitutes the willful intedkrence with 
property and/or funds belonging to Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance; 
andor which such property andor funds should be under the possession and/or control of 
A M  Services, AL4 Insurance and/or Reed Taylor, as the person entitled to such money 
and property as a creditor and pledgee. Hawley Troxell intentionally deprived Reed 
Taylor, AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance of possession of such property andor funds. 
Despite demands, Hawley Troxell has refused to return such property and/or funds, and 
has unlawfhlly retained the property andor funds. 
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83.. As a direct mdor  proximate cause of Hawley Troxebf's acts mdlor 
olreissions (w&ch c o m ~ b t e  conversion), Reed Taylor has been dmaged jn aa mount to 
be proven at the time of trial or on 
84. Hawley Troxell has dso aided and abeQed andlor conspired with other 
parties in the conversion of propem that Reed Taylor is legally entiaed to possess mdor  
properfy to which ALA. Services mdor  AIA hswmce axe en~t ied  to possess (includiag, 
wi&out l&itatio.rr, h d s  paid to Bawley TroxeU, h d s  paid to Soha Taylor and other 
interested parties, the p l e d e g  of the $1.2 Million Modgee to CropUSA, and the $1.5 
Million u n l a w y  transferred to CropUSA). As a direct and/or proximate result of 
Hawley Troxell's aiding and abetting and/or civil conspiracy relating to the conversion of 
assets andlor funds that Reed Taylor, AIA Services, and/or AIA Insurance are legally 
entitled to possess, Reed Taylor, AIA Insurance, and/or AJA Services have been 
damaged in the amount to be proven at the time of trial or on smw judgment. 
IV. SECOm CAUSES OF rlCTION&TORmOUS m m B N C E  
(Reed Taylor, MA Sentices andlor A M  bsurance's Causes of Actions) 
85. Reed Taylor is a pa.rty to the Redemption Agreements. Hawley Troxell 
has fitll knowledge of the Redemption Agreements. Hawley TroxeU has intentionally 
interfered with Reed Taylor's contractual rights set forth in the Redemption Agreements 
causing breaches of the Redemption Agreements. Hawley TroxeUYs intentional 
interference, includes, but is not limited to, tortiously interfering with Reed Taylor's 
contractual rights to vote the shares of AIA Insurance, rights to possession of the 
commission collateral, right to be a member of the board of AIA Services, right to be an 
officer and director of AIA Insurance, right to possession and control of AL4 Insurance, 
other rights set forth In the Redemption Agreements, and rights set forth in the 
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Subordination Agreement with D o n a  Taylor. Also included in this cause of action me 
todous bterfereace claims based upon Hawley Troxell, John 'Tiqj4or, Connie Taylor, 
Jmes  Beck, asld other p&ies exceedkg .their a u & o ~ q  to act on bebaff of AIA Services 
85. Hawley Troxell has also aided and abe.tted andlor conspired with John 
Taylor, C ~ m i e  Taylor, J m e s  Beck, Rljchael Cashmm, J o k e  Duclos, Bryan Freeman, 
CropUSA andlor other parties in the tortious ia'terference of Reed TayIor's contractual 
rights, I-IawIey Troxell" acts andor omissions also constitute the aiding and abetting 
and/or civil, canspiracy with others in the tortious interference of Reed Taylor's 
cantsactual rights. 
87. As a direct andor proximate result of Hawley Troxell's acts and/or 
omissions, Reed Taylor has been damaged and is entitIed to damages in the mount to be 
dete&ed at the time of trial or on summary judgment. 
88. AIA Services is a party to John Taylor's Executive Officer's Agreement. 
Hawley Troxell has full knowledge of the Executive Officer's Agreement. Hawley 
Troxell has intentionally interfered with AIA Services' contractual rights set forth in the 
Executive Officer's Agreement causing breaches to the Executive Officer's Agreement. 
Hawley Troxell's intentional intederen~e, includes, but is not limited to, tortiously 
intedebg with AIA Services' contractual rights prevent John Taylor from transferring 
ALA Insurance's employees to CropUSA, rights to prevent John Taylor Erom competing 
against AIA Services or AIA Insurance through CropUSA, and rights to control John 
Taylor's compensation. A11 of these allegations have been repeatedly alleged by Reed 
Taylor throughout the course of Taylor v. AL4 Services, et a!. Also included in this cause 
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duties to Reed Taylor and caused Reed Taylor to incur dmages fiom the paments of 
a~omeysYees and costs m~d lost possession of propem and funds because of A U  
Insurance being w o n m y  .IlriWeld 60m Reed Taylor. As a result of Riley's acts 
andlor omjssions (wkch con&iate &and]!), Reed Taylor has been damaged in an mount 
to be proven at trial or on s m q  judmeat. 
93. Hawley Troxell owed Reed Taylor special duties as the secured cre&itor of 
MA Services, the sole pledgee of all of .the outstanding shares of ,4C4 Insurance, a stock 
pledgee in which Hawley Troxell knew had lawfully voted the shares of AIA Insurance, 
the only authorized officer and director of ALA Insurance, the holder of a security interest 
in all of the commissions and related receivables of AIA Senices and MA Insurance, the 
holder of a security interest in all of the shares of aU of AIA Services' other subsidiaries 
and all d~stributions related to the shares (ie., the $1.2 Million Mol-tgage and $800,000 
settlement), the most si&nrficant creditor of the insolvent AIA Services, and the only 
party entitled to the remaining assets of AIA Services and AIA Insurance. 
94. Hawley Troxell owed and owes duties to AIA Services and AIA Insurance 
to properly represent the best interests of the corporations and to not allow interested 
parties (including, without limitation, John Taylor) fiom talckg actions that are not in the 
best interests of the corporations, including, without lirnitation, unauthorized andor 
conflicted persons directing litigation, misappropriation and tortious transfer of assets and 
f h d s  to interested parties to the detriment of AIA Services and/or AL4 Insurance, to 
advise the Court and disinterested shareholders of the actions of John Taylor and other 
interested parties, and to not issue opinion letters to auditors andor other parties to assist 
in the commission of tortious conduct. Hawley TroxeU has breached its duties and acted 
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x-mlafilly (and all hpxoper and/or d a m  acts set fo& and/or contemplaled in tGs 
Gompl~tlt), m d  its conduct constimtes consmcljve &aud for which AIA Services nadlor 
lasurance me e n ~ a e d  to recover dmages to the mount to be proven at itd or on 
95, Hawley Troxell has also aided md abeaed and/or conspired .with John 
Taylor, Connie Taylor, J m e s  Beck, Michael C a s h = ,  JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, 
CropUSA m u o r  other parties in the c o e s s i o n  of fkaud and/or c o m c t i v e  h u d  and 
to olfierwise defkaud Reed Taylor, ALA Se+ces and/or ALA Insurance. As a direct 
and/or proximate result of Rawley Troxell's acts, Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or AIA 
Ius1xance have been damaged in. an mount  to be proven at the time of trial or on 
summary judgment. 
We F O m m  CAUSES OF A C n O N G m P W C m C E  
(Reed Tay1or;AI.A Services andlor MA Tnsurance's Causes of Actions) 
96. H~wley Troxell owed Reed Taylor a special attorney-client relationship 
for all of the reasons set forth in this Compl&t (including, without limitation, the 
.allegations contained in Reed Taylor's breach of fiduciary duty cause of action). From 
time to b e ,  Hawley Troxell has also possessed h d s  and/or property which it should 
have protected and safeguarded for Reed Taylor, but failed to da so. All of the foregoing 
results in the existence of duties on the part of Hawley Troxell owed to Reed Taylor, or at 
the minimurn, a special duty to ensure assets and h d s  are protected for the benefit of 
Reed Taylor in the event that he takes control and possession of AIA Insurance pursuant 
to his contractual rights (which such event could have happened at any time during 
Hawley Troxell's purported representation of AIA Services a d o r  AIA Insurance), 
97. Hawley Troxell's purported clients were trustees and/or fiduciaries 
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g senlllar knctions for a ~lon-cdienq Reed Taylor. &wley TroxeIl h e w  that its 
approplliate a c ~ o m  were necessw with respect to the representation of AL4 Services 
mdisr AlA laswmce to take action to prevent aadior recti@ the breaches of ficfuciq 
duties owed by ALCt Services and/or AlA Iasurmce to Reed Taylor when such breaches 
were c ~ e s  andlor f aud aadi'or Hawley Troxea assisted and/or are assishg in the 
breaches. Reed Taylor was not able to protect his rights because of Wawley TroxeIl's 
actjoas and Hawley TroxeU3s obligations to A M  Services andor AL4 hurance  would 
not be sipificmay impaired because the best interests of all the foregoing is to collect 
s w s  owed by others and recover damages for the Fmproper tortious conduct of others 
(inclu&ng, without limitation, John TayIor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, PYlichael 
Cashman, JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freernm, and CropUSA). 
98. Hawley Troxell breached its duties (including, without limitation, the duty 
of the standard of care) owed by it to Reed Taylor. As a direct andor proximate resdt of 
Hawley TroxeLl's failure to perform the duties owed to Reed Taylor, he was damaged in 
the amount to be proven at trial or on summary judgment. 
99. Defendant Riley owes Reed Taylor special duties by and through an 
opinion letter that was based upon Riley's personal knowledge, which M e r  hvokes 
personal liability to Riley. Riley breached his duties when he asserted that the transaction 
was illegal. Although Reed Taylor believes the transaction was legal and supported by 
applicable law, Riley's actions have breached his duties to Reed Taylor and caused Reed 
Taylor to incur damages for the payments of attorneys' fees and costs and lost revenues 
because of A .  Insurance being mongfirlly withheld from Reed Taylor. As a result of 
Riley's acts andor oroissions, Reed Taylor has been damaged in an amount to be proven 
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105. Reed Taylor, AIL% Senices and rxlswmce are all persons as defined 
by I.C. 48-602. Hawley Troxell's spurported practice of law constitutes services as 
deked  by I.C. f j  48-602. Reed Taylor, At4 Services and A M  Insurance have either 
pmchsed services directly &om Hawley Troxell, are known beneficiaries of services 
provided by Hawley TroxeU, and/or its attorneys are members of the Idaho State Bar 
&ou& which A M  Services, AIA Insurance and/or Reed Taylor has contracted for 
services through trade and comerce. 
106. By way of the attorneys caf Hawley Troxell's obligations to the Court and 
as members of the Idaho State Bar, they owe duties to their purported clients, 
beneficiaries of their services, and the adverse parties in litigation to comply with the 
Rules of Professional Conduct and the laws. Hawley Troxell has served only the 
interests of John Taylor, Connie Taylor, Michael Cashman, James Beck, JoLee Duclos, 
CropUSA and other interested parties-who Hawley TroxeU has not honestly represented 
to the Court and Hawley Troxell's beneficiary and/or adversary that Hawley Troxell was 
not complying with its obligations under the Rules of Professional Conduct or the law, to 
the detriment of Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance. Hawley Troxell's 
unlawful and inappropriate acts have a direct impact on consumers and the integrity of 
the legal system, and M e r  constitute unfair methods and practices and violations of LC. 
5 48-601, et seq. 
107. Hawley Troxell has falsely represented that it had approval from the Idaho 
State Bar and approval from authorized constituexlts to represent AIA Services and/or 
F %TION AND 
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Insurance, when ia fact it did mt have such au&ority in violation of LC. Ij 48- 
603(5). Hawley Troxell (hc luhg ,  vvi~out =tafion, Riley's services to Reed Taylor 
"ibrough an opinion letter with indjvidd responsibiliey) has falsely represented that its 
sefices have been provided to a particular standard when in fact its services have not 
met the appropriate standards (incluhg the standard of care) in violation of I.C. tj 48- 
603(7). Hawley TroxeU has fdsely disparaged the services of Reed Taylor's counsel in 
xsiolation of I.C. $ 48-603(8). Hawley Ttoxell has falsely represented that services were 
not needed (i.e., not making claims against John Taylar, Connie Taylor, James Beck, 
Michael Cashan,  CropUSA and others, when it h e w  such claims were warranted) in 
violation of 1.C- Ij 48-603(16). Hawley TroxeU has engaged in acts andlor practices that 
have been misleading to Reed Taylor, AIA Services and AL4 Insurance in violation of 
LC, fj  48-603(17), Based upon all of the allegations ia this Compl&$ Hawley Troxell 
has also violated other applicable provisions of I.C. 5 48-603 and/or I.C. $ 48-601, ef seq, 
108. Reed Taylor has purchased services and has lost property and/or money 
and has been damaged by the methods, practices and/or acts of Hawley Troxell declared 
unlav\rfirl by I.C. $48-60 1, et seg. 
109. AJA Services and/or AIA Insurance has purchased services and have lost 
property and/or money and has been damaged by the methods, practices and/or acts of 
Hawley Troxell declared unlawful by I.C. Zj 48-601, et seq. AIA Services and/or AIA 
Insurance is tequesting that all contracts for purported services provided by Hawley 
Troxell be declared void and that all h d s  and/or assets paid under such contracts be 
returned to AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance. 
110. Hawley Troxell knew or should have lcnown that its condrlct was 
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perpetuated directly and/or indireclly ag&sl Reed Taylor in viola~orz of I.C. $ 48-608, 
mcludhg, ~ t h o u t  I s t a ~ o n ,  for being an elderly person who has lost more &an 25% of 
his monMy income by way of Hawley Troxell's s la-  acts. 
11 I. Hawley Troxell's acts cons~b t e  violations of the Idaho Consmer 
Protecfrion Act, speciGcally, I.C. fi 48-601, et seq. Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or 
Ah% Insurance are entitled to damages, treble dmages, p ~ . t i v e  dmages, agomey" fees 
and costs and/or such other requested relief as a result of Hawley Troxell's violations and 
as avdable under I.C. fj 48-601, et seq. Hawley Troxell's violations or the un_laxhl acts 
of attorneys (including aMomeys as adversaries) are not any of the exceptions to I.C. 5 
48-601, ef seq. as set farth in LC. (j 48-605. 
VIIE. SIXTH CAUSES OF' ACTIORGBWACR OR F I D U W Y  DUTIES 
(Reed Taylor, AIA Semces andlor rill, Insurance's Causes of Action) 
112. Hawley Troxell owed Reed Taylor special duties as the secured creditor of 
Ah% Services, the sole pledgee of all of the outstanding shares of A.IA Insurance, a stock 
pledgee in which Hawley Troxell knew had IawEutly voted the shares of f d A  Insurance, 
the only authorized officer and director of AIA Inwance, the holder of a security interest 
in all of the c o ~ s s i o n s  and related receivables of A.IA Services and AIA fnsurance, the 
holder of a security interest in all of the shares of a l l  of ATA Services' other subsidiaries 
and all distributions related to the shares (i.e., the $1.2 Miliion Mortgage and $800,000 
settlement), the most significant creditor of the insolvent ALA Services, and the only 
party entitled to the remaining assets of AIA Services and AM Insurance. Based upon all 
of tbe foregoing and Hawley Troxell's possession of fuads and assets of AIA Services 
andlor AIA Insurance from time to time, Hawley Troxell owed a special fiduciary duty to 
safeguard the assets and funds of ALA Services and AIA Insurance. 
1 13. Hawley Troxell breached its fiduciw dulies owed to Reed Taylor. As a 
direct m a o r  proxkate result of Hawley TroxeUk breached fiduciary duties, Reed 
Taylor has been dmaged in an mount to be proven at the b e  oftr id or on s m a f y  
judmeat. 
114, Hawley Troxell, John Taylor, Coanie Taylor, James Beck, JoLee Duclos 
and Bryan Freemm owed andlor owe fiduciary duties to AlA Services andlor AIA 
lnswance and to Reed Taylor as the only significant secured creditor of the insolvent 
AIA Services and as the pledgee of all the outstanding shares of AIA Insurance (and the 
persol1 who voted the shares). Hawley Troxell has substantially assisted other parties in 
breaching the Bylaws of AfA Services and/or AIA Insurance. J o h  Taylor owed and/or 
owes fiduciary duties to Reed Taylor by way of being Reed Taylor's brother. The 
fiduciary duties owed and breached include, but are not limited to, the duty of loyalty, 
duty of care and duty to deal in good faith. 
115. Hawley TroxeU had f i l l  knowledge of all of the fiduciary duties owed to 
Reed Taylor, AIA Services andfor AIA Insurance. The fiduciary duties owed to Reed 
Taylor, AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance include (but are not limited to), the 
obligation to safeguard AIA Services and APA Insurance's assets and business 
relationships and to recover fuads and assets unlawhlly transferred £iom AIA Services or 
ALA Insurance. 
116. Hawley Troxell, John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, JoLee Duclos 
and Bryan Freeman breached their fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor, AJA Services 
and/or AIA Insurance; and Hawley Troxell knew that. the foregoing parties' conduct 
constituted the breach of fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor, Ah% Services andor AIA 
& X % m B  Ei)%Mrs-fib~~o~ AND 
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Insurmce. 'Rese breached fiduciary duties axe ongohg and Hawley Troxell ~ E E  
substm~dly assisted and/or encouraged the foregoing, parties in the c 
breaching their Sir9uciary duties owed to Reed Taylor, AIL% Services andlor AM 
h m m c e .  Hawley Troxell also conhues to m b s m ~ d l y  assist m a o r  encowage the 
foregoing p d e s  in breachg their f i duc iq  duties owed to Reed Taylor, AJA Services 
and/or Insurance. 
117. Wawley TroxeU's acts and conduct has damaged Reed Taylor, AIA 
Services and/or A.W Insurance in m amount to be proven at trial or on s m a r y  
judgment by aiding and abetting and/or substmtially assisting others (including John 
Taylor and CrwpUSA) through a civil conspiracy in the commission of breaches of 
fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor, AIA. Services and/or ALA. Insurance. 
118. Defendant Riley owes Reed Taylor special duties by and through an 
opinion letter that was based upon Riley's personal knowledge, which M e r  invokes 
personal liability to Riley. Riley breached his duties when he asserted that the transaction 
was illegal. Although Reed Taylor believes the transaction was legal and supported by 
applicable law, Riley's actions have breached bis duties to Reed Taylor aad caused Reed 
Taylor to incur damages for the payments of attorneys'fees and costs and lost revenues 
because of AIA Insurance being \wongfUIly withheld from Reed Taylor. As a result of 
Riley's acts and/or omissions, Reed Taylor has been damaged in an amount to be proven 
at trial or on stmunary judgment. 
DL S E W M  CAUSES Or AmON-EXCESSIVE COWENSAmONT\;VASTE 
(Reed Taylor, ATA Services andlor ALti hsurance's Causes of Actions) 
119. Hawley Troxell has known that AIA Services is insolvent and ALZ 
Insurance is pledged to Reed Taylor as collateral. Hawley Troxell has k n o w  that MA 
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bur rnee  is a wholly owned subsidiary ofthe &olveut Services. Hawley Troxelll 
bas h o w  that Inswmce% business is in the hat years of existence md &at its 
ssions are d ~ d l k g  as new health policies have not been issued for years. 
120. Hawley 'rroxell has aided and abeged andlor conspired with John Taylor, 
Caivlie Taylor, J m e s  Beck, and o.t;hers to pay excessive cornpensarion for sdaries aad 
fees for pqorlledly being oEcers andor directors of AIA Services and AXA Insurance, 
HawIey Troxell bas aided and abetted andlor conspired wifh John Taylor, Connie Taylor, 
Jmes  Beck, Michael C a s h a n  and others to waste the remaining assets of AIA Services 
and/or M A  Insurance. MI the while Hawley Troxell has known of Reed Taylor's rights 
and AIA Se~ces%solvency. Hawley Troxell had fdl knowledge that John Taylor and 
o&er directors and officers compensation was required to be set by the lawful board of 
directors of AIA Services and/or AIA Insurmce, but substantially assisted John Taylor 
and others in obtaining inappropriate compensation. 
121. Hawley Troxell's acts and conduct has damaged Reed Taylor, AIA 
Services andor AIA Insurance in an amount to be proven at trial or on summary 
judgmentby aiding and abetting and/or substantially assisting others (including, without 
limitation, John Taylor, Connie Taylor and James Beck) through a civil conspiracy in the 
payment of excessive compensation. 
X DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
1. Reed Taylor demands a trial by jury of not less than twelve (12) on alI 
claims and damages so triable. 
XI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
%%EREFORE, Reed Taylor prays for the following relief 
PER@& S F ~ ~ T I O N  A D 
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1. For a judgment ag Hawley TroxeU, joirnt'l-g. and ssverdy, for 
$10,500,000 in dmages ($3,500,009 in actual d a a g e s  md $7,000,000 in treble 
dmages), the exact mount of which will be proven at trial, mcllor on s m a t y  
judment, plus an award of pre-judment and post-judment interest; 
2. For a judgment again& Hawley Troxell, jointly and severally, for treble 
dmages of $7,000,000, the exact m o m t  to be proven at trial pussuant to I.C. Fj 48- 
3. For a judgment r e q d g  the disgorgemeat of the payments of all 
attomeysyees and costs paid to Hawley Troxell by AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance; 
4. For judgment ag&st Hawley Troxell, jointly and severally, for additional 
damages as provided under I.C. 5 48-608; 
5. For such other relief as may be available to Reed Taylor pursuant to I.C. 5 
48-601, et seq. or the law, ineluhg,  without limitation, obtdning a preliminary 
injunction to restrain Hawley TroxeU fiom undertaking further representation; 
6. For an award of attorneys fees and costs incurred in this action pursuant to 
Idaho Law, including, without limitation, LC. 5 48-608, I.C. 5 12-120 andlor I.C. Fj 12- 
121; and 
7. For such other relief as the Court deems just and equitable. 
DATED this - day of October, 2008. 
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC 
By: 
Michael S. Bissell 
Attorneys for Reed Taylor 
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STATE OF D M O  1 
j ss. 
I, Reed J. Taylor, bekg f i rs t  ddy  sworn on o~th ,  deposes and says: 
I am the pl&mia the above-en~tled action. 1 have read the contents of th is First 
Amended C o m p l ~ c  know the contents of this First Amended Complaint, and believe 
that the facts in Illis First ADlended Complht are true and accmate to the best of my 
knowledge and belief. 
Reed J. Taylor 
S m S C D E D  AND SWO'RN to before me this d a y  of October, 2008. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at: 
My commission expires: 
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